MY SUBMISSION TO THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS- Chilufya Tayali

By Chilufya Tayali

MY SUBMISSION TO THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS
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PREABLE
Firstly, I wish to differ with those protesting against the Technical Committee on Constitutional Amendments (TCCA), alleging that it is unconstitutional. In my view, the Technical Committee is properly established under our Constitution.

Those opposing the Committee appear to be doing so frivolously. Initially, they objected when the constitutional amendment process was initiated through Parliament. The President then responded to their concerns by appointing the Technical Committee, yet the same individuals continue to oppose the process. I find this retrogressive, and I believe it should not be entertained by well-meaning Zambians

We urgently need constitutional amendments, especially considering how long this process has been ongoing, even dating back to the failure of Bill 10 during the Patriotic Front administration.

As a citizen and as President of the Economic and Equity Party, I fully support the appointment of the Technical Committee and the work they are doing. I am therefore pleased to make the following submissions:

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1. PRESIDENTIAL TERM LIMIT
The current Constitution provides that a President may serve two consecutive terms of five years each. I propose that this clause be removed, allowing an individual to contest for President without a term limit, but still subject to elections every five years.

My reasoning is as follows:

• If a President is not performing, the people will naturally vote him or her out.

• If the President is performing well, he or she should be allowed to continue serving, rather than being restricted by an artificial two-term limit.

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2. RUNNING MATE CLAUSE

I propose that the running mate clause be removed. From experience, the running mate is not directly elected by the people, yet may assume the presidency if the elected President is unable to serve. The running mate’s position is dependent on the popularity of the presidential candidate, not their own mandate.
Instead, I propose that:

• The Vice President should be appointed by the President.

• Should the President be unable to complete the term, the appointed Vice President should assume office, since even the running mate is effectively chosen by the President.

• Alternatively, the country may return to elections. While costly, this option is preferable to having a President who was not directly elected by the people.

We have seen in other countries how difficult it becomes when the Vice President differs with the President. Because both enjoy constitutionally protected tenure, it creates administrative paralysis. Removing the running mate clause would help prevent such situations.

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3. VOTE OF NO CONFIDENCE IN THE PRESIDENT

I propose the introduction of a mechanism allowing Parliament to pass a vote of no confidence in the President by a two-thirds majority

This would ensure that:

• A President remains accountable for the promises made to the electorate;

• If a President fails to deliver, Parliament may trigger a national election;

• If a President performs well, he or she may continue serving without the limitations of a term cap.

In the event that the President is removed through such a vote, I propose that the Chief Justice assume office on an interim basis before the next elected President takes over.

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4. PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION FOR MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT

While maintaining the requirement that the President be elected by a 50% + 1 majority, I propose that Members of Parliament be elected through a system of proportional representation based on the total votes each political party receives.

I further propose that political parties be required to consider:

• Gender balance, and

• Representation of persons with disabilities,
according to prescribed percentages, when nominating candidates to Parliament.

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5. INCREASING PRESIDENTIAL NOMINATIONS TO PARLIAMENT TO 20

To enhance inclusivity in Parliament, particularly regarding regional balance, youth representation, persons with disabilities, and women, I propose increasing the number of presidential nominations from 8 to 20.

This would give the President more latitude to ensure national diversity and representation, especially in regions where the ruling party may not have performed well electorally

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6. PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS ON NATIONAL VALUES AND PRINCIPLES

I propose that the annual Presidential Address to Parliament on National Values and Principles be scrapped.

Instead, the President should have a designated day each year, preferably towards the end of the parliamentary calendar, to appear before Parliament and respond to questions directly related to the deliverables outlined during the official opening of Parliament.

This approach will promote transparency, accountability, and direct engagement with elected representatives.

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7. INDEPENDENT MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT

Article 51(a) currently requires that independent candidates must not have been members of a political party for at least two months before the general elections.

I propose that this period be extended to six months.
This requirement should also apply to civil servants wishing to run for office. They should be required to resign at least six months before the election date. This ensures fairness, transparency, and adequate preparation for all candidates.

https://youtu.be/yiecXDxJ2Yo?si=mpemCDLMQ9Dgvoer

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8. CONSTITUTIONAL COURT STRUCTURE

The Constitution currently establishes the Constitutional Court as the final court for constitutional matters.

I propose the creation of a subordinate constitutional court to hear constitutional cases at first instance before they proceed to the Constitutional Court.

This would:
• Improve judicial efficiency,

• Reduce the burden on the Constitutional Court, and

• Ensure that constitutional questions receive thorough and structured preliminary consideration.