COMMENTARY | Increase MP Seats But Main By-elections
Bill 7 has now returned to Parliament and the debate has entered its decisive phase. Among its thirteen clauses, none strikes at the architecture of representation more directly than the proposal that allows political parties to replace an MP without a by election. It reads like a technical fix. In reality it rewires the relationship between voters, parties and Parliament. It shifts power from the constituency to the secretariat. It is a quiet revolution dressed as administrative reform.
Today, an MP sits in the House because citizens placed a mark on a ballot paper. The party sponsors the candidate, but the mandate flows from the voters of that constituency. A vacancy triggers a return to the people because the seat belongs to them. Bill 7 alters this logic. Under its current wording, a party simply selects a replacement and notifies the Electoral Commission. No campaign. No public scrutiny. No renewed mandate. The people watch decisions being made in rooms they cannot enter.
In a political culture where MPs already fear party censure more than electoral punishment, this is not cosmetic. It institutionalises loyalty to party leaders above loyalty to the constituency. An MP who challenges internal wrongdoing or votes with conscience risks swift expulsion followed by an effortless replacement. No sunlight. No contest. A single letter becomes the instrument that decides who speaks in the House. Power shifts upward from the community to the party centre.
Supporters are correct to argue that by elections are expensive. Treasury loses money. Tensions can rise. Turnout is usually low. These concerns are valid. But democracies pay for accountability. The ballot is not a financial burden; it is a safeguard. By-elections send political signals. They correct arrogance. They reveal shifts in public confidence before a general election. Removing them may reduce costs for the Treasury, while creating deeper costs for citizen oversight.
Everything also depends on internal party democracy. For this clause to work credibly, parties would need transparent rules for selecting replacement MPs. Zambia’s record is uneven. Adoption processes often reflect factional interests, personal networks and financial muscle. Concentrating all powers in the same structures hands more leverage to those at the centre of party politics.
Constituencies risk becoming rewards in internal fights rather than communities with a voice.
Comparative experience shows caution. In proportional representation systems, party lists determine who enters Parliament after a vacancy, but those systems are built around strong institutional checks, ideological programmes and internal discipline. Zambia is not built that way. The country runs on personality heavy politics and fluctuating alliances. Giving parties unilateral control over replacements without corresponding reforms in transparency, oversight and governance creates a structural tilt against accountability.
If Parliament passes this provision in its present form, citizens must understand the trade off. Zambia will have fewer by elections and lower short term costs. The price will be a shift in power from voters to party secretariats, weaker direct links between MPs and their communities, and a Parliament more sensitive to internal party pressure than public opinion. It strengthens the centre and weakens the citizen.
Editorial Note: This commentary offers independent analysis based on the published text of Bill 7. It does not endorse or oppose any political actor. Its purpose is to clarify how proposed clauses may alter the balance of authority between voters, parties and Parliament.
© The People’s Brief | Ollus R. Ndomu