Called Out Of Retirement.
On 3rd March 1997 Francis Kaunda (going forward shall be called Francis,to avoid confusion with the former president, also, no relation) a phone call came through, from Minister of finance & Econ Development, Ronald Penza “ I am the bearer of a message from the president, and it is of an urgent nature.” 5 days later sitting across the table was president Chiluba, “can you help us with the privatisation of ZCCM.” A note of hesitation, which Francis, attributes to hostility directed at him by a clique within government which led to his early retirement in 1991. Francis said “yes.”

Less than a week after this meeting on 11th March 1997, Penza called Francis and informed him that he had been appointed Chairman of The Government of the Republic of Zambia/ZCCM Privatisation Negotiation Team (PNT going forward) effective immediately. The major inducement for this appointment was obviously Francis’ privileged knowledge about ZCCM assets and nearly 2 decades of experience, dealing with some of the biggest players, in the world copper mining industry. The appointment was totally unexpected as the manner of his forced retirement resulted from political changes, in euphoria that was dubbed the winds of change from the Soviet Union, and other socialist leaning states in the world. Executives in parastatal firms were seen as a close appendage of the political leadership. The view was that, Francis and Co could not be trusted by the new government, because of their perceived umbilical ties to the vanquished UNIP government.

Let The Games Begin

Although the privatisation programme in Zambia began with the passing of the Privatisation Act 1992, ZCCM sale did not kick off till 1996. There was a decision by the MMD government, to retain 2 firms from the UK to advise on mode of sale. NM Rothschild as financial advisers, and Clifford Chance as legal advisers.They advised in favour of unbundling based on their initial work. Even at the early stages, the process was not without controversy, acrimony and accusations, at every stage of every unit of ZCCM. The recommendation finally found full acceptance, and govt keeping in line with the new legislation, the Zambia Privatisation Agency (ZPA) was directed to proceed with the sale of units.

The process started with ZPA putting out a tender for pre-qualification, interested firms that qualified were then asked to make bids. ZPA received these on 28 Feb 1997. At a briefing at ZPA, PNT was to act as an agent of ZPA, not independent of it. ZPA CEO at the time was Valentine Chitalu, and CFA from NM Rothschild Charles Mercy, duly gave the briefing. Francis’ first involvement in the privatisation process was through a ZCCM board meeting on 23rd March 1997. NM Rothschild and Clifford Chance tabled the bids received on Feb 28 1997.

In tabling these bids, they advised the board that there were Preferred Bidders, without elaborating the justification of selecting them as such. At the same meeting, the advisers curiously tabled a resolution for voluntary liquidation of ZCCM. (what the fk??) There was great consternation among board members representing the Zambian government, Chairman of the board then Luke Mwananshiku argued. He did not see the link between tabling bids and liquidating ZCCM. The motion of liquidating was basically terminating the lifeblood of Zambia itself, which would result in social and political upheaval. When the recommendation was neither seconded nor followed up, the Zambian team dismissed the motion as an attempt at arm twisting. This sort of charade was a precursor to the character negotiations for sale of ZCCM’s premier mining assets. A group known as the Kafue Consortium (going forward, we shall call them KC), shortly after submitting their bid was to claim deterioration of assets and lowered their cash consideration as much as $100m. This matter was the first Francis had to deal with as Chairman of the PNT. (More on this later). The decision to privatize ZCCM came largely as one aspect of reform under the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). The previous government had also realised privatisation of mining operation was inevitable. The idea entertained by KK’s government, was to allow ZCCM continue operating as a state owned firm, complemented by private companies to be issued licenses for new exploration and exploitation of minerals. Similar to the Chilean model where the state runs Codelco, but new mining development are given to investors. (Elite Mentality) It was greatly acknowledged that privatisation was the greater part of Zambia’s economic reform. The first step taken was to contract German consultants Kienbaum, to study and recommend a mode of privatising ZCCM. It was this report in mid 1994 that recommended ZCCM be broken up into 5 units before privatisation. While all this was going on ZCCM was hurtling towards decline. Nearly everyone who cared to look could see the country’s economic future dissolving before their very eyes. The Kienbaum report was made public in September 1994, and all indications were it was never going to be a genteel affair. The government indicated it’s disagreement with the Kienbaum report, and its major reason was that the various divisions would make other divisions less attractive assets, and they’d be mass redundancies in those divisions. The stated practice of voicing decent was within govt itself, however, deputy Minister of Mines, Dr Mathias Mpande, took every opportunity to state publicly that the Kienbaum report made more sense. His reason was that no single investor could be found to come up with $3 billion, which was the estimated cost of rehabilitation and required investment. Dr Mpande was in tandem with the report, that breaking ZCCM down to 5 units would optimize investment in the industry. He found a sympathetic ear in the local media, however, Dr Mpande and another Deputy Minister Ackson Sejani were, shortly after that, dismissed from government. As the debate raged a picture had been painted that some ministers were trading information to potential investors for personal gain. This suspicion endured throughout the privatisation process. The Kienbaum report saw a quick demise, as the government threw it out in October 1994. While this was going on, the Zambian economy was on its knees, government was failing to keep ZCCM afloat, president Chiluba accused donors of shifting goal posts when Zambia moved closer to fulfilling conditions for aid. Out of the 100 firms privatised by December 1994, cabinet only sanctioned selling shares to the public in 30 companies. Out of these only Chilanga Cement, Zambia Sugar, and Zambia Breweries were sold to the public. Still, by Jan 1995 the privatisation of ZCCM was in uncertain waters. While this sideshow was on, by March 1996, ZCCM was diagnosed to be in need of $2billion to avoid complete collapse. “People should not fear that when foreign investors take over running of ZCCM they would externalize the money, Zambia will benefit from taxes paid” Ronald Penza. (Minister Of Finance at the time). At this time all contributions to the debate in the media, appeared to agree that the decision to unbundle ZCCM was the right one. Still some minor disagreement on how to do it. This new public awareness, helped the government save face and retreat from its earlier position of selling ZCCM as a single unit. It later approved the report by NM Rothschild to unbundle. By July 1996 tenders were expected to be initiated. ZCCM board tabled proposals for privatisation in 2 stages. Stage 1 was to leave ZCCM as owner of minority interests, managed by incoming investors. Stage 2 government shares to be distributed to public and financial institutions. Tenders were duly initiated and bids received by 28 Feb 1997. Govt recognized that to address the objectives of Zambia’s privatisation programme, all available, qualified and experienced, national human resources needed to be summoned. Power Rangers Part of government decision to appoint a negotiations team (PNT) at this point, was ZPA admission that it lacked capacity for ZCCM privatisation. The process was seen to be in need of input from top flight professionals, who had worked in the mining industry, and had in depth knowledge of Zambia’s mining assets. Enter, Francis. Appointed chairman of the PNT, the head of the group of some of Zambia’s finest professionals. In the PNT was, Attorney General George Chilupe,(and later Bonaventure Mutale), Secretary to the Treasury Prof. Ben Mweene, ZCCM chairman Luke Mwananshiku, ZPA CEO Valentine Chitalu, PS Mines Albert Kashimu, Director Mining, Willie Sweta. This team was supported by 2 lawyers from the Attorney General’s office, the Technical Director, 3 others from ZCCM, an economist from ZPA, and Norman Mbazima from Deloitte &Touche. As mentioned before, the privatising of state firms was already under way under the ZPA, this process was a system of giving Preferred Bidder status the criteria of which was questionable. Negotiations of sales of some assets was led on behalf of government by Rothschild instead of ZPA. The PNT discarded this. The Process The role of the PNT was now to receive all bids of mining assets on offer. Painstakingly analysed before recommendation on which potential buyer to engage in negotiations. Recommendation from PNT were then sent to committee of Ministers on Privatisation of ZCCM, chaired by the Mines Minister. Committee included Benny Mwiinga the Minister of Local Government, minister of Finance, Commerce Energy and Environment. Keli Walubita, foreign affairs Minister This committee went through recommendations from the PNT, and if approved sent to ZCCM board of directors. After ZCCM board approved a sale then it went to ZPA which then gave go ahead for actual negotiations to commence. It was only after committee of ministers and boards gave approval that garnished business ceremonies were organised. Before the finalising of the garnished documents and ceremonies it went through this process one more time! (Damn, I thought privatisation was easy) This prevented any one team having powers to effect a sale on their own. (you don’t say) Now the articles, that made up the process. 1) cash consideration. 2) Issue or ZCCM retained interest in the privatised mines. 3) The question of assumption of ZCCM debt. 4) The metal price participation scheme arrived at through negotiation On 4,the seller quotes optimistic prices, of metals to maximize what the buyer would pay, while buyer contends prices will be lower than proposed and impact negatively on cash flow. Parties agree on a price above which seller would get percentage of proceeds. There were also other consideration such as, the buyer commitment to a clause that should the initial investment fail to turn around mines, they would seek additional investment over the life of the asset. Other considerations, commitment to local business development, environmental impact of mining operations etc Mines were split into packages: Aco (Nchanga, Chibuluma, Nkana) Bco (Luanshya, Baluba), Cco(Mufulira), Dco(Chambishi), Eco(Kansanshi), Fco(Nampundwe), Gco(Chambishi cobalt) Hco(Precious Metals plant), Jco(Power Division), Lco(Chingola Refinery) Luanshya/Baluba 3 bids received, FQM of Canada, Binani Industries, and Sterlite Industries both from India. ZPA on behalf of Rothschild had given Preferred Bidder status to FQM, but when the PNT was appointed, it ceased the status of Preferred Bidder to allow others to get equal opportunity at clarification stage. FQM ignored this, and moved to Luanshya sure that the deal would be consummated. (Remember the games, yeah they’ve begun). The 3 bids were as follows FQM cash consideration $15m, new equity investment $20m, assumption of debt $25m, and ZCCM retain interest of 25%. Investment commitment $41m, contingent investment $25m. Binani Industries, cash consideration $10m, new equity investment $21.7m, debt assumption $20m, investment commitment $32m, contingent investment $86m, ZCCM retain 24%. Sterlite Industries cash $3m, new equity $1m, debt assumption $20m , investment commitment $33m, no commitment for contingent investment. Initial stage is calling bidders for clarification of bids. After clarification bidders were asked to review offers and make final bids towards the close of first half 1997. Tipping the scales in favour of Sterlite and Binani was that their bids included plans to develop secondary industries, fertilizer plant etc, commitment to not declare any workers redundant. FQM intended to lay off 1,000 a huge figure from a town whose major employer was the mine. As the first mine to be sold this point was crucial for the govt as they needed support from mine workers Union of Zambia, and securing it at that point was critical. On 1st July 1997 Francis wrote to Binani group informing them their bid was successful for the Bco package. Subject to negotiations and various agreements. FQM suddenly shed all magnanimity and openly refused to accept failure for their bid, the media didn’t help, as surprisingly they were sympathetic to FQM They did little to effect a balance by getting views from the government, ZPA, or the Negotiating Team. FQM surged the ferocious denunciation of Binani as an Indian trading Company with no experience in mining and inadequate financing, which was not true, Binani had commercial links to Lakshmi Mittal a steel magnate, and one of the richest men in India. Culminating in a letter written by Mr Pascall (FQM CEO), to all the committee’s stating FQM was chosen by ZCCM and ZPA as leading bidder, and had done all necessary due diligence and completed negotiations. FQM insistent claims of impropriety against ZCCM and the possibility of unleashing negative propaganda in the international markets had to be addressed politely but decisively. Francis explained the boards, government committee’s, and PNT position. (Francis should be CEO of Manchester United) FQM were not satisfied. FQM proceeded to the high court of Zambia to file a claim against ZPA, ZCCM, and Binani industries. They were represented by Shamwana & Co. They wanted an injunction on ZPA offer of Bco to Binani, and in addition damages and costs. (This is the most ghetto st sentence you’ll read today)
On 10 Sept 1997, chairman of ZPA board, Abel Mkandawire filed an affidavit that virtually killed FQM claim. He swore that the board met and ratified the decision of the PNT to award Binani Bco. FQM withdrew the case.
Binanis bid was successful and moved into begin running Luanshya mine now called Roan Antelope Mining Corporation (Ramcoz)

Major problems for Ramcoz came afterward. At time of bidding price of copper was $2,200 per tonne, after takeover price dropped to $1,600 per tonne
By 1999 price dropped to $1,350 per tonne. Cobalt price fell from $22.50 per pound, to $6.90 per pound in 1998.
Their business plan which was based on a good copper price came apart and could not be sustained. Secondly, because this mine was sold first, it endured much tougher negotiations, and didn’t get concessions later bidders were afforded. Electricity tariffs etc. Then Mines Minister Syamujaye lent a sympathetic ear and tried to get government to help, through a world bank facility government had. Edith Nawakwi, then finance minister skirted around the issue. It was delayed. One of the creditors was ZANACO, Ramcoz went into receivership on 20 Nov 2000.
Only the relevant authorities can answer why Ramcoz wasn’t given concessions afforded to other mines, considering they had a world Bank facility to do so. They even had to pay more in royalties. They had to make in excess of 2,000 staff redundant.
The Kafue Consortium
The premier offerings of the mining packages were what was known as Package A, these were Nchanga and Nkana divisions
They were premier assets because they were the most productive units of the ZCCM conglomerate. Only one bid was received for package A, by a group known as the Kafue Consortium. (Avmin of SA, Noranda of Canada, Phelps Dodge of the USA). They came together citing the advantage of the merged groups, increased capacity to mobilize huge sums of capital needed to revamp the mining jewels. Government was excited but in hindsight this may have been a mistake, because it removed competition among bidders. Being found the sole bidder for the whole of package A, they assumed government could be stampeded into parting with assets on any terms. ZPA CEO Valentine Chitalu didn’t help matters by rubbishing a valuation report from ZCCM on these mines. His strong view played into the hands of the bidders.
The Kafue Consortium (KC), initial bid had cash consideration $140m , debt assumption, $125m, committed investment $200m, uncommitted investment $550m, and ZCCM retain interest of 10%.
Shortly after submitting their bid, KC, wrote a letter stating that assets in Package A had deteriorated by $100m and the group had to reduce its cash consideration by this amount. This letter suggested tough times were ahead for this negotiation. The first meeting in London dispelled any hopes that this was an exaggeration. On April 14th 1997.

Francis and Co, following the usual procedure in all meetings,asked for the bid to be clarified to establish understanding of all contents. Gerry Robbertze who was spokesman for the group said he was disappointed and walked out, and is if on cue the rest of KC all walked out. PNT later learnt the walkout was a negotiation tactic, Robbertze later called the hotel they were in, asked them to round up the team to reconvene the meeting. PNT rejected their offer at the new meeting. The consortium offer was too low for the assets that formed the heart of the ZCCM operation. Assets that sustained the whole Zambian economy. Surprisingly the consortium response was to leave the offer on the table.

