Thabo Kawana, Civil Service Neutrality, and Zambia’s 2026 Election
Professor Namukolo Miyanda, Pan-Africanist and Governance Expert
10th July 2026
If the statements attributed to Mr. Thabo Kawana, Permanent Secretary for the Ministry of Information and Media, are accurate — namely, that “if the court also fails to make a decision soon over the nomination petitions against Hakainde Hichilema, then the UPND will have no choice but postpone the elections to 2031 to allow the court cases resolved” and that “it’s better to hand over power to Zambia Army not Brian Mundubile” — then Mr. Kawana must be confronted by the Law Association of Zambia, the Secretary to the Cabinet, and the Electoral Commission of Zambia on the alleged remarks. Such conduct, if verified, stands in direct breach of the Constitution of Zambia, the Electoral Process Act No. 35 of 2016, the Penal Code, and the Public Service Code of Ethics.
The Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 2 of 2016 leaves no ambiguity on the transfer of executive power. Article 105(1) provides that “The President-elect shall assume office after being sworn in by the Chief Justice or, in the absence of the Chief Justice, the Deputy Chief Justice”. Article 105(2) fixes the timing: the President-elect “shall be sworn into office on the Tuesday following — (a) the seventh day after the date of the declaration of the presidential election results, if no petition has been filed… or (b) the seventh day after the date on which the Constitutional Court declares the election to be valid”. Where disputes arise, Article 104(3) is explicit that “Where an election petition is filed against the incumbent… or an election is nullified… the Speaker shall perform the executive functions, except the power to — (a) make an appointment; or (b) dissolve the National Assembly”. No provision contemplates a handover to the Zambia Army. Article 91 vests executive authority in the President, and Articles 103 to 105 exhaustively prescribe the lawful transition. Article 91 matters because it establishes that executive power belongs to the President alone and is exercised directly or through appointed public officers subject to the Constitution.
It creates no room for military custodianship and it confines civil servants to delegated authority. A Permanent Secretary therefore has no constitutional competence to declare, suggest, or endorse an alternative transfer of power. The Electoral Process Act No. 35 of 2016 reinforces this framework. Section 3 sets out principles of the electoral system, including “transparent and credible electoral process” and “timely resolution of electoral disputes”. Section 81 of the same Act criminalises bribery and corrupt practices in connection with elections, reflecting Parliament’s intent to insulate the electoral process from unlawful influence. Any public assertion by a senior civil servant that military custodianship is an option or that elections can be postponed to 2031 outside constitutional procedure contradicts the supreme law and undermines public trust in the electoral architecture.
The Public Service Code of Ethics binds all civil servants to political neutrality. It requires that officers “serve the Government of the day, whatever its political persuasion, to the best of his/her ability in a way that maintains political impartiality” and “not act in a way that is determined by political considerations, or use official resources for political purposes”. Personal political views must not “determine any advice he/she gives or action taken”. This principle has been enforced by successive Secretaries to the Cabinet. In 2014, Secretary to the Cabinet Roland Msiska warned public servants to “desist from engaging themselves in political activities” and that non-compliance “constitutes misconduct which shall result in disciplinary action” (Times of Zambia, 2014). In May 2026, Secretary to the Cabinet Patrick Kangwa directed disciplinary action against officers who “violated the Public Service Code of Ethics by remaining in government posts while participating in politics” (ZANIS, 2026). Article 186 of the Constitution has been publicly invoked as the basis for civil service political neutrality. The Electoral Process Act further prescribes an Electoral Code of Conduct to govern conduct during elections. If Mr. Kawana is commenting on electoral litigation, campaign dynamics, and extra-constitutional transitions, he is engaging in partisan discourse incompatible with his office and with the Code of Conduct made under the Act.
Such statements also raise concerns under the Penal Code, Chapter 87 of the Laws of Zambia. Section 60(1) defines seditious intention to include an intention “to bring into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection against the Government as by law established” or “to incite resistance… to any law or the administration thereof”. Section 57 criminalises the utterance of seditious words or acts done with seditious intention. Disaffection matters here because it strikes at the legitimacy of constitutional authority itself. When a senior civil servant suggests that elections can be deferred to 2031 or that power should pass to the military, the statement does not merely criticise policy; it invites the public to doubt the binding force of Articles 103 to 105 and to withhold loyalty from the lawful electoral process. That erosion of public allegiance to constitutional procedure is what the law on sedition seeks to prevent.
Pronouncements that elections may be postponed to 2031 outside the framework of Articles 103 to 105, or that power will be surrendered to the military rather than a President-elect, are capable of exciting disaffection and inciting resistance to electoral law. Sections 48, 49, and 50 further proscribe incitement to mutiny or disobedience within the defence and security services. While section 58 requires the written consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions for prosecution, the threshold for inquiry is met where a senior public officer makes claims that contradict constitutional procedure.
The Law Association of Zambia Act, Chapter 31 of the Laws of Zambia, establishes LAZ to promote constitutionalism and the rule of law. Pursuant to its statutory objects, LAZ has standing to petition the Constitutional Court for interpretation of constitutional questions, as it did in Law Association of Zambia v Attorney General (2014) and Law Association of Zambia and Chapter One Foundation Limited v Attorney General 2019/CCZ/0013/0014. The Constitutional Court Act No. 8 of 2016 confers jurisdiction to determine such matters. Section 28 of the Constitutional Court Act empowers the Court to make a declaratory order on any question of constitutional interpretation. Section 28 matters because it provides the legal mechanism for LAZ, or any person with sufficient interest, to challenge extra-constitutional pronouncements before the final arbiter. If a Permanent Secretary publicly advances a “military handover” or “postponement to 2031” contrary to Articles 91, 103 to 105, and 186, LAZ can invoke Section 28 to seek a declaration that such a position is unconstitutional and that the only lawful transition is the one prescribed by the Constitution.
Section 32 of the same Act then binds all persons and State organs to that declaration. The Electoral Commission of Zambia, empowered under section 4 of the Electoral Process Act to administer and enforce the Act, also has a direct interest in statements that threaten the credibility and timing of elections. If Mr. Kawana’s reported remarks are verified, LAZ, the Secretary to the Cabinet, and the Electoral Commission of Zambia are duty-bound to confront the issue and seek declaratory relief or administrative action. Precedent demonstrates that civil servants who breach impartiality face removal for gross misconduct.
Democracy requires that state officers confine themselves to administration. The Constitution does not empower the executive to postpone elections to 2031 because petitions are pending. Articles 103 to 105 set the timeline, and the Speaker acts where necessary. Fresh elections, if ordered, must be held within thirty days of nullification.
Public statements that pre-empt judicial outcomes or propose military intervention depress turnout and fall within the ambit of seditious intention under section 60 of the Penal Code. Thabo Kawana should stay away from politics and concentrate on civil service work as prescribed by procedure, practice, and the Constitution of Zambia. With 34 days remaining to 13th August 2026, the lawful path is clear: votes are cast, results are declared, and the President-elect is sworn in by the Chief Justice. Any suggestion otherwise is vexatious, superfluous, unlawful, and antithetical to constitutionalism.