EU Report and Zambia’s Selective Outrage

🇿🇲 INSIGHT | EU Report and Zambia’s Selective Outrage

The European Union has spoken, and Zambia’s political camps are once again divided over what its election observers have found. Opposition figures associated with the former Patriotic Front, Tonse Alliance and NRPUP are celebrating the EU’s criticism of the August 2026 elections.

Across the divide, UPND-aligned communicators are challenging the report, while the Government questions aspects of its findings. It is a familiar political spectacle: the credibility of an international observer appears to rise or fall depending on which party occupies State House.

But the EU did not begin observing Zambian elections in August 2026. Ten years ago, when Edgar Lungu defeated Hakainde Hichilema, its mission documented systematic bias in state media, restrictions on opposition campaigning, electoral violence and weaknesses in results management. The mission’s chief observer, Cécile Kyenge, stated: “News coverage of the state broadcaster was biased in favour of the PF and largely excluded other parties, or only reported other parties negatively.” The EU issued 33 recommendations following that election. The same institution now being celebrated by sections of the opposition was raising uncomfortable questions when the PF governed Zambia.

The 2016 report went further. Although observers described the elections as highly competitive and largely professionally prepared, they criticised the slow announcement of results and the Constitutional Court’s handling of Hichilema’s presidential petition. The court, according to the mission, failed to provide sufficiently clear and timely guidance on the petition process. That was not a minor observation. It concerned the constitutional mechanism through which a losing presidential candidate could challenge an election. Nevertheless, Lungu remained President, and the country’s institutions continued functioning amid intense political disagreement.

Five years later, the EU returned for the August 2021 elections. Hichilema defeated Lungu, ending ten years of PF rule. Once again, observers recognised that voting had generally been competently administered, but criticised unequal campaign conditions, restrictions on political freedoms and advantages enjoyed by the incumbent. The final report contained 22 recommendations, six classified as priorities. Among them were the repeal of the Public Order Act, legislation on political financing and the removal of undue campaign privileges enjoyed by the President and Vice-President.

One finding from 2021 deserves particular attention. Of the 33 recommendations made after the 2016 elections, only seven had been fully or partially implemented. Just one had been fully adopted. That means Zambia entered another general election with most of the earlier concerns unresolved. The problem was not simply the identity of the President. It was the failure of successive political administrations to undertake reforms that could outlive their own terms in office.

Now consider 2026. The EU’s latest report acknowledges that the Electoral Commission of Zambia was generally well prepared, that voters had a competitive choice and that polling day was largely calm. But it also documents an unequal campaign environment, police bias, advantages associated with incumbency and serious shortcomings during results tabulation. Following the ECZ’s six-hour suspension of counting and results announcements on 14 August, observers reported deteriorating procedures and reduced transparency. The Commission’s failure to make complete polling-station results publicly available compounded those concerns.

The numbers are equally revealing. According to the EU mission’s media monitoring, the ruling UPND received 96.2 percent of the monitored airtime on ZNBC Television and 90.5 percent on ZNBC Radio. Women accounted for only nine percent of candidates across the elections. The mission also raised concerns over opposition arrests, security operations and the temporary closure of courts during the presidential election-petition period. It has issued 13 recommendations, eight of them priorities.

These are substantive findings that cannot be answered simply by accusing observers of misunderstanding Zambia.

President Hichilema subsequently received Chief Observer Michael McNamara and members of the EU delegation at State House. He thanked them for their observations and recommendations, and acknowledged the congratulations conveyed on his re-election.

Government, through Chief Spokesperson Elvis Nkandu, has nevertheless challenged aspects of the report, arguing that observers did not sufficiently consider Zambia’s constitutional history, institutional circumstances and security concerns. These positions are not necessarily contradictory. A President can welcome an international delegation while his Government disputes particular conclusions. The real test is whether the administration addresses the documented problems.

Opposition faces an equally uncomfortable question. When the EU criticised the PF’s handling of the 2016 and 2021 elections, its observations were available for public scrutiny. Today, political figures emerging from that same PF establishment are invoking the EU’s authority against the UPND. Criticism of the current Government is legitimate, but so is scrutiny of the opposition’s own record.

Those who now demand complete respect for observer findings should explain how they responded when similar criticisms concerned their administration. The same standard must apply whether the ruling party is PF or UPND.

There is also a distinction between identifying electoral irregularities and establishing that an election was stolen. The EU’s 2026 report raises serious questions about transparency, campaign fairness and the post-election environment. It does not establish that Brian Mundubile won the presidential election. Zambia must be capable of examining procedural failures without automatically converting every criticism into evidence of a different electoral outcome. Otherwise, observation reports become instruments of partisan mobilisation rather than foundations for institutional reform.

A broader question concerns Africa’s relationship with international election observers. The EU deployed 124 observers to Zambia in 2016 and approximately 100 in 2026, both following invitations from Zambian authorities. European elections also undergo international observation, including through the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe.

But where are the comparable African Union missions independently examining elections in France and other major European democracies? Why is the movement of electoral scrutiny between Africa and Europe so visibly unequal? These questions deserve examination, not because African elections should escape scrutiny, but because democratic accountability should never be understood as a responsibility belonging to one continent alone.

Ultimately, Zambia’s electoral weaknesses will not disappear merely because a different party wins State House. In 2016, the EU wanted ZNBC transformed into an independent public-service broadcaster. A decade later, it is still calling for essentially the same reform. The names of presidents have changed, but the institutional questions remain.

If Zambia’s political actors continue celebrating observer reports only when they embarrass their opponents, another election will come and another report will be written. The more consequential question is whether Zambians can demand the same democratic standards from every government, including the one they support.

The People’s Brief | Ollus R. Ndomu

4 November 2026