The idea was to leave the offer on the table, whilst trying to find ways or personalities within Zambia’s government who could influence the PNT to accept the offer.
One method was a campaign in Zambian media publication called Profit Magazine, where it said biggest mistake Zambia made was appointing Francis PNT chairman.

The consortium finally revised their bid, cash consideration $160m, debt assumption $150m, committed investment $400m, uncommitted investment $350m, and ZCCM retained interest at 12%. This revised offer came with excessive tax concessions, if they didn’t get the concessions the cash consideration reduces by $75m.
Mineral Royalty tax was brought down from 3% to 2% Witholdong tax from 15% to 10% , KC wanted Royalty tax brought down to 1%, witholdong tax from 10% to 0, Import Declaration Fee from 5% to 0.

For some reason there were members of KC who thought, who believed, they could get a better deal by talking directly to key political leaders. Opening gambit in this stratagem was a request by the group to meet President Chiluba. This took place on 15August 1997. Roy Reynolds of CDC (Commonwealth Development Corporation) began by assuring that the donor community, was with Zambia on its decision to privatise the mines,and that speedy execution of this programme would be a boon to the countries economy. He carried on and ended with something that hit a nerve with the president.

“Mr President if you accept this package, the British government will give your government a £10m grant”
President Chiluba “ Tell your govt that this is a commercial transaction and has nothing to do with British aid to Zambia”
There followed a string of unproductive or inconclusive skirmishes between the 2 sides. In October 1997 KC came with an improvement on their original bid
Cash consideration $150m, debt assumption $75m, investment commitment $400m, cobalt price participation $75m, retained interest for ZCCM 12% valued at $70m.

Amounting to $370m , ZCCM valuation of the package was $399m, on this basis, ZCCM board chairman and Francis made presentation to cabinet. The government accepted that this offer, form a basis for further negotiation on the sale of package A.
KC on 12th Nov 1997, signified agreement and wrote a letter to the PNT of their wish to implement a 12week interim monitoring process, pending closing of the transaction. A Management Task Force from KC was set up and on ground on 18th Nov 1997. Everything was moving well.
The PNT and government were jolted to say the least, when on 10 March 1998, KC submitted a revised bid that was a complete departure from the agreed commercial terms. The timing was chosen carefully, because the following week there was to be a Consultative Group meeting in Paris, on aid to Zambia, where ZCCM privatisation was to feature as a major conditionality.(Well shave my left ball, and call me Stewart).

Robbertze from Avmin, Khalid from Phelps Dodge visited the negotiation team, Explained that due to the Far East economic crisis, more assets should be added to the package. KC now sprung new demands on the Zambian side. Among the demands were 300 houses in addition to the institutional houses attached to the mining assets. Either that or they would deduct $150,000 from the cash consideration for each house they should have received. (is this even real life?)Before a response was even give KC sent officers to inspect the 300 houses, it would be impossible to find 300 houses valued at $150, 000 on the Copperbelt. The reaction of government was that they could not sanction the sale under substantially downgraded terms.
Noranda and Phelps Dodge withdrew at that point, and it became clear to the PNT they were not committed to the original terms. The talks had gone on long enough and the team had to move on to plan B. It was an event that released a cascade of half informed criticism that descended on the government
There appeared to be an attempt by some people in Zambia with undeclared interest to paint the offer from KC in very attractive terms which had no resemblance to what was on the table. (Keep this in mind as we go along).

Nkana Slag Dumps

KC had put no value on the Nkana slag dumps, and it this point we now move to the Nkana Slag Dumps, in what would be an eye opener for the PNT on the hidden motives of bidders. In July 1998 after talks with KC broke down, the PNT were on their way to China to finalise negotiations on a deal for Chambishi Mines, connecting through Johannesburg.
Robbertze the cold shrewd obnoxious conduit of the KC, called Francis in July 1998, keeping track of the PNT movements, no doubt. Francis found the phone call strange as the person on the other end sounded reborn in all manner of etiquette. His firm Avmin, now wanted the Nkana Slag dumps. (This is what we call corporate sojo).
When Francis and team arrived in Lusaka they found an offer from Avmin for the slag dumps $48m. These were same slag dumps KC said were of no value to them. The offer was that the assets would be acquired by a public company called Newco, incorporated in Zambia and owned by Avmin. Offer was $48m and cobalt price participation scheme amounting to $4.5m, $2m in Newco in the form of equity or a loan, ZCCM retained interest would be 10%, $60m in contingent investment
There was opposition to the deal from minister of Finance Edith Nawakwi, by her belief was selling the Nkana Slag dump, would reduce the substantial value of the entire assets of Nchanga and Nkana.
When negotiations with KC broke down, the committee of ministers made a decision in July 1998 to allow the PNT to break up Aco package into smaller more affordable business units. This was done to avoid the kind of situation the state faced with KC, and to speed up the ZCCM privatisation. This made minister Nawakwi’s protestations against sale of Nkana to Avmin very surprising. She stated “Avmin to us does not present an alternative. “ She was even against the PNT meeting Avmin to discuss their proposal.
Francis replied with a letter copied in was the president and Mines Minister Syamujaye. Dr Syamujaye replied on their behalf, “please make the necessary arrangements and travel to meet Avmin for more information on the matter. “

Francis, the team and then CEO of ZCCM Edward Shamutete, travelled to Johannesburg, to meet Avmin. Shamutete couldn’t believe what Avmin was offering. The $48m was way above what ZCCM valued the slag dumps. Avmin proposed a 31 month construction programme for a new treatment plant for the slag. ZCCM retained interest was put at 10% (in the KC bid,which Avmin was part, the slag dumps were to be brought online in 12th year of operation LOL).
While this was going on the Zambia side had to deal with the issue of Qasim Mining Ltd. They approached ZCCM in 1993 to secure rights to Nkana slag dump. Agreement was signed 25 May 1995. Qasim experienced difficulties in operating perhaps due to capacity, and ended up owing ZCCM $284,000 for electricity charges. The Avmin proposal was a virtual rescue deal for the Nkana slag dumps. On 28th August 1998 Avmin CEO Rick Menell, and ZCCM chairman Shalaulwa Shimukowa, signed the agreement for Avmin to take over Chambishi cobalt and Nkana slag dumps under a company called Chambishi Metals Plc.
This was the same with Chibuluma assets, KC undervalued it in its bid, saying it had no value but must be included in its bid. Metorex consortium a Canada and South African joint company, we’re quietly fighting for excision of Chibuluma from KC. When talks broke down with KC they approached with a bid
Metorex bid had cash $12m, deferred payment $3m, copper participation $1.2m, committed capital expenditure $34m, ZCCM retained interest 20%
The PNT argued that at this point since government had given significant tax concessions Metorex needed to improve their bid.
Cash was raised to $17.5m, cobalt contribution at $15 a pound, amounting to $6.4m was introduced. ZCCM retained interest 15%, committed capital expenditure remained at $34m.
Deal was done on 30 Sept 1997.
Back to KC and its impact, Phelps Dodge representative Khalid was the epitome of a hard nosed capitalist, out to get package A for as little as possible. Only Avmin had done a due diligence study before bidding. Coming from SA freshly shed of its obnoxious apartheid past, they were worried about perception. KC continued identifying ministers in shady backroom talks, the donor community codenamed “Operation Bypass” The intention was to get round the inconvenience of dealing with the PNT.

The PNT came to learn about this when the consortium demanded the 300 houses. PNT later discovered, KC met a key minister who assured the houses would be given.
Another minister taking advantage of Francis’ absence from the country, assembled KC and other govt officials at a lodge out of Lusaka. This kind of activity slowed down the privatisation process.
Donors had made clear they’re cooperation with KC as disposal of Package A morphed into a major conditionality for further aid, particularly balance of payments support. KC employed the “the controlled leak” ploy, where just before a crucial meeting they would leak favourable contents of their bid to local and international press.
Konkola and Zambian Copper Investments.
ZCI(owned by Anglo American) in Nov 1998 submitted a bid for Nkana, Nchanga, together with Nampundwe, Chingola Refractory Ore dumps(CRO) combined with Konkola Division.
ZCI offer was $72m, CRO commission payment $3m, ZCCM retained interest 20%, expected investment $1.12billion over 8 years.
Cobalt Price participation involving ZCCM deriving price difference of 50% , amounting to $32m, a forecast $723m in dividend over the 30 year estimated life of project.
For all this ZCI asked for serious concessions, no customs duty on capital items, company tax at 25%, no withholding tax, mineral royalties be reduced from 2% to 1%. The PNT found that the commercial terms of ZCI offer compared favourably when compared to the KC offer. Even with concessions, the terms meant the Zambian govt was to earn $3.8 billion, in tax revenue over 30 year period.

ZCI also signified their commitment by being the only bidder to allow the PNT full access to their computerised financial model. An MOU was signed between government and ZCI on 24 Nov 1998 under a few conditions. ZCI needed a major mining partner. ZCI had been in negotiations with Codelco of Chile, for a partnership to buy Konkola, Nchanga, Nkana, and Nampundwe. Now known as KNNNCo.
Completion of the transaction was agreed for early October 1999. It was not to be, Codelco pulled out on grounds that their due diligence revealed KNNNCo failed to meet investment criteria. Upon further discussion with Codelco officials led by Ivan Valenzuela, it may have been more to do with elections, in Chile which were imminent, than with the investment criteria. This did not diminish the implications of the action on the Zambian economy. Balance of payments support were tied to the conclusion of privatisation of ZCCM in 1999.
ZCI were in the hunt for financial partners as they too did not agree with Codelco valuations, and opted to go it alone with financial backing.They looked at the IFC, CDC, SAIDC and Mitsubishi Corporation of Japan.
ZCI would require to cover that investment commitment, not internally generated from KCM (the new company which was to be formed).
The pullout by Codelco brought desperation, but helped sharpen the focus on the need to dispose these assets, and added briskness to proceedings.
24 Aug 1999,Codelco pulled out. 27 Aug 1999, delegation of Zambia government and PNT visit Washington DC to brief IMF and World Bank on ZCCM privatisation programme.
6 Sept 1999 same delegation met ZCI in Johannesburg to seek a commitment on the package.
16 Sept 1999 ZCCM shareholders gave ZCI 2 weeks to submit a formal proposal. 23 September 1999 ZCI submitted its bid to Finance Minister Kalumba.

As always, there seemed to have been some sticking points in the negotiations. ZCI was concerned over long term supply of lime at what they considered the right price.
Government emphasized that it’s policy was to encourage diversified ownership of the mining assets, therefore Ndola Lime Company could not be included in the package ZCI had bid. Other hiccups were ZCI wanted the Companies Act section, of having over half the directors of a company, be resident in Zambia be revised. As a compromise Attorney General Mutale proposed a reduction to 30%.
ZCI also raised objections to Pensions Scheme Regulation Act, which prohibited a private pension from investing its assets abroad.
Enactment of these and other pieces of legislation demanded a fast track, the committee of ministers called a meeting on 26 Nov 1999,together with the Attorney General chambers and various ministries whose jurisdiction touched the required provisions.
Mufulira mine assets, among the larger divisions of ZCCM, with annual yield of 140,000 tonnes of copper. It had its own concentrator, smelter, and refinery. At the time of initial bids, ZCCM in Feb 1997, split the assets into 2. Mine and concentrator as Cco. And the smelter and refinery under Konkola Deep Mining Project (KDMP).
September 1998 a bid was received from Reunion Mining PLC. The bid contained $47m in capital expenditure, over 3 years, working capital of $20m, contingent capital expenditure of $60m. ZCCM retained interest of 5%

Prior to this bid there were studies by the mine itself done and presented to the PNT, made finding a buyer for these particular assets imperative. The study showed that temporary closure of the mine, would require $32.2m in expenditure from ZCCM for retrenchment of workers, there also would be loss of production amounting to a revenue loss of $64m
FQM/Glencore made a bid cash consideration $100m, investment commitment $92m. $334m, conditional investment, ZCCM retained interest 10%, copper participation $20m. Agreement was reached between the 2 parties and Mopani Copper Mines was formed.
The Spat Over Non Core Assets.

During the KC debacle, there was growing frustration in government circles, and in the nation in general, there was even some ill veiled campaigns at ridding the PNT of its chairman, which found expression in sections of the media. The government of Zambia was worried that the attention of the privatisation of the main mining assets of ZCCM, meant there was a real possibility of being laden with a huge residue of no core assets.
Under the category of non core assets were grouped 7 ZCCM subsidiaries, and hundreds of miscellaneous entities, schools, hospitals, recreational facilities, items of furniture, office equipment and motor vehicles.

Thus was born the ZCCM Transformation Plan on September 1998. To execute this plan, the government formed 3 subgroups under the main PNT.
Group 1 was led by John Patterson (ZCCM) and Norman Mbazima (a partner in Deloitte and Touche) and was to negotiate the sale of ZCCM core assets. Team members included Andrew Webb (Rothschild), Vicki Hazelden (Clifford Chance), J. Joseph (ZPA), Willie Sweta (Ministry of Mines), D. Mwimba, Max Mukwakwa, Dr Sixtus Mulenga, Wilfred Katoto, and Alfred Sakala. (ZCCM)
Group 2 to handle negotiations of ZCCM subsidiary companies was led by Hakainde Hichilema (Managing Partner of Grant Thornton) team members appointed were M. I. Ahmad, T.M Chanda, and B. Simutende (ZCCM), G M Mwansa, Peter Heath(ZAL Holdings), F. Kapilikisha(ZCCM), Ron Peiris(ZCI), Alex Chikwese(ZPA)

Group 3 was to help dispose of miscellaneous assets and was led by Mwila Lumbwe, Managing Partner of Ernst and Young. Team members were M. Mwandenga (ZPA), C. Chungu (Deloitte and Touche), Muna Hantumba (ZCI), M. Munyinda, P. H. Nabuyanda, Geoff Handia, D. C. Kabole, FL Mwiya, Professor Muyunda Mwanalushi, and Dr. M Simukonde, all from ZCCM, and NN Simukonde who came in as external adviser -Human Resources.

The groups were established in such a way that they had capacity to co-opt more members from ZCCM, ZPA, external financial legal advisers, and local consultants, to take some additional work load dictated by the tightness of the schedule. There was a comprehensive project management planning system, to provide monthly updated progress reports to ZCCM directors, government ministers, and outside parties, including the World Bank.
All three groups were to report to the PNT.
The Attorney General sat on the the main committee, and had a representative on each of the 3 sub committees. Representative from his chambers in each of the 3 sub committees established by ZCCM Transformation Plan.

Because the ZCCM miscellany was multifarious, the PNT asked for for blanket approval to speed up their sale. Otherwise approval was going to be sought for such items like computers, paintings, filing cabinets, one by one. Both the board of ZPA and ZCCM acquiesced to the blanket approval scheme.(My personal opinion is that this where the rumours and all sorts of conspiracy theories start. We shall begin with Francis and Chatham Estates limited)
ZPA wrote to Francis on the 3rd of December 1998, stating that there was correspondence from Francis, that highlighted his close relationship with Chatham Estates, (his son and his nephew were directors). They were helping with the valuation and disposal of some of the non core assets. Francis replies:
As my terms of reference do not include responsibility for contracting, either directly, or indirectly, advisers, consultant etc, I have decided to defer your letter to the management of ZCCM who have such authority.

ZCCM company secretary Max Mukwakwa attended to the query.
“In the process of enhancing the privatisation teams, due to slippage in privatisation, the government of the republic of Zambia, and the ZCCM board approved that the following be appointed:
Group 2: subsidiary companies, Group Leader Hakainde Hichilema (Grant Thornton)
Group 3: Miscellaneous Assets: Mwila Lumbwe (Ernst and Young)
Ernst and Young subcontracted, Chatham Estates and Premier Consultants in the valuation of properties on the Copperbelt.

Ernst and Young also wrote extensively restating what the ZCCM board secretary had written, but also said the following:
“You should also be aware that Mr Kaunda, (Francis)did bring to the attention of this company, that certain officers of Chatham were related to him, and further that he had no control or interest in Chatham.”
The Attorney General Mutale, also had his own episode over non core assets. He wrote letters to team leaders of groups 2 and 3.

“The ZPA has indicated to me that a report on the sale of non core assets of ZCCM is ready. While we have not received such copy, it has also come to my attention that my chambers were not availed the draft agreements before finalization as procedure requires. Further, you will recall that 22nd April 1999, the chairman of the PNT did circulate a letter to all parties concerned informing you of this requirement.

Kindly inform me why the Attorney General chambers were not availed these copies for scrutiny and approval, before they were concluded. In addition, kindly send these chambers copies of all agreements in order that they are considered accordingly, you are also reminded that where some agreements are found to have been concluded against the interest of GRZ and ZCCM, those agreements may be subject to a process of rescission.

Group 2 leader, Hakainde Hichilema elected to merely refer Attorney General Mutale to ZCCM Company Secretary Mukwakwa for copies of the agreements. (hahaha, this guy)
Group 3 leader Lumbwe chose to to elaborate,
“Group 3 of the PNT was mandated to ensure the orderly and timeous disposal of ZCCM non core assets under the ZCCM Transformation plan of 16 September 1998. The non core assets included those under corporate head office and operations Center as well as social assets at the division. The listing of the relevant assets included the closure report you refer to.” He attached a copy of the sale of Telecommunications and Computing Unit in Kitwe, with correspondence from the Attorney General office indicating that transaction was approved by the Attorney General office. The attached document was a letter by principal state Advocate Gaudencia Salasini, signed by a representative of the Attorney General which informed the chief legal counsel of ZCCM to proceed to execute the agreement for the sale of telecommunications and computing unit. Went on to also state that all groups activities, were subject to regular review by the PNT in meetings the attorney general chambers were represented. Mrs Gertrude Kalulu, and Mrs G. Salisini.
Attorney General Mutale was not done, chose to raise the same issue with Francis on 1st June 2000.

“I wish to state for the record that I was not availed copies of the transaction documents of a considerable number of the non core assets.” He listed 45 items ,covered schools, clinics and some ZCCM subsidiaries abroad.

The timing of the AG letter got many people excited, it was taken up by a parliamentary committee with the belligerence, according to Francis, by independent MP Dipak Patel and opposition MP Benny Tetamashimba. Apparently the MPs had not seen Francis reply. He gave a copy which members began to read,
“Your list of non core assets, which you said were sold without your knowledge comprise largely social assets, included in KCM, and MCM transactions. Your list also includes assets disposed to GRZ and it’s agencies, under the debt swap arrangements, assets that were sold prior to the establishment of the PNT, and assets which have not even been sold.”

Among the assets which received prominent mention was the port facility at Dar es salaam, the challenger aircraft, the presidential guest house in the Copperbelt town of Ndola, another one in Lusaka, and MEMACO House in London. All these were handed to the government under the debt swap arrangement.
But when all this was presented to parliament, Francis’s reply was ignored, they seemed to be disappointed in not finding real scandal attached to the privatisation process.
Ndola Lime Company (NLC)

Another round of negotiations that found scandal was the sale of Ndola Lime Company (NLC),to a Belgian company called Socomer. The Genesis of this was the ZPA board, being over eager to show their independence awarded to it by the Privatisation Act. ZPA gripped over a losing bidder Pretoria Portland Cement. (PPC)

Bids from NLC came by the closing date 15 May 1998. Socomer, PPC of South Africa, ITM (owned by former Defence and later Energy Minister, Ben Mwila) City Investment limited, and Chilanga Cement PLC Zambia. Of the 5 Socomer and PPC were in serious contention.
Socomer offered $17.5m, capital expenditure over 5 years, $16m, but they were found wanting on technical expertise due to lack of experience in lime and Cement production.
PPC offered $15m, capital expenditure over 5 years $11.3m

An independent evaluation of NLC was done by KPMG and a value of $19.5m was estimated.
The PNT recommended the Socomer bid for the following 3 major reasons, one was a desire to realise, one of the terms of reference for the whole privatisation process, which was diversification of ownership of former state enterprises. It was realised that many privatised companies had gone to SA companies. Socomer being Belgian was a way of diversification of foreign ownership.

Secondly PPC was already a major producer of lime in the Southern African region, it was found their desire to acquire Ndola Lime, was merely to strengthen a monopoly position. Thirdly, Socomer was recommended as they had better commercial terms
Before the deal was finalized it needed to go through the same process of approval as picking of winning bids. Committee of ministers, ZCCM board, and ZPA etc.
When it went to ZPA they instructed the PNT to open further talks with PPC at the same time, they were talking to Socomer. (LOL)

When the recommendation was taken to the ZCCM board, Anglo’s ZCI wanted Ndola Lime given to PPC. After another round of negotiation ZCCM accepted the recommendations of the PNT on Socomer bid.

The issue here was that the process suggested by ZPA went against the initial procedures agreed by ZPA themselves, on talking to more than one bidder at the same time. ZPA accused Francis of being motivated by self interest, as he was a chairman of Access Financial Services, who were advisers to Socomer. On 30 Sept 1998, at an extraordinary meeting of ZPA, decided that Francis cease to be chairman of the PNT for the privatisation of NLC. Francis responded, that the sale of NLC was assigned to the group led by Mr John Patterson of ZCCM, and Norman Mbazima, who were jointly chairing the talks with Socomer,
More letters from ZPA , Francis was asked how the structure of the company was to be implemented. He reminded the board of its decision to remove him as PNT chairman of the NLC sale, so he was surprised that the same board that removed him, would expect him to carry out functions of the same position. (ROTFL)

All these delays were costly, ZCI main concern was the supply of lime for the mines they had acquired which they were hoping was a fixed rate and price per tonne. Secondly the price of (HFO) Heavy Fuel Oil, which accounts for 55% of the cost of quicklime, increased by 300% between 1998 and 2000. This had an immense effect on contracts and viability of NLC, when viewed from the fixed contracts and supply to its main consumers, the mines, ZCI was buying.
This led to Socomer reducing its bid from $17.5m to $5.6m, and this became another sticking point with ZPA, even though Socomer had committed $12m in additional investment in Ndola Lime, the ZPA appointed Charles Sichangwe, a Lusaka banker of Wits Limited, as chairman of an Independent Negotiating Team for Ndola Lime, to be assisted by Constantine Chimuka of Ellis and company, and Alfred Sakala (ZCCM).

Turned out to be a costly delay, on 1st March 2000, Finance Minister Kalumba called a meeting for the next day, and it was resolved NLC privatisation reverts back to the PNT.
My view here, is that it, appears from the book, that there seemed to be animosity between ZPA and the PNT, Francis said , this stemmed from the fact that the ZPA had a record of transferring over 200 firms from the state into private hands in a space of 3 years. The agency appointed independent negotiators from the private business sector in Zambia. This quickly led to unsubstantiated claims that there were “privileged lawyers and accountants” favoured in appointments to handle lucrative privatisation negotiations. This may have made ZPA believe, ZCCM would was going to go in the same line, through them.

Had the government allowed ZCCM to go with ZPA as sole agents on its privatisation, Francis says, would have been disastrous, as they had few or no Zambians with the most experience in the mining industry. (They also did say, they lacked capacity in the beginning remember?) It would have been dangerously out of depth, in conducting negotiations with some of the worlds most experienced mining hands.

The Participants

Apart from those already mentioned , were a supporting cast and crucial according to Francis, to the successful privatisation of ZCCM.
Dr Edwin Koloko, ZCCM Director Corporate Affairs, John Patterson, ZCCM technical director, Deepak Malik General Manager ZCCM, Alex Chikwese an economist from ZPA, and Wilfred Kototo a metallurgist from ZCCM. (These were the other team members of the PNT). Others were Norman Mbazima, Andrew Webb, Charles Mercey.

Mines have interdependent operations, useful lives (reserves) these members were crucial, Mbazima would provide financial models at the ready, cash flow analysis for respective units in a remarkably short time.
On Interdependent operations, for example, Metorex bought Chibuluma mine which has neither a smelter, nor refinery, the copper concentrate they produce would have to go to Nkana for treatment. Such relationships needed separate agreement, Kototo and Patterson worked these out.

All transactions resulted in legal documents, legal issues features prominently, this area was covered by the Attorney General, first George Chilupe, and later Bonaventure Mutale, whose role was to protect the national interest in every transaction, and ensuring they confirmed to Zambian law. It was with Mutale that most of the work was done. Other lawyers who worked with the team, under the AG chambers, we’re Gertrude Kalulu, Gaudencia Salisini, Kamwenje Nyalungwe, and Monica Musonda. Francis said they were a crop of lawyers whose smart contributions brought nothing but pride to Zambians on the team.

Special mention also goes to PS for mines Kashimu, and director of mining Sweta. They were in charge of the development agreements, ensuring they were in line with national interest. It was under these agreements through the negotiation team, government would give certain concessions, to the investors in return.
Image for post
Random picture of Kalusha Bwalya
The Politicians
The infamous secret meeting between KC and a minister at a lodge?While the PNT was out of the country
That was Edith Nawakwi, between KC and a team from government at Lilayi Lodge.
Nawakwi according to Francis, didn’t stop there, she brought a firm called Carlington Sales company of Canada. Trying to get a sales agreements for the main mines after Codelco pulled out of their venture with ZCI. It failed embarrassingly. One of the agents representing the same company tried to sue the Zambian government in the UK. The English court threw out the case.
Francis was to learn later that Nawakwi had signed an agreement to retain the services of Carlington Sales Company, to facilitate the privatisation of some of ZCCM mining assets for an undisclosed fee.
She wasn’t the only one.
Ronald Penza, first played his hand in the privatisation process, with his parallel talks with KC as he was willing to give them the 300 houses they had demanded in their bid.
He went as far as writing to ZCCM Chairman, Luke Mwananshiku, which in effect sought to transfer, responsibility of privatisation of the mines from the PNT to the ZPA.
President Chiluba expressed shock at the audacity of the move. He characterised it as blatant insubordination, as the PNT was appointed agency of the ZPA through a decision of cabinet. He was fired.

Chambishi Mine (dco), bids were received from China Non Ferrous Metal Industry Corporation (CNNC), GMD resources, Ivanhoe capital, Jet Cheer Development (Zambia) Limited, and Sterlite Industries of India.
CNNC won the bid, with cash consideration of $20m ZCCM retained interest 15% 15 July 1998, a new company was formed NFC Africa Mining PLC.
Power Division (Jco) like all ZCCM operations, we’re hampered by serious lack of investment capital. The division bought power from Zesco, for resale to ZCCM mining operations, and other consumers. The package was advertised on the international market, 6 firms, pre qualified to bid, Eskom (South Africa), Edison International (Canada), Houston Industries (USA), Midland Power Int(UK), National Grid Company (UK), Trectebel (Belgium),
Midland Power International/National Grid under a consortium called Copperbelt Energy Corporation was superior in commercial considerations. Cash $50m, revised debt assumption $73m, ZCCM retained interest 20%. CEC also had a plan for the forecasted retrenched workers numbering 250 employees, over 3 years. They planned to retrain them, and also committed $250k for overseas training for Zambians in their 1st year of operation.
Completion of the sale was achieved on 17th December 1997.

Conclusion

There appears to be a general expectation that Zambia was going to mint lots of money out of privatising ZCCM. Francis thought this understandable, through sentiment attached to the mines, arising out of knowledge that the mines were Zambia’s most valuable resource. It didn’t seem to matter or people are just not aware, that ZCCM assets had been losing value over the previous 20 years and during their sale. There just wasn’t enough reinvestment into the mines, low copper prices didn’t assist matters.

The whole truth about next year’s elections is that, the United Party for National Development (UPND) and it’s leader Hakainde Hichilema is more likely to win and become President of Zambia.

Of course this is not something that Patriotic Front (PF) members want to hear. While many of them do see that the ground is ripe for Hakainde to become President, they still want to pretend that the opposite is true. But we must be very honest with ourselves in all we do. Therefore, PF must be honest to accept that not all is how they would want them to be. The old hackneyed song that HH is not on the ground and mainly on social media is now sleep inducing. You do not count on the weakness of your opponent as enough reason to celebrate your own victory.

But given the caliber of characters in the corridors of power in PF, they do not understand a thing about rationality and authenticity. To them, HH is still the person they had successfully tagged as a tribalist, a Satanist and someone who privatised mines.

What many characters in PF do not know is that, these tags they keep on putting on Hakainde do not have any significant bearing in the voter next year. Yes, you may have successfully branded Hakainde in the past but the current voter doesn’t know about all that and is way ahead of such pettiness. Many new voters – those who were 7,8,9 and 10 years in 2011 – will be 19,20,21 and 22 next year. This is a demography that knows nothing about tribalism and the allegation that Hakainde sold mines. When you insistently tell them about this that Hakainde sold mines, they probably wonder what that is all about because they are not directly affected with the privatisation that took place in 90s.

This is why, Hakainde seems to be doing very fine. The people he has hired to brand him do understand that dynamics have changed and they have diagnosed a perfect way of tapping into the new voters.

Often than not, PF has tried to ride on the name of their late founding leader Michael Sata. But do they think someone who was 8,9,10 and 11 years in 2011 can still remember something about Sata?

Impossible!

Hakainde is way ahead of PF. And this is because characters that surround Edgar Lungu are more of tsetse flies than useful people. All they know is to feed Edgar lies. On the other hand, Hakainde has objective people who are advising him correctly.

Currently, the PF can only count on the demography that voted for it in 2016. But if they’re honest with themselves, how many of those that voted for them can still proudly vote for them again next year? We all know that, even some of the staunchest supporters who voted for Edgar in 2016 will stay home or even vote for Hakainde next year.

These are truths which anyone is free to verify. We are not here to tell lies and please anyone but to say the truth as it is. And this truth is Hakainde is headed for victory in 2021 should Edgar and his minions continue on their destructive path of self appeasement.

Editorial at Kwacha Times

By Trinko Jr

EDITH NAWAKWI IS JUST A USELESS ROBOT WHO HAS NOTHING TO CONTRIBUTE IN POLITICS.

It’s clear that the corruption money of the PF which she’s eating has completely damaged her brain whereby she’s now thinking everyone who’s got wealth through corruption.

Edith Nawakwi has contributed nothing in politics apart from saying “HH won’t rule” as if his destiny is in her dirt hand. As the matter of fact HH is our next Republican president come 2021, because the words that Nawakwi use to vomit through her dirt mouth has nothing to do with the destiny of president HH.

Following her radio interview, being a leader of FDD, she was supposed to tell the people what she’s all about with her kantemba party other that throwing empty accusations on president HH, but still on her accusations being a financial minister during the time of privatization she was asked “Did HH sold mines?” Her answer was supposed to be NO or yes he did, if her answer was yes then she would have started explaining how HH who was not a government official sold mines while her MMD government was active! That’s what people of Zambia wanted to hear, but for her being a foolish corrupt chap who have been sponsored by Edgar Lungu to talk rubbish on air she has failed to answer the question because she knows that she was involved in privatization and president HH is completely innocent.

Furthermore Edith Nawakwi should be ashamed of herself for stating that “there is no humanity in HH that’s why he can’t win” herself she has been a leader of the opposition has she won any election? NO, so were will she win, in snatching people’s husbands or packaging sausage in condoms? Which one is which? Because she can’t tell us that accepting someone’s husband is humanity, that’s prostitution at its best mama waluse, you can’t say you can win elections in packaging sausage in condoms, that’s witchcraft at its best. So she better stop talking rubbish about our incoming president, she have to find another way of fetching money from Edgar Lungu not through attacking HH.

I leave it here….
Trinko Junior_ a little diciple of Bally…

CIC PRESS TEAM ©2020

THE SOURCE OF HAKAINDE HICHILEMAS WEALTH

By George Mtonga
If you care to read

QUALIFICATION

· BA Economics and Business Administration (University of Zambia)

· MBA Finance and Business Strategy (University of Birmingham, United Kingdom)

· Trained Business Negotiator

· Qualified Change Management Practitioner

· Member – Institute of Directors

RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION

· A Christian who believes that all faiths should be accommodated.
POSITIONS HELD

· Chief Executive, Coopers & Lybrand Zambia 1994 – 1998

· Chief Executive, Grant Thornton Zambia 1998 – 2006
BUSINESS EXPERIENCE

HH served as Chief Executive Officer of Coopers and Lybrand and later Grant Thornton for 12 years, companies he formerly co-owned. Coopers & Lybrand and Grant Thornton are leading international professional services firms providing corporate finance, accounting, auditing, corporate recovery, management consultancy and tax advisory services to several reputable clients. These firms are both member organizations of Coopers & Lybrand International and Grant Thornton International respectively which operate in more than 100 countries world wide.

· HH has been one of the leading lights in business with wide experience in Zambia, Southern Africa, United Kingdom and other countries at operational and executive management levels.

· HH has chaired several international conferences among them the Zambia Investment Opportunities Conference organized by the Financial Times of the United Kingdom held in London in May 1996 and a similar one was held in Lusaka, Zambia in 1997.

· HH is a member of the Institute of Directors for Zambia and believes very strongly that good governance is key to Zambia’s economic development.

· HH is an entrepreneur with a number of private and corporate investments.

· HH is also a large commercial farmer
BOARD OF DIRECTORS

· HH served/serves on numerous (25) boards of corporate entities including;

· Chairman of the Board of Directors – Barclays Bank Zambia Plc.

· Chairman of the Board of Directors – Sun International (Z) Ltd

· First Chairman of the Board of Directors, Africa Trade Insurance (ATI) a multilateral Pan African organization based in Kenya.

· Chairman – Greenbelt Fertilizers Limited

· Chairman – Media Trust Fund

· Chairman – Export Development Programme II

· Director – Zambia Investment Limited

· Director – Seedco Zambia Limited

· Director – African Life Financial Services

· Director – Zambezi Nickel (Bermuda) Limited

· Director – Westlake Investment Ltd. (Mauritius)

· Board Member – Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (ZACCI)

· Member – Zambia Business Forum

· Served for seven years on the Coopers & Lybrand’s Africa Governing Board

· Served on Coopers & Lybrand’s International’s Governance Committee

· Served as Non Executive Director – Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (Smelterco) Limited

· Served on boards of eight other companies
COMMUNITY SERVICE

· HH is a community man who was born in a village, along the way learning so many things locally and internationally which Zambia can benefit from.

· HH is passionate about community work and has supported many community projects including dip tanks, clinics, schools, boreholes, and dams’ e.t.c over the years.

· HH has helped found a cultural fund aimed at financing the revival of cultural ceremonies in Zambia. Among the ceremonies supported by the fund include Kulamba Kubwalo of the Soli people in Central Zambia, Likumbi Lyamize of the Luvale people in North Western Zambia, Kusefya Pa Ng’wena of the Bemba People in Northern Zambia, Kuomboka of the Lozi people in Western Zambia, Lwiindi in Southern Zambia, Nc’wala of the Ngoni people in Eastern Zambia, Shimunenga among many others.

· HH is an employer of Zambians in urban areas through companies and rural communities through his farming activities. HH clearly understands rural and urban poverty and has contributed in someway in alleviating poverty.

· HH is one of the founder members and supporters of UPND.
OTHER ATTRIBUTES

· HH has been active in the business community and has a strong high level private and public sector network locally and internationally.

· HH has lived and worked in the United Kingdom and traveled widely around the world on business and leisure.
WRITTEN ATTRIBUTES

· An Economic Analysis of Determinants of Government Budget Deficits – The case of Zambia, 1986.

· Managing Businesses in the third world Privatized Environment – The Zambian Case, 1992.

· Numerous lecture materials, occasional papers, consultancy and advisory reports
WHAT HH BRINGS INTO ZAMBIAN POLITICS

· Focus on a new vision for Zambia and promote love in the country.

· Strong, humble and knowledge based leadership.

· Quality leadership with a difference

· Focus on service to the nation and not benefit to self (Servant leadership).

· Ensure racial harmony in society

· Promote unity, embracing all regions and tribal groupings as the nation belongs to all.

· Clean politics that are issue based, not personality and insult based.

· Promote professionalism, integrity and ethical conduct in public office.

· Improve the working conditions in the public service including those of our men and women in uniform so as to improve service delivery to the public.

· Economic development and prosperity for all.

· Promote peace and constitutionalism – give Zambians the constitution speedily.

· Facilitate the enactment of a new electoral law acceptable to all Zambians.

· Promote freedom of the press through enactment of appropriate laws.

· A leadership that promotes gender equity and effective participation of differently-abled, women and the youth in public affairs.

· Focus on key economic sectors such as agriculture, tourism, mining, manufacturing, energy services.

· Promote employment creation and entrepreneurship.

· Fight poverty; promote economic business and investment growth to support social sectors.

· Taking a building block approach to running the country carrying on with the good aspects of previous Governments and only change those that are wrong

· Improve sanitation and facilities in public markets so that marketers can operate in safe and decent conditions.

· Change with continuity and not continuity with change.

· Moving away from politics of anger, vindictiveness and revenge

· De-politicize the public service and strengthen public institutions to deal with among other things, the fight against corruption.

· Drive the decentralization agenda effectively.

· Vigorously fight HIV/AIDS.

· Give our country a fresh and better start.

· Speedy payment of retirement benefits to retirees to enable them start a new life.

· Work to end endemic strikes in the nation.

· Will take advise from past leaders, professionals, churches, traditional rulers, women and youth.

I’m not a thief, tribal tag does not bother me- Hakainde Hichilema
July 28, 2014
In “Headlines”
Stanbic Bank Zambia welcomes new Chief Executive

[By Maka Tounkara]

The sudden dismissal of Bank of Zambia Governor Denny Kalyalya was as surprising as the choice of his successor Christopher M. Mvunga. Both developments sent shock waves throughout the country. A trained economist by specialisation, Kalyalya was appointed head of the central bank by President Edgar Lungu on 13 February 2015. He took over from Michael Gondwe, a lawyer. Following the appointment of Kalyalya, the president received kudos from members of business and finance communities because the choice inspired confidence in the banking sector. The same cannot be said about the response that has accompanied Mvunga’s appointment. While I congratulate Mvunga on his new role, I am not persuaded that he is the right nominee to improve Zambia’s monetary landscape and help steer the economy away from the brink of a recession.

Many people have condemned the appointment of Mvunga as the new Bank of Zambia governor on ground that he is a mere accountant. These views are misplaced, as the constitution provides that a prospective candidate to the position of Governor must, among other requirements, have specialised training and experience in economics, law, accountancy or related field. Mvunga, a trained accountant, theoretically qualifies to be Bank of Zambia Governor owing to the fact that he is a citizen and has specialised training in accounting as prescribed under the law. In my view, the concerns should be around the suitability of Mvunga for the role: is he a person of proven integrity? Does he have the relevant experience to occupy the top job at the central bank? Is he a credible and competent figure who can inspire confidence in the market and keep Zambia’s economy on an even kneel? NO, would be my answer to all these questions because I do not think he was the best candidate for the job. It is not enough to possess minimum qualifications for such an important position as central bank governor. One must have extensive and relevant experience at the highest level and intimate understanding and knowledge of financial matters. Otherwise, any person with training in law, economics or accountancy, with bits of experience in financial institutions, would be eligible to be appointed to the role.

The professional background of the central bank governor is instrumental in shaping and determining the course of Zambia’s monetary policy. This is because the primary role of the Bank of Zambia is overseeing a sound monetary system and policy, which is at the core of Zambia’s economic development agenda. The credibility of the head of the central bank boosted by relevant past professional experience in central banking is key in devising sound monetary policy that encourages growth. In times of economic turmoil and distress, it is important to appoint a central bank governor who inspires confidence. This was demonstrated by President Lungu in his congratulatory letter to Kalyalya when he appointed him as Bank of Zambia Governor: “Your experience and knowledge in the sphere of economics should stand you in good stead to help our country at a time when we face enormous challenges largely on account of external factors.” Can such sentiments be echoed about Mvunga? The answer is no. It is evident that Kalyalya brought a wealth of economic experience in monetary policy having once served as deputy governor of the Bank of Zambia. Many economic commentators welcomed this appointment because Kalyalya was seen as a technocrat who inspired confidence in the banking sector.
The credentials and experience of the new Bank of Zambia Governor as an accountant are impressive. However, there is nothing in his background that makes him suitable or inspires confidence in the conduct of monetary policy. Moreover, the credibility of Mvunga is highly questionable owing to the fact that he is a full-time Patriotic Front (PF) member who once served as an appointed deputy minister. His transfer from Cabinet Office to Bank of Zambia is viewed by many as state capture of the Central Bank, a move that is likely to politicise the operations of the central bank.

The conduct of modern-day monetary policy heavily depends on the credentials of the central bank governor, and their importance manifests in many ways. Take India circa 2013 as a case in point. The country was faced with spells of volatility in the financial market due to external forces beyond its control. The appointment of Raghuram Rajan in 2013, a former Chief Economist and Director of Research at the International Monetary Fund as the Governor of the Reserve Bank of India is responsible and credited with restoring financial stability. Similarly, Paul Volcker’s credibility and professional experience at the US Treasury Department is famously responsible for the decline in inflation in the 1980s. It is apparent from the foregoing that the appointment of a governor with relevant experience is key not only to the conduct of monetary policy but also to the restoration of financial stability and enhancement of credibility in the management of monetary policy.

Central banking operations should be spearheaded by apolitical and truthful technocrats whose allegiance is to the nation and not the party in power. It is imperative that the central bank is devoid of individuals who are perceived as serving the interests of the political elite at the expense of marginalised citizens. This is because the central bank is the custodian of confidence which is essential to calming financial markets.
Although the President has the power to appoint whoever he deems fit to serve as Bank of Zambia Governor, this power should be exercised in the interests of improving monetary policy and subsequently the economic welfare of the citizenry. The appointment of Mvunga as new Bank of Zambia Governor is unlikely to restore financial stability because his experience is at variance with the major requisites of the post. As a country, it is important that we learn from our past mistakes. Many people raised similar concerns when Margaret Mwanakatwe and Michael Gondwe were appointed to the positions of Minister of Finance and Governor of the central bank respectively. Despite being qualified in their respective careers, the two renowned individuals were not suitable for the posts they were appointed to owing to the huge mismatch between their professional qualifications and the relevant experience needed to smoothly execute fiscal and monetary policy.

The president should have hired an individual with a track record similar to that of the outgoing governor in order to inspire confidence in the conduct of monetary policy. It is not too late for him to do so. I call on the President to revoke his nomination of Mvunga and appoint a credible and competent person as Kalyalya’s successor. Mvunga’s experience, while appropriate to other sections of government, is unlikely to boost financial regulation reforms or have a significant weight on how Zambia’s competitiveness and financial firmness is perceived. What the President should have done is to either elevate the current Deputy Governor, Dr Francis Chipimo, to the position of governor, or appoint a new bank governor with unrivalled experience for purposes of bolstering confidence and credibility in the central bank.

The qualifications of the new Bank of Zambia governor will likely not add any value to the conduct of monetary policy. We have to be honest with the President and call a spade a spade. What the central bank requires is a qualified technocrat who will professionally advise the President on the best policy mix that can revive Zambia’s economy. Mvunga’s previous assignment as deputy secretary to cabinet and professional experience as an accountant will neither boost the Bank of Zambia’s image nor bring about best practices of monetary policy. The autonomy of the central bank and credibility is critical to maintaining a sound financial system, and the unfortunate dismissal of an experienced and eminent technocrat with relevant economic experience is a huge blow to the growth of Zambia’s financial and banking sector. Zambia is experiencing economic hardships, and an experienced person with a proven track record in economic research and practice would have been a suitable fit as head of the central bank.

Maka Tounkara is a Lecturer in Economics at the University of Zambia. Educated at Oxford, he researches climate change, fiscal and monetary policy, and structural transformation in low carbon settings.

THEY WANT TO BLACKMAIL HH BECAUSE THEY KNOW THERE WILL BE NO ROOM FOR STEALING

Very interesting political distraction coming from some hired guns like Edith Nawakwi, who the PF government is footing her husbands medical bills.

Criminals, thieves, oppressors, haters and slanders have all ganged up with an intent to black mail HH, because they know that he shall bring sanity in the country.

This reminds me of what my state house sources of late said to me that they (PF), are deadly scared of the man(HH) for fear of being prosecuted for stealing and committing crimes against humanity.

If we were a progressive people, we should have redirected the debate to pending and critical issues affecting our lives across the political divide.

The Kwacha is in a spinning, tumbling and spiraling mode like a piece of paper in a whirlwind. Electricity is rationed without anyone taking responsibility to justify this paradox. Our children seem will not go to school this year because the president is busy campaigning. Our citizens are dying in hospitals without medication. The youths are jobless. Yet no one is talking about all these issues.

People have digressed from issues that require sober scrutiny. In any case, HH is being discredited because of his indelible credits in business and Political strategy which has sent criminals and thieves, into a panic mood.

Under the prevailing circumstances, even if it was to be proven beyond doubt that HH sold the mines, he would still be the best man to lead the nation let even the devil know about it. HH would still command national respect for selling the mines and conniving with successive governments and all the state institutions to ignore him.

We have seen how executive power can be exercised by a sitting president to even reverse legally legitimate deals like the sale of ZAMTEL to LAPGREEN. A sitting president can order for a retrial. If HH really sold the mines and we have a Lawyer who really passed the course who is a sitting president wielding all the powers, then this HH must be the most powerful and intelligent man in Zambia.

Here is my points of argument about him, look at the following and prove me wrong with facts;

INVESTMENT ACUMEN: the majority of the wealthiest men and women we can point fingers at today amassed their fortunes through connections to government deals. Their business have been built through doctored government contracts and deals of which HH has never making him a unique entrepreneur.

RESILIENCY: Being in opposition is like stirring the hornet’s nest. Few people who rushed into opposition ranks had to crawl back with their tails pegged between their legs on account that the government had squeezed their businesses( sebana wikute). Never with HH thus some of us draws a lot of inspiration from him.

SOCIAL CREDIBILITY. Many people who have ventured to oppose the government have spent their opposition life in and out of Court on either trumped up charges or credibly committed cases. No litigation has been contemplated against HH to date to save for the embarrassing traffic offence mutated into treason case which ended in a nolle proseque as it lacked merit.

BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT. Under 24/7 scrutiny, and apparent plottings and sabotaging by state functionaries, HH has been able to grow his businesses to the perplexity of his enemies attempting to curtail his success, to the contrary, they have ended up being most consumer of his beef produced by Zambeef and high taxes he pays.

Today HH is the largest private employer in our nation, yet thieves and criminals are busy internalizing their stolen moneys.Today, they are demanding for his trade secrets which he has been selflessly offering to the nation.

FOCUS AND DISCIPLINE. Despite all the rantings and mudslinging, he has not been distracted from his vision of an equitable society clearly acknowledging that he comes from a poor background, a villager from Bweengwa and he would want to serve in a public office to give back to his country.

No one among the current contenders has any CV that could be shortlisted for consideration to the office of President under the crumbling Economy like ours. HH has proven to posses exceptional navigational skills that have enabled him to survive the most turbulent seas of Political and economic machination that no other man in known Zambian history has been subjected to.

He comes with an irrefutable prototype for resiliency, strategic planning,investment and risk management that can be scaled to the national setting. So yes HH would still be the only reasonable option to inspire hope among we the young people and the general citizenry under such waning national prospects.

And no amount of accusations will detour any meaningful citizen that HH can provide what citizens are yearning for.

Sikaile Sikaile
Good Governance and Human Rights Activist

By McDonald Chipenzi

A LEADERSHIP VACUUM AT THE BANK OF ZAMBIA (BOZ) DUE TO NO GOVERNOR.

IT is clear that at the Bank of Zambia (BOZ), there has been a vacuum since the sudden dismissal of the then BoZ Governor, Danny Kalyalya a week ago.

The new presidential nominee to the position, Christopher Mvunga, can’t assume office until he is ratified by Parliament and Parliament will only resume sitting on Sept 11, 2020, two weeks and one day from todate.

Constitutionally under Art 94 of the Constitution, Mr. Mvunga’s nomination and consequent ratification by the National Assembly has a maximum days of 21 to be considered by Parliament.

This is what Art 94(1) prescribes: “Where the performance of an executive function is expressed by this Constitution to be subject to approval by the National Assembly, the National Assembly SHALL, in the sitting next [Sept 11) after receipt of the request for approval, give the approval within twenty-one days of the commencement of the Sitting”.

The National Assembly, however is further given room to refuse the nominee and refuse to approve him which may force the President to ‘refer the matter to the Constitutional Court for hearing and the decision of the Constitutional court would be final (Art 94(2), (3) and (4)

Further, Art 95(1) guides that: “where in this constitution an appointment to an office is subject to ratification by the National Assembly, the National Assembly SHALL, in the sitting next after receipt of the request for ratification, give its ratification within twenty-one days of the commencement of the Sitting.”

Further, this Art 95 provides space to parliamentarians to reject the ratification requested which once rejected, the President is expected to propose another appointment upto the 3rd one.

If the National Assembly still refuses or delays the ratification for the 3rd nominee or appointee for the position, that appointment shall take effect (Art 95(4).

Clearly, Mr. Mvunga’ s appointment still has a long away to be ratified and for him to assume this prestigious position of the Bank of Zambia Governor.

This is so because the ratification is not automatic as Parliament reserves the right to reject his nomination as it happened with the former Acting Chief Justice, Lombe Chisebakunda.

Despite the arrogance of numbers from the ruling party since the ratification of such an appointment just needs simple majority to pass in Parliament, the PF lost the battle to ratify Ms. Chisebakunda as substantive Justice and ended up as Acting for years.

Coming back to the vacancy at BOZ at this crucial times, this has been created by the President’s failure to appoint an Acting Governor at the Bank.

The position of a Bank of Zambia Governor is constitutional and his/her deputy cannot assume that position unless appointed by the President to do so.

This is like the issue of deputy ministers and Cabinet Ministers. In the absence of the Minister, a deputy Minister cannot assume that office unless the President appoints another Cabinet Minister to Act.

Art 214 is very instructive to the nation and the President that “there shall be a Governor of the Bank of Zambia who shall be appointed by the President, subject to ratification by the National Assembly…”

The absence of ratified Governor by the National Assembly and a Presidential appointed Governor to Act in the interim, whoever is acting by virtue of being deputy Governor may be an illegality being practiced at the Bank and by those who have authority to do the right thing.

Therefore, constitutionally, there is a leadership vacuum at the Bank of Zambia.

I submit!

FROM THE PRIVATISATION HEAD MR FRANCIS KAUNDA.

By Francis Kaunda
GRZ/ZCCM Privatisation Negotiating Team (PNT) head Francis Kaunda has written about his experiences leading the government’s privatization programme of mining companies during MMD rule.

Mr Kaunda’s account is significant and unique especially as it comes from a mining expert, a man who ,before leading the PNT, had been chairman & CEO of ZCCM when the government owned the mines during UNIP days.

Under “The Politicians”, Mr Kaunda reveals some of his frustrating encounters with some Cabinet ministers at the time whom he said made his work burdensome through various tactics, including “misplaced and uninformed invective and blatant disinformation.”

Notably, Edith Nawakwi was Finance Minister at the time. Mr Kaunda does not seem to have a positive assessment of her. He gives examples.

Mr Kaunda describes a moment when Nawakwi tried to subvert the PNT’s efforts by conducting separate talks with some of the foreign bidders against government procedure.

He says: “Nawakwi’s efforts bordered on the hysterical. She was credited with organizing the infamous rendezvous between Kafue Consortium and a team from government at Lilayi Lodge while the negotiating team was out of the country. Unfortunately, whatever agreement they reached could not be consummated because they could not pass the test of the approved procedure.”

In another dramatic encounter, Mr Kaunda describes how Nawakwi brought a Canadian consultant firm (Carlington Sales Company represented by a dubious character called Ari Ben-Menashe) whom Nawakwi said would arrange Canadian mining houses interested to buy Zambia’s mines.

“We took off and arrived in Montreal on 10 June 1998. The following day we were taken to some very posh offices. Upon inquiry, we were informed the offices were actually a law firm’s boardroom. We sat down to face a group of officials we thought were executives from the said mining houses”, he says.

Mr Kaunda continues: “We later learnt that the officials we met in Montreal were a bunch of retired mining executives rounded up to perform for a fee.”

(From: “Selling the Family Silver: The Zambian Copper Mines Story” a book by Francis Kaunda, published 2002).

WHY SOME SELF PROCLAIMED OPPOSITION LEADERS ATTACK HH INSTEAD OF THOSE IN GOVERNMENT STEALING?

For some time now I have been observing how some opposition political parties leaders fight their fellow opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema. What is the motive behind in fighting a fellow citizen who is just seeking public office?

I have come to a conclusion that Hakainde Hichilema, is worthy a national leader and these people who call him names and accuse him of privatisation know very well that the man is capable of serving our nation with integrity, but they would wish it is them with these kind of credentials.

Here are some issues that I have taken so keenly. You are all very much aware that most people who handle key positions in our governments are people in their late 40s and above, because it is generally perceived they are mature and experienced citizens.

Now HH was only 27 years old when he was contracted to do some consulting before the MMD government sold some parastatal companies. All these people who today want to smear HH with rotten tomatoes, were by then in very key and technical positions. Edith Nawakwi and the likes of Alexander Chikwanda are among them. Surprisingly these people want to put the blame on HH who was just a young consultant then. For me as an individual, if HH at that age managed to convince an entire MMD government to do the wrong the thing, then he is the man who urgently needs to convince the entire world to partner with Zambia and foster national development.

Financial management and self discipline.

Hakainde Hichilema, has greatly scored on how to manage wealth from scratch and this is one issue that bothers the likes of Nawakwi and others. You all know the fake life of most politicians, once they leave office they become paupers because they have no idea of how to invest in life long businesses other than stealing from tax payers money. HH’s haters know very well that the little money HH was paid by the MMD government was correctly invested and yet those who had more money without a vision are still struggling today. This is why you see them bitter about HH and trying hard to discredit him.

Hardworking spirit in HH.

Some of you have been very fortunate in life that from the day you were born, everything was right there in front of your nose, even though, some of you have failed to utilize such opportunities. Anyway it’s about what choices one makes in life. Growing up in the village is not as easy as many want to assume. And this poor beginning of HH, made him think hard for future prospects and whenever he came up with something, he would ensure it was well taken care of.

Some people were busy investing their student allowances whilst at UNZA in Jameson, yet HH was busy investing his in livestock, and we expect urine to turn into cows after 20 years and vice versa.

Anyone who gets bitter about HH’s success is the biggest loser in life, because the best people like Nawakwi, and many others could have been doing, is to seek advice on how to run a successful and viable business even for individual benefits, unlike making unwarranted accusations on a radio station, just to please real criminals who are being acquitted even when the evidence is overwhelming .

May I take this opportunity to encourage all young people in this country to align themselves to the likes of HH who can positively pump sense in their lives, than those thriving on corruption and political violence.

Fellow young people in this country, we need a leader or government that will genuinely mentor us and not those foolish handouts from some corrupt people. We need to be educated about wealth creation and how to maintain it and be successful entrepreneurs. Let no one blackmail you, HH gives these advice for free of charge as long as you have a right functioning brain, you can prosper. Even these people who have messed up our economy, he has warned them before, but because they have no vision they decided to ignore and the rest is history.

For your own information Levy Patrick Mwanawasa, who served this nation with integrity, gave HH an offer of being a Vice President, but even when HH didn’t accept it, Mwanawasa never accused HH, to say you stole from the government. Now, are you really telling me Mwanawasa would have spared HH if he had sold the mines?

When the PF founding leader Sata came into power, no single day I heard him saying HH stole money, but Sata went after all those who had stolen in the MMD government and today, some ex-convicts are in the forefront painting HH black, and some serving as ministers under the PF government of Edgar Lungu. The scandal at the airport involving Zamtel, you know the people behind it and where they are today calling HH a thief, one day Zambians will know real thieves in this country.

The question is why is it that hardcore criminals are the ones who are championing this baseless issue?

Sikaile C Sikaile Good Governance and Human Rights Activist

EDITH NAWAKWI’s LETTER OF INTENT TO THE IMF – 1999.
Evidence showing Edith Nawakwi was responsible for privatization of ZCCM and other government assets.

Lusaka, March 10, 1999

Mr. Michel Camdessus
Managing Director
International Monetary Fund
Washington, D.C. 2043.

Dear Mr. Camdessus,

During the last few years, Zambia has continued to make progress in stabilizing the economy and implementing structural reforms, including the privatization of state enterprises, the reform of the public service, and the strengthening of the banking sector. The country has experienced a strong growth of economic activity in the nontraditional sectors since the start of our adjustment program, and the fight against inflation has born results. The recent progress on the privatization of the copper mines has been crucial in creating an enabling environment for economic growth in the coming years. Notwithstanding these encouraging developments, Zambia’s economic recovery remains fragile, and we must continue with our macroeconomic stabilization and structural reform efforts in order to establish the conditions for sustained economic growth.

The attached Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies of the government of Zambia describes the policy objectives for 1999. The government’s medium-term macroeconomic and sectoral policy objectives are embodied in a policy framework paper (PFP) for the period 1999-2001. In support of the program for 1999-2001, the government hereby requests a three-year arrangement from the Fund under the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility in an amount equivalent to SDR 254.45 million (52 percent of quota).

We believe that the policies and measures set forth in the attached Memorandum are adequate to achieve the objectives of the program, but will, if necessary, take any additional measures deemed necessary for this purpose. During the period of the arrangement, we will consult with the Fund on the adoption of any such measures in accordance with the Fund’s policies on such consultations. The government of Zambia will provide the Fund with any information that may be requested for the purpose of monitoring progress under the program.Yours sincerely,

/s/

E.Z. Nawakwi
Minister of Finance and
Economic Development Attachment: Memorandum of Economic and Financial PoliciesMemorandum of Economic and Financial Policies

I. Introduction

1. This memorandum summarizes the government’s medium-term adjustment strategy for the period 1999-200¹ The medium-term strategy is elaborated in the policy framework paper for 1999-2001. and presents its economic and financial program for 1999.
2. Our main macroeconomic objectives for the period 1999-2001 are to achieve average economic growth of about 5 percent a year, further reduce inflation, and strengthen the external position. To that end, we will continue our stabilization efforts through prudent financial policies, complemented by structural reforms, specifically public service reform, privatization, a strengthening of the banking sector, an improved legal framework and the provision of growth-enabling infrastructure. These reforms will be essential for removing the bottlenecks that hamper the development of the private sector, which, in turn, will create the conditions for making a dent in the widespread poverty through job creation in the private sector.
3. The main sources of economic growth over the medium term are in mining, agriculture, tourism, and export-oriented manufacturing:
4. We expect copper production to grow by some 10 percent a year during 1999-2001. In the wake of the recent economic crises in Asia, the copper price has weakened considerably and is projected at about US$1,600 per metric ton over the medium term.
5. The government recognizes that sustained growth in agriculture, which contributed about one-fifth of GDP over the 1990-97 period, will require the elimination of bottlenecks on the supply side, notably through improved roads, increased access of farmers to new production and harvest technologies, and wider access to financing. The government will also emphasize and stimulate the role of the private sector in agriculture and refrain from intervening in the marketing of agricultural products and input supply, except in the context of officially declared emergencies and specifically targeted poverty reduction schemes. Agricultural production is projected to grow on average by some 7½ percent a year, driven importantly by the nontraditional sectors, including cotton, tobacco, horticulture, and floriculture. Past agricultural reforms, including the liberalization of prices and the privatization of support services, processing, and distribution, have encouraged new private sector initiatives.
6. Several recent developments have affected tourism positively, including the establishment of a number of private airlines and the leasing to the private sector of government lodges.
7. The restructuring of the manufacturing sector has been accelerated by trade and exchange reforms, as well as by progress in privatization and the removal of restrictions on private sector activities.
8. The tariff reform of 1996 and the elimination of the import declaration fee in 1998 have been particularly beneficial in enhancing the attractiveness of producing for exports. A continuation of these policies should encourage further growth in these sectors.
9. The growth projections are predicated on normal weather conditions and a steady increase in investment to 21 percent of GDP in 2001 from 14½ percent in 1998, with the bulk of the increase originating from foreign investment in the mining sector. Improved macroeconomic conditions and a strengthened banking system should help raise the national savings rate by about 7 percentage points of GDP while reducing the savings-investment gap by about 1 percentage point between 1998 and 2001.
10. The medium-term fiscal strategy will aim at reducing the overall fiscal deficit to about 1 percent of GDP by 2001, which will require domestic fiscal surpluses of about 1 percent of GDP a year (excluding exceptional lending to the mining parastatal (ZCCM). In view of the limited scope for raising substantially the revenue- and expenditure-GDP ratios, the need for expanding investment in infrastructure and social services will require a significant reallocation of public outlays. The lowering of the combined wage and interest bill as a share of total expenditure over the medium term will create room for stepped-up expenditure in priority areas. As the scope for raising tax rates and introducing new taxes is limited, the revenue effort will need to come mainly from a further strengthening of tax administration, while avoiding new tax exemptions and special regimes. We also intend to undertake a study of the structure of corporate income tax rates, with a view to unifying these rates in a revenue-neutral manner.
11. The main objective of monetary policy is reducing inflation through an appropriately tight policy stance, notably by controlling the expansion of reserve money and maintaining positive real interest rates.
12. The privatization of state enterprises is key to the government’s efforts to raise efficiency and bolster economic growth. In January 1999, the government and a foreign mining company reached firm understandings on the sale of the main asset packages of the ZCCM, which is expected to take place by end-March 1999. As regards the nonmining sector, we plan to do the following:
13. offer for sale a minority shareholding and management rights in the telecommunications company (ZAMTEL);
    
14. concessioning of the railway system;
    
15. privatize the Zambia National Commercial Bank (ZANACO);
    
16. instruct the Zambia Privatization Agency (ZPA) to explore the options for divestiture of the electricity company (ZESCO), parastatals in the transport sector (the Njanji Commuter Company and ZAMPOST), and the National Savings and Credit Bank;
    
17. ensure that the Zambian and Tanzanian privatization agencies will submit recommendations to their respective governments on options for private sector participation in the operations of the commonly owned TAZARA railway and TAZAMA pipeline.
18. The government adopted on September 1, 1997 a comprehensive public service reform program, with the twin objectives of reducing excess employment in the public sector and improving the delivery of public services by, inter alia, eventually offering a more competitive remuneration. Some 15,500 public workers were retrenched between December 1997 and end-1998 under this program. The original plan envisaged a reduction in the size of the public service to 80,000 employees by end-1999. However, an updated payroll analysis suggests that such a sharp reduction in the public service cannot be realized without reducing employment in education and health care. With the assistance of the World Bank, we are carrying out more detailed work to determine the optimal size of the civil service in the medium term. Nonetheless, for 1999, we are targeting a reduction in the number of civil servants to 112,500, which entails removing 7,000 civil servants from the payroll through retrenchment, natural attrition, and the hiving off of public institutions. Owing to delays in the retrenchment of pensionable civil servants in 1998, we envisage an extension of the timetable for the implementation of a revised program through 2001. A new civil service remuneration structure, which will address, inter alia, the significant compression in the pay scales, will be introduced after the substantial completion of the retrenchments, but with the understanding that the central government wage bill will not exceed 5 percent of GDP.
19. The liberalization of the trade regime has contributed importantly to the expansion of private sector activity. The government intends to complete this process by following up on its commitments under the Cross-Border Initiative, as well as by reducing import tariffs to a weighted average of close to 10 percent. To this end, we also intend to reduce the maximum import tariff rate from 25 percent to 20 percent by 2001.
20. During 1999-2001, we intend to make significant progress toward the attainment of external viability by
21. fostering a stable macroeconomic environment;
    
22. maintaining trade and exchange rate policies that are conducive to the further expansion of nontraditional exports;
    
23. revitalizing the mining sector, led by the privatization of the ZCCM;
    
24. raising national savings;
    
25. increasing gross official reserves to the equivalent of about three months of imports.
26. Zambia’s heavy external public debt burden will require continued reliance on debt relief and concessional balance of payments assistance for the foreseeable future. We intend to make a request for debt relief under existing mechanisms in early 1999. In addition, we hope to qualify for assistance under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative, as it is not expected that the external debt burden can be reduced to sustainable levels without such supplementary debt relief. We recognize that consideration for participation in the HIPC Initiative will require a strong track record under Fund- and Bank-supported programs, improvements in our capacity to produce accurate debt and external sector statistics, and the maintenance of an accurate database on social sector outlays.
27. The widespread poverty in Zambia remains a key concern. The government has prepared a National Poverty Reduction Plan, which aims to reduce the overall incidence of poverty from the current 70 percent of the population to 50 percent by the year 2004. This is to be achieved through rural development, increased investment in infrastructure, the development of human resources, and targeted poverty reduction programs. In this regard, we intend to allocate at least 36 percent of domestic expenditure (excluding debt service) to the social sectors in 1999-2001. We also intend to promote the construction of dwellings and home ownership through the President’s housing initiative, which is expected to gain momentum in 1999.
28. The government’s macroeconomic objectives for 1999 are to achieve real GDP growth of 4 percent; reduce inflation to 15 percent (end-of-year basis); and strengthen the external position by adding some US$120 million to gross international reserves. The principal structural reforms in 1999 relate to public service reform, privatization, and the strengthening of the banking sector.
29. Our main fiscal policy objectives are to reduce inflation, to reconfigure the expenditure profile toward high-priority sectors, and to contribute to an increase in national savings. We will aim at limiting the overall fiscal deficit to K 250 billion (3.2 percent of GDP) and attach great importance to controlling firmly the government wage bill and implementing a restrained public service wage policy. As part of the budget process, we will in 1999 continue to operate a contingency reserve mechanism to cope better with unforeseen outlays and revenue shortfalls.
30. Domestic revenue is programmed to increase by 30 percent to K 1,460 billion in 1999, which takes into account the improvements in tax administration, notably in personal and company income taxes.² Also, we are continuing to step up our efforts to combat smuggling and customs fraud. In this regard, as part of the customs modernization project, antismuggling operations started in November 1997, and the collection of excise duties was tightened, including through the closure of major loopholes, during 1998. Furthermore, we expect positive effects on value-added tax (VAT) and customs revenue from the ongoing computerization of controls on removals in bond and transit and customs declarations, as well as from increased cooperation with customs officials in neighboring countries.
31. To achieve the targeted improvement in revenue performance, it will be crucial to maintain the integrity of the tax system. With a view to protecting the tax base, we have revoked import duty and import VAT exemptions granted in September-October 1998 to three companies,³ including ZESCO. We will ensure that the duty exemptions granted to the parliament⁴ will be limited to goods imported through the National Assembly for use by parliamentarians in performing their official duties. In practice, this exemption will apply only to the importation of one official car for each parliamentarian. In addition, we will refrain from introducing any tax reductions, new exemptions, rebates, or any other preferential tax treatment in 1999, except for the suspension of import duties on agricultural machinery and equipment, and the specific tax concessions that were made in the context of the privatization of the ZCCM.
32. Total domestic expenditures (excluding the contingency reserve) in 1999 will increase by 29 percent to K 1,333 billion. As regards current outlays, the wage bill will increase by 21 percent to K 395 billion (5 percent of GDP), which will be achieved by limiting the average per worker pay increase to 22 percent (including wage drift), retrenching public workers, and setting limits on employment levels in 1999 (see ¶26 below). Domestically financed capital expenditure will increase by 23 percent over the 1998 budget provision, to K 170 billion. More than 25 percent of this amount will be used to improve the road infrastructure, and about 10 percent of the funds will be spent on water and sanitation facilities. Foreign-financed capital expenditure is projected at K 666 billion, of which more than 30 percent will be spent in the social sectors, 36 percent on infrastructure, about 13 percent in the agricultural sector, and about 9 percent on private sector development. Exceptional charges in this year’s budget consist of the retrenchment costs for 7,000 civil servants and the lending to the ZCCM of K 302 billion for the financing of the retrenchment of 7,500 workers and the settlement of arrears.
33. To strengthen the cash management of the budget, the government will establish a contingency reserve of K 147 billion in 1999, which will be utilized to offset unforeseen shortfalls in domestic revenue and external program assistance, and to cover unforeseen domestic arrears and interest payments up to the total amount allocated for each quarter. Any remaining amounts in the quarterly contingency reserve would then be allocated in the month following the quarter to projects that could not be funded in the original budget. The contingency reserve will also be used if a tightening of the fiscal stance is needed to counter unexpected macroeconomic developments.
34. The government is strengthening budgetary procedures, notably with respect to spending commitments, cash outlays, and domestic arrears. Two comprehensive audits of domestic arrears, completed in 1998, are being used to build a database for the monitoring and payment of arrears, as well as for the analysis of commitments. In addition, six principal budget management measures will be introduced in 1999:
35. quarterly auditing of arrears and commitments by the Ministry of Finance;
    
36. the establishment of a coordination cell in the Budget Office for cash release and monitoring of ministry monthly returns on commitments, expenditures, and arrears;
    
37. outstanding commitments of ministries at any time must not exceed 10 percent of their warrant limit without the specific agreement of the Permanent Secretary of Budget and Economic Affairs;⁵
    
38. the rationalization of commercial bank accounts held by ministries, and, where appropriate, the transfer of these accounts to the central bank by end-June 1999;
    
39. the completion, by June 30, 1999, of a comprehensive inventory of capital projects, complemented by a review of the management and control of ongoing capital projects; and
    
40. the completion, by end-June 1999, of a feasibility study of a computer-based financial management information system.
41. The key to bringing down inflation is a firm control over the growth of money supply. Taking into account the programmed strengthening in 1999 of the net foreign assets position by almost 23 percent of beginning-of-year broad money, net domestic assets of the banking system will need to be reduced by about 2½ percent of beginning-of-year broad money. To provide sufficient credit to the private sector, which is projected to grow in line with nominal GDP, net bank claims on the government will need to contract by K 109 billion. The increase in treasury bill rates since mid-May 1998 has contributed to our objectives of stabilizing the kwacha and mobilizing financial savings. We will continue to maintain positive real interest rates.
42. With a view to keeping broad money growth within the program targets, the Bank of Zambia (BoZ) will carefully monitor the growth of reserve money. The targeted improvement in the net foreign assets position of the BoZ will require a decline in its net domestic assets of about 4 percent. On November 1, 1997, when the payments clearing house was transferred to commercial banks, the BoZ ended operation of its unsecured overdraft facilities to financial institutions. It will continue to refrain from providing unsecured overdrafts to commercial banks.
43. Notwithstanding the projected recovery in metals production and robust growth of nontraditional exports, the current account deficit (including official transfers) is expected to widen from an estimated 8 percent of GDP in 1998 to almost 9 percent in 1999. The balance of payments projections assume an average copper price of US$1,507 per ton, copper export volume growth of about 16 percent, and import volume growth of about 13 percent. The growth of imports mainly reflects higher imports of capital goods by the mining sector. With adequate external support, the BoZ will be able to build up its official reserves without putting undue pressure on the exchange rate.
44. The exchange rate of the kwacha is market determined, and the BoZ will continue to refrain from interventions in the exchange market that go against underlying market trends. We will closely monitor conditions in the exchange market and price and exchange rate developments in other major countries in the region, and we will adjust policies if exchange rate developments jeopardize the inflation objective or Zambia’s external competitiveness.
45. The external financing requirement before Paris Club debt relief is estimated at US$526 million in 1999 (excluding foreign-financed capital expenditure). Of this amount, US$175 million could be covered by World Bank program assistance,⁶ US$20 million by the African Development Fund, US$50 million by the European Union, US$50 million by the United Kingdom, and US$12 million by Germany. The remaining financing gap (US$219 million) could be filled by debt relief.
46. The government intends to remain current on all its external debt-service obligations and start discussions with the Paris Club in early 1999 on the rescheduling of debt-service obligations falling due during 1999-2001. We will also make efforts to reach an agreement with Russia on the rescheduling of outstanding debt, consistent with the 1996 Paris Club rescheduling agreement, and with non-Paris Club bilateral official creditors, both on terms at least as favorable as Naples terms. We will also settle in 1999 payments obligations dating from the era of exchange controls that give rise to exchange restrictions under Article VIII of the Fund’s Articles of Agreement.
47. The program for 1999 envisages that a further reduction in the size of the public service will take place in the context of the restructuring of ministries, the hiving off of government units,⁷ and the government’s long-term strategy to develop the sustainable capacity needed in the public sector to deliver high-quality services. With the assistance of the World Bank, we have drawn up a detailed implementation plan for the retrenchment of 7,000 public sector employees in 1999 to be achieved through (i) the hiving off of three government institutions with a total of 3,754 employees; (ii) the elimination of 500 positions in restructured ministries; (iii) 645 voluntary separations; (iv) natural attrition of 355 employees (on a net basis); and (v) the compulsory separation of 1,746 contractual daily employees. To ensure that the total cost of retrenchment of pensionable civil servants in 1999 will not exceed K 80 billion, we will adjust the benefits that separated civil servants presently can claim under the Public Service Pensions Act. An actuarial review of civil service pensions, which will specifically correct the anomalies in the various pension options under the present plan, will be submitted to the President by end-April 1999.
48. The monitoring of the targeted reductions in the public service will require reliable payroll data and effective controls on the establishment register. At present, inconsistencies exist between the payroll data of the Ministry of Finance and the establishment register managed by the Cabinet Office. By end-April, 1999, we will submit recommendations on improving the quality of the payroll data and establishing controls. In the meantime, the size of the public service will be monitored on the basis of the payroll data of the Ministry of Finance.
49. The government will continue to give high priority to the privatization of state-owned enterprises, including major utility companies, parastatals in the petroleum and transport sectors, and financial institutions. The following specific actions are envisaged in 1999:
50. offering for sale minority shareholding and management rights in ZAMTEL before end-September 1999;
    
51. requesting the ZPA before end-June to study options for the divestiture of ZESCO;
    
52. offering for sale or closing the Zambia National Oil Company (ZNOC);
    
53. before end-September 1999 putting out to tender the granting of concessions of the railway system;
    
54. tendering management rights on the operations of the National Airports Corporation in Livingstone, Ndola, and Mfuwe;
    
55. handing over ZAMPOST and the Njanji Commuter Company by end-June 1999 to the ZPA; and
    
56. ensuring the preparation by ZPA of options for the privatization of the Zambia National Commercial Bank (ZANACO).
57. Owing to the decline in economic activity, the financial position of the banking system remained weak in 1998. We are addressing this problem by pressing banks to step up their loan recovery efforts and, where appropriate, requiring changes in management in those banks. This policy has already led to a decline in the portfolio of nonperforming loans in recent months. In addition, the supervisory authorities will not hesitate to require new capital injections or the closure of banks that show capital deficiencies. In conjunction with these measures, prudential supervision of commercial banks will be further reinforced in 1999. The BoZ intends to strengthen off-site risk analysis through intensified training of staff and the use of an improved commercial bank database, which will be set up with Fund technical assistance. In addition, we have prepared an amendment to the Banking and Financial Services Act that, inter alia, would strengthen the supervisory powers of the BoZ and extend supervision to nonbank financial institutions. We intend to send a legislative proposal to parliament in early 1999.
58. We aim for the completion of the sales agreement on ZCCM’s largest asset packages by end-March 1999. The net amount of short-term debt and suppliers’ arrears (after deduction of the privatization receipts) to be repaid by the ZCCM holding company at the time of the transfer of the assets is projected at US$124 million, including US$110 million arrears to the electricity supplier (CEC). This financing gap will be covered in part as follows:
59. rescheduling of ZCCM debt to the CEC beyond 1999, amounting to US$50 million; and
    
60. assumption by the government of ZCCM’s debt-service obligations to the World Bank, amounting to US$23 million.
61. The net financing gap to be covered by the government is projected at US$51 million. Taken into account the uncertainties with regard to the financial position of the ZCCM, the program for 1999 includes a budgetary provision of K 151 billion (US$65 million) to cover the remaining liabilities emanating from the sale of the assets. If the debt settlement by the government is below this provision, the difference will go toward raising the targeted domestic fiscal surplus in the second quarter of 1999.
62. Recognizing the importance of a reliable and efficient energy supply for the economy, the government remains committed to the market-based pricing of energy products. The privatization of public enterprises in the energy sector will contribute to this effort by ensuring an environment that fosters competition and efficiency. In support of this objective, regulations make it possible for the private sector to connect to the power grid and import petroleum products. However, given the existing monopolies in the energy sector, oversight of energy pricing will continue to be necessary. To this end, the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) will henceforth adhere to a price adjustment policy that allows for the adjustment of wholesale and retail petroleum prices in order to reflect costs, including changes in exchange rates and world market prices. With respect to electricity tariffs, prices will be set to reflect underlying costs and a reasonable margin. Price adjustments in energy products will be subject only to ex-post reviews by the ERB on the basis of the aforementioned criteria.
63. In the recent period, considerable progress has been made in improving the quality of monetary and balance of payments data. The BoZ will attach the highest priority to the elimination of the remaining inconsistencies in the monetary survey and further improve the timeliness of balance of payments data by implementing the recommendations of the November 1997 STA technical assistance mission by, among other things, speeding up the collection of bills of entry forms from customs offices. The Central Statistical Office will eliminate inconsistencies between the revised national accounts data and production data on the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. The Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Zambia will strengthen data reporting on external debt service.
64. The progress in the implementation of the government’s adjustment program will be monitored on the basis of quantitative and structural performance criteria and benchmarks, as shown in the attached Tables 1 and 2. These include ceilings on (i) increases in net domestic assets of the BoZ, (ii) increases in net bank claims on the government, (iii) the outstanding stock of domestic arrears of the government, (iv) the accumulation of external payments arrears, (v) the contracting of new medium- and long-term nonconcessional public or publicly guaranteed loans, (vi) the stock of short-term debt contracted or guaranteed by the central government and the BoZ, and (vii) the size of the public service. The quantitative performance criteria and benchmarks also include floors on the domestic fiscal balance (cash basis) of the government and the net international reserves of the BoZ. The structural performance criteria and benchmarks relate to (i) the offering for sale of a minority share and management rights in ZAMTEL; (ii) the submission of recommendations on the establishment of an actuarially sound civil service pension system; (iii) the maintenance of positive real interest rates on treasury bills; (iv) the abstention from new tax exemptions, waivers, or preferential tax treatment; and (v) the transfer of the major asset packages of the ZCCM.
65. The Fund will conduct with Zambia two reviews of the annual program based on performance through end-June 1999 and end-December 1999, respectively. The reviews will include an assessment of the macroeconomic framework, progress in public service reform, the implementation of measures to improve expenditure control, privatization, and the strengthening of prudential supervision of the banking sector.

¹The medium-term strategy is elaborated in the policy framework paper for 1999-2001.
²The modernization program for direct taxes includes the following measures, which were substantially completed by mid-1998: (i) revised procedures to improve the issuance of tax returns and assessments; (ii) procedures for the systematic management of tax arrears; (iii) systematic control procedures for the examination of accounts; and (iv) the reallocation of staff to areas of greatest revenue return. On the basis of a review of direct tax legislation completed in October 1997, legislative amendments to ensure appropriate powers for the charging of pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) taxes and the provisional tax were introduced in 1998.
³Under Statutory Instruments 113, 114, and 116.
⁴Statutory Instrument 115 of September 22, 1998.
⁵Violations of this rule will be sanctioned by withholding cash allocations in the following month.
⁶Disbursement totaling US$170 million from the public sector reform and export promotion credit (PSREP), and US$5 million from IDA reflows.
⁷Thus far, the restructuring plans for 12 out of 22 ministries have been approved, and a decision was taken to hive off 3 government institutions. We intend to implement the restructuring plans for the 22 ministries and take a decision regarding the possible divestiture of a further 23 government units, which employ about 2,000 persons, in the first quarter of 1999.

SOURCE: IMF

NAWAKWI IS DODGING RESPONSEBILITY

The deliberate betrayal and lies Nawakwi displayed in her rehearsed radio interview on Hot FM is another reminder of how the current crop of female leaders in Zambia have not been inspiring at all.

Lies are the least we expect from leaders and under the PF we have been subjected to many lies from sabotage, genocide, gassing, 48 houses, toll gates, gay rights, mfwiti mfwiti, etc. Zambians are tired of politics of deception, mockery and slander.

The shameless performance by Nawakwi was not only demoralizing to her young female admirers; it also exposed her desperation to win favour from the PF hierarchy.

1. MINISTER’S ROLE IN PRIVATISATION
   Nawakwi as former minister finance minister and an elected MP, was sufficiently empowered by the Privatization Act to select companies, approve valuations, negotiate prices and sign the sales agreements. To this day she is morally, legally, constitutionally and logically responsible for every decision that she made, because Nawakwi and Cabinet had the final say and authority on every single deal be it property or company sale.
2. HH’S ROLE AS CONSULTANT
   The role of a valuation consultant was to provide government with information on financial performance, position and value of companies, to help them make a decision. After valuation ZPA would then decide whether to sale or hold, liquidate or recapitalize, concession or give to management. The decision to sale was made by Minister and recommended to Cabinet. That is how powerful she was. After the decision to sale, everything now depended on the competitive bidding process that was open to the whole world. It is a tall order for a valuer to manipulate an open and competitive tender process involving companies from across the world.

Next time Nawakwi comes on radio, out of respect, she should take responsibility for her decisions. Zambians gave her a great privilege and she should be respectful in return by explaining her actions and not passing the blame.

3. HH UNDERVALUED INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL
   The evaluation of the bids for intercontinental hotel – Livingstone cannot be looked at like an off-the-shelf sale. Nawakwi is arguing like a tomato marketeer from Chisokone market who only looks at the price on a particular day because the product would go bad the following day. She was given details and options and as person who was in-charge of the process she should explain to us all the bids that came through why she accepted or rejected them. If she can’t do that then she was dozing indeed.
4. HH WAS INVOLVED IN RAMCOZ LIQUIDATION
   When Nawakwi was asked about HH selling mines, she just referred to RAMCOZ. Another lie, because she hid the fact that the government sold the mine to the Binani against expert advice. She was dishonest because Binani failed to settle a ZANACO loan, it was ZANACO that put it on receivership. She lied because the Liquidator of RAMCOZ was Chris Mulenga and not HH. Therefore the problems in Luanshya emanated from the decision to sale mine to a bad investor and not because of the liquidator. If you believe Nawakwi does not know these facts, then you will never know a hypocrite when the hypocrisy slaps you in the face.
5. HH ILLEGALLY ACQUIRED THE KABULONGA HOUSE FROM LIMA BANK
   Despite millions of Zambians buying houses and therefore benefiting from privatisation either as sitting tenants or through open bidding, HH is the only Zambian demonized for doing what everyone else did. I would be shocked if Nawakwi did not purchase any state property. All those houses people rent out in Kabulonga and Olympia at K15,000 per month were bought during privatization, some of them at K10,000. She got her facts wrong on the Lima bank house. She was challenged live on air by HH, and she had no facts to counter out apart from calling HH names. Only HH’s haters were able to make sense out of all her nonsense.

As much as politics can be a fierce game, we should not lose our morals. We should not be dishonest with ourselves. If a mother like Nawakwi can lie on live radio, what message is she sending to youths? PF have let the dogs out on HH like they do during elections, because they are only good at barking and not reason. They know debating the economy is negative for them. It is up to us as voters to separate sense from noise. Separate leaders from politicians. Separate yappers form doers. It is time to appeal to our conscience, sense of reason and logic.

Richard W

By Eugene Makai

There abound many myths (some enduring) and misinformation about the history, participants and management of privatization in Zambia which transitioned from the Command Economy along socialist lines (mixed economy) in which the state was a primary operator in the economy, to the sale of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), in what is now commonly referred to as Zambia’s Privatisation period (1991-2001).

The objective of this series of articles is to separate commonly held myths from the facts of privatization – and afford the reader an opportunity to obtain real, accurate and undiluted facts – unrelated to the political bent and innuendo which has been a staple for many Zambians in the last 14 years.

•MYTH – Chiluba’s MMD conceived the privatisation of SOEs

•FACT – The United National Independence Party (UNIP) government of Dr. Kenneth David Kaunda set up a Task Force on Privatisation based at Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation Ltd. (ZIMCO) Head Office in September 1990 to examine and recommend modalities for implementing a privatisation policy.

This was prompted by Dr. Kaunda’s address to the 5th Extraordinary National Council on 28th May, 1990 in which he admitted that the Command Economy had run its course and that his government had decided to “…devolve more economic power to the Zambian people through a scheme by which the state will sell PART of its capital in state enterprises to the general public.”

The Budget Address of November 1990 underscored the UNIP government’s commitment to privatization. In January 1991 the Task Force on Privatisation submitted its report to the Minister of Finance after which government set up a Steering Committee on Privatisation. It is this Committee that put together the initial framework for launching the privatisation process.

At this point, all this was administrative as no legislative anchor had been created to enforce this economic policy. The first tranche of companies identified by June 1991 to be sold were:
•AFE
•Consolidated Tyre Services Limited
•Crushed Stones Sales
•Eagle Travel
•Mwinilunga Canneries
•Zambia Clay Industries
•Zambezi Sawmills
•Lublend *
•Nkwazi Manufacturing Company*
•Poultry Processing Company*

*In the last three, Minority shareholders had pre-emptive rights.

《pre-emptive rights or first option to buy is a contractual right to acquire certain property newly coming into existence before it can be offered to any other person or entity.》

FAST FORWARD 2002 – KCM

In August 2002, then Finance and National Planning Minister Emmanuel Kasonde announced on the floor of the house that after protracted negotiations by the government of the Republic of Zambia (MMD) with Anglo-American out of GRZ’s demand of exit payments of US$250 million, the mining firm only agreed to a package of US$65 million which included exit payments amounting to US$30 million and US$26.5 as soft loans to Konkola Copper Mines (KCM), while on its part GRZ was to provide US$8.5 million to KCM.

These negotiations commenced in January 2002 after Anglo-American gave its notice to quit its mining operations.

PART TWO FOLLOWS….

THIS IS WHAT PF DEPUTY SG MUMBI PHIRI HAD TO SAY ABOUT EDITH NAWAKWI IN JULY 2015.

FDD president Edith Nawakwi has been challenged to explain her involvement with the Canadian businessman Ari Ben-Menashe who swindled Zambia in a bogus maize deal and was also involved in the failed privatization of some mining assets.

PF deputy secretary general Mumbi Phiri has also challenged FDD spokesman Antonio Mwanza to explain if he had asked Ms Nawakwi about Ben-Menashe’s involvement in the botched mines privatization deals, “he should not just talk about things without investigating”.

Ms. Phiri revealed that Carrington Sales owned by an Israeli Ben-Menashe was ordered by a London court to refund Zambia US$10 million from the botched maize deal but that Ms. Nawakwi introduced the same man to the privatization team led by chairman Francis Kaunda.

Mrs. Phiri said Ms Nawakwi, who presents herself as an incorruptible and virtuous person, must explain what role Ari Ben-Menashe played in the failed delivery of maize to Zambia and also his involvement in the failed purchase of mining assets which had to be stopped by President Frederick Chiluba.

Ms. Phiri said the role of Ms Nawakwi in the botched sales of the mines were very well documented in a book published in 2002 by former privatization negotiation chairman, Francis Kaunda, which book has never been challenged.

“That book gives details of the role Ms Nawakwi played and it cannot be said that she is blameless,” she said.

“In all fairness I would like her to explain to the Zambian people what role Ari Ben-Menashe played in the maize deal and in the sale of the mines, both of which were found to be irregular,” Ms Phiri said.

“I would also like Ms Nawakwi to tell the country why she was dismissed as Minister of Finance so that the people of Zambia have an idea of the person who has now come out to criticize and cast aspersions on Edgar Lungu and other people in leadership.

“She must explain if, as the book says, it was not her who brought Carrington Sales Company of Canada with their key man Ari Ben-Menashe to negotiate the sale of the mines which Mr. Francis Kaunda later discovered to have been totally contrived, involving people of dubious character.

According to the book, Ms. Phiri said, Mr. Kaunda and his negotiating team travelled to Canada for a meeting with alleged mining houses organized by Carlington Sales but that when the Zambians investigated the people they were meeting they discoverd that they were not mining houses, but actors who had been paid to do so.

“This book was published in 2002 and Ms Nawakwi has never challenged the facts presented by Mr. Francis Kaunda. Can she explain this to the people of Zambia. Can she explain why Mr. Kaunda refused to sign the mining deals in Canada?

After that can she also explain how Zambia lost millions of dollars paid for maize which was never delivered in a deal brokered by Ben-Manashe of Carrington Sales,” Ms Phiri said.

NAWAKWI YOU CAN RUN BUT YOU CAN’T HIDE.

BY Shamoba, LET THE TRUTH BE TOLD #CANADASCANDLE AND ZAMBIAN MINES.

mining industry, foreign policy and neoliberalism overlap tightly. It is a subject Canadians ought to pay attention to if they want their country to be a force for good in the world.

While few Canadians could find Zambia on a map, the Great White North has significant influence over the southern African nation.

A big beneficiary of internationally sponsored neoliberal reforms, a Vancouver firm is the largest foreign investor in the landlocked country of 16 million people.

First Quantum Minerals (FQM) has been embroiled in various ecological, labour and tax controversies in the copper rich nation over the past decade. At the end of last year, First Quantum was sued for $1.4 billion by Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Investment Holdings (ZCCM-IH), a state entity with minority stakes in most of the country’s mining firms. The statement of claim against First Quantum listed improper borrowing and a massive tax liability.

In a politically charged move, President Edgar Lungu recently ordered ZCCM-IH to drop the case and seek an “amicable” out of court settlement with FQM. Social movements criticized the government for (again) caving to powerful mining interests exploiting the country’s natural resources. According to the organization War on Want, Zambia loses $3 billion a year to tax dodges by multinationals, mainly in the lucrative mining sector. A recent Africa Confidential report on the row between First Quantum and ZCCM-IH highlighted the Vancouver firm’s political influence, pointing out that “top government officials are frequently feted and hosted by FQM.”

First Quantum’s presence in Zambia dates to the late 1990s privatization of the Zambian Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM), which once produced 700,000 tonnes of copper per year. In a report on the sale, John Lungu and Alastair Fraser explain that “the division of ZCCM into several smaller companies and their sale to private investors between 1997 and 2000 marked the completion of one of the most comprehensive and rapid privatisation processes seen anywhere in the world.”

The highly indebted country was under immense pressure to sell its copper and public mining company. Zambia’s former Finance Minister Edith Nawakwi said, “we were told by advisers, who included the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank that…for the next 20 years, Zambian copper would not make a profit. [But, if we privatised] we would be able to access debt relief, and this was a huge carrot in front of us — like waving medicine in front of a dying woman. We had no option” but to privatize.

Ottawa played a part in the privatization push. Canada was part of the World-Bank-led Consultative Group of donors that promoted the copper selloff. With the sale moving too slowly for the donors, a May 1998 Consultative Group meeting in Paris made $530 million in balance of payments support dependent on privatizing the rest of ZCCM.

(Canada had been a proponent of neoliberal reform in Zambia since the late 1980s. At the time Ottawa slowed aid to the country in a successful bid to change the government’s attitude to neoliberal reforms, explains Carolyn Bassett in The Use of Canadian Aid to Support Structural Adjustment in Africa. After Zambia fell into line with the International Monetary Fund, CIDA recharged its aid program. As part of a push for economic reform Ottawa secured an agreement that gave a former vice president of the Bank of Canada the role of governor of the Bank of Zambia, where he oversaw the country’s monetary policies and “responses to the IMF”. In her 1991 PhD thesis Bassett notes, “instrumental in developing Zambia’s new ‘domestically designed’ [economic] program was the new head of the Bank of Zambia, Canadian Jacques Boussières.” Paid by Ottawa, Boussières was the first foreign governor of the Bank of Zambia since independence. This was not well received by some. Africa Events described Boussières as “a White Canadian who came to de- Zambianise the bank post under controversial circumstances.”)

The hasty sale of the public mining behemoth was highly unfavourable to Zambians. The price of copper was at a historic low and the individual leading the negotiations, Francis Kaunda, was later jailed for defrauding the public company. “ZCCM’s privatization was carried out with a complete lack of transparency, no debate in parliament, and with one-sided contracts which few of us have ever seen,” said James Lungu, a professor at Zambia’s Copperbelt University.

Taking advantage of the government’s weak bargaining position, First Quantum and other foreign companies picked up the valuable assets for rock bottom prices and left the government with ZCCM’s liabilities, including pensions. The foreign mining companies also negotiated ultralow royalty rates and the right to take the government to international arbitration if tax exemptions were withdrawn for 15 years or more. Many of the multinationals made their money back in a year or two and when the price of copper rose five-fold in the mid-2000s they made bundles.

Having conceded tax exemptions and ultralow royalty rates, the government captured little from the surge in global copper prices. In 2006 Zambian royalties from copper represented about $24 million on $4 billion worth of copper extracted. The .6% royalty rate was thought to be the lowest in the world. The government take from taxing the mining companies wasn’t a whole lot better. Between 2000 and 2007 Zambia exported $12.24 billion in copper but the government only collected $246 million in tax.

Since 2008 Zambia has wrestled more from the companies, but they’ve had to overcome stiff corporate resistance. When the government suggested an increased royalty in 2005 First Quantum’s commercial manager Andrew Hickman complained that it “would probably make any new mining ventures in Zambia uneconomical” while three years later First Quantum said it would have “no choice” but to take legal action if a new tax regime breached the agreement it signed during the privatization process.

With billions of dollars tied up in the country, First Quantum had good reason to campaign aggressively to maintain the country’s generous mining policy.

First Quantum stands accused of cheating Zambia out of tens of millions of dollars in taxes. An audit found that between 2006 and 2008 Mopani Copper Mines underreported cobalt extracts and manipulated internal prices to shift profits to First Quantum and Glencore subsidiaries in the British Virgin Islands and Bermuda, allowing it to evade millions of dollars of tax in Zambia.

In Offshore Finance and Global Governance: Disciplining the Tax Nomad, William Vlcek explains: “As a corporate entity, First Quantum does not directly manage the mining operations in Zambia, rather it owns a subsidiary in Ireland which in turn owns subsidiary corporations registered in the British Virgin Islands and Zambia. … The overall corporate organization involves similar subordinate corporate structures with subsidiaries registered in Barbados, British Virgin Islands, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Netherlands, none of which jurisdictions include a mine or smelter operated by First Quantum. … Jurisdictions such as the British Virgin Islands … do not impose a corporate income tax on foreign-sourced income. Thus, First Quantum’s subsidiaries will pay corporate income tax on their operations in Zambia to the Zambian government, but any income that flows through to the BVI-registered subsidiary will not be taxed before flowing onward.”

In a bid to cut down on corporate ‘transfer pricing’ and tax evasion, the Zambian government sought to simplify the mining fee structure. In 2013 Lusaka proposed eliminating income tax on mining companies and substantially increasing royalty rates (up to 20% for open-pit mines and 8% on underground operations). In 2015 Minister of Finance Alexander B. Chikwanda told Parliament: “the tax system was vulnerable to all forms of tax planning schemes such as transfer pricing, hedging and trading through ‘shell’ companies which are not directly linked to the core business. Sir, it has been a challenge for the revenue administration to detect and abate such practices. Further, provisions on capital allowances and carry forward of losses eliminated potential taxable profits. Mr Speaker, the tax structure was simply illusory as only two mining companies were paying Company Income Tax under the previous tax regime as most of them claimed that they were not in tax-paying positions.”

First Quantum, Toronto’s Barrick Gold and a number of other foreign mining companies screamed murder and worked to derail the Zambian government. First Quantum government affairs manager John Gladston said “the new system doesn’t incentivise investment in new capital projects which in turn, will inevitably be translated into fewer new jobs and less opportunities for wealth creation for Zambians.” To spur a backlash in the job-hungry country, First Quantum laid off 350 workers at its Kansanshi mine. The government responded by saying First Quantum wasn’t adhering to the country’s labour law. Government spokesperson Chishimba Kambwili told Xinhua that “all mining companies are aware of the standing order, which obliges them to consult the government through the Ministry of Labour before any decision to sack any worker becomes effective.”

Barrick Gold also threatened to lay off workers if the government increased royalty rates. The Toronto company said it would shutter its Lumwana mine, which prompted 2,000 workers, fearing for their jobs, to hold a one-day strike. The foreign-run Chamber of Mines of Zambia claimed 12,000 jobs would be lost if the royalty changes went through and the IMF added its voice to those opposing the royalty hike.

The mining corporations’ strong-armed tactics succeeded. After a six-month standoff, the government backed off.

First Quantum, Barrick and the other foreign mining companies exploited the immense power ZCCM’s privatization gave them over Zambian economic life. By shuttering their mines they could produce economic hardship for thousands of people. (With an 80% unemployment rate and most Zambians living on less than a dollar a day, each formally employed individual provides for many others.) Some suggested the foreign mining companies were even “powerful enough to manipulate the exchange rate” of the country.

Canadian officials actively backed FQM and other mining companies in Zambia. At the 2013 Prospectors and Developers Association of Canada Convention Ottawa announced the start of negotiations on a Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement with Zambia, which would allow Canadian companies to pursue Zambia in international tribunal for lost profits. The next year the Head of Office at the Canadian High Commission, Sharad Kumar Gupta, “said the Canadian government is trying to encourage the private sector to explore… opportunities in Zambia’s mining sector,” reported Lusaka’s news.hot877.com.

After the leftist Patriotic Front opposition party accused First Quantum of blocking workers from voting in a 2005 parliamentary by-election, the Canadian High Commissioner defended the Vancouver company. John Deyell, who previously worked at mining giants Inco and Falconbridge in Sudbury, claimed First Quantum wasn’t responsible for day-to-day operations despite owning a sixth of MCM stock and controlling two seats on MCM’s executive board. In response the Patriotic Front sought to take their protest against MCM’s violation of workers’ rights to the Canadian High Commission, but the police denied them a permit.

In Zambia, as with elsewhere in Africa, Canada’s mining industry, foreign policy and neoliberalism overlap tightly. It’s a subject Canadians ought to pay attention to if we want our country to be a force for good in the world.
Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM), which operated ten mines, three smelters, two refineries and a tailings leach plant. ZCCM was owned by Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation (60.3%), an Anglo-American subsidiary ZCI Holdings (27.2%), RST International (7.0%) and the public (5.5%). ZCCM was sold in 1998 for just US$627 million, split into 7 units, including Konkola Copper Mine ($25 million), Kansanshi Mine ($28 million), Luanshya Mine ($35 million), Chibuluma Mine ($17.5 million), Chambishi Mine ($20 million) and others. The low price was criticised for being a result of bribery and corruption – with Anglo-American, which sat on the board of ZCCM, buying Konkola Copper Mines, ZCCM’s flagship, for a song, critics alleged. The mines were privatised after the copper prices had dropped from $2,300/tonne in 1997 to about $1,500/tonne in 1998 – and remained at this level until 2003. As the government was subsidising the mines by approximately $1 million a day, the privatisation was encouraged by a bit of arm-twisting: “We were told by advisers, who included the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank that for the next 20 years, Zambian copper would not make a profit. [But, if we privatised] we would be able to access debt relief, and this was a huge carrot in front of us, We had no option,” said then Minister of Finance Edith Nawakwi.#1999

The objectives, which the Government was seeking to achieve through the privatisation of ZCCM, were to: · Transfer control of and operating responsibilities for ZCCM’s operations to private sector mining companies as quickly as practicable; · Mobilise substantial amounts of committed new capital for ZCCM’s operations; · Ensure that ZCCM realised value for its assets and retained a significant minority interest in principal mining operations; · Transfer or extinguish ZCCM’s liabilities, including its third party debt; · Diversify ownership of Copperbelt assets; · Promote Zambian participation in the ownership and management of the mining assets; and · Conduct the privatisation as quickly and transparently as consistent with good order, respecting other objectives and observing ZCCM Ltd’s existing contractual obligations.
As part of the privatization process, the company’s mining assets were unbundled and sold off as separate new entities or business packages to the private sector. The reason for unbundling the ZCCM Ltd into business packages was to promote diversity of ownership and minimise political and economic risks.

A two-stage privatisation process was adopted. Under Stage one, majority interests in the packages relating to certain of ZCCM Ltd’s mining and power distribution operations were offered to trade buyers, which was to leave the transformed ZCCM Ltd as an Investments Holdings Company, with minority interest in each of these packages. Through ZCCM Investments Holdings Plc., Government has retained minority interests of not more than 21% within each of the business packages.

The privatisation of ZCCM commenced in 1996, after GRZ and the Boards of ZCCM and the Zambia Privatisation Agency (ZPA) approved the ZCCM Limited Privatisation Report and Plan presented by UK based financial and legal advisors, NM Rothschild & Sons and Clifford Chance, respectively.

Stage two of the privatisation of ZCCM envisaged GRZ disposing of some or all of its shareholding, with part of this being earmarked for Zambian institutional and private investors as a way of promoting Zambian participation in the mining sector.

GRZ obtained the support of the World Bank and the Nordic Development Fund for the Copperbelt Environment Project (CEP), to address environmental liabilities and obligations remaining with GRZ/ZCCM-IH following the privatization of mining assets.

The Environmental Management Facility (EMF) which is composed of multiple stakeholders, working as the EMF Steering Committee, was established by the Minister of Finance and National Planning as provided for by the protocols, for the purpose of prioritizing and approving subprojects of the CEP for funding. The project which became effective on 31 July 2003 ends in August 2008.

Apart from environmental responsibilities ZCCM-IH has the additional responsibility of managing the ex ZCCM employees trust fund and also the finalization sale of ZCCM properties.

In November 2011, the role and importance of ZCCM-IH have been highlighted, led by the Hon. Zambian Minister of Mines Wylbur Simuusa, representing the major shareholder.

“Through its state mining investment company, Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines Investment Holdings, the government is finalizing plans to start negotiations with mining companies aimed at increasing its stakes in projects to as much as 35%” he told the press.

“There is need for the country to have increased ownership in the mines and ZCCM-IH is an engine which can facilitate the process.”

“ZCCM-IH is an important unit which if properly managed, can help the country realise huge benefits from the mining resources.”

To that purpose, as Zambian presidential elections have emerged the victory of Patriotic Front leader Michael Sata, Mr. Wila D. Mung’omba was appointed as Executive Chairman of ZCCM-IH with effect from 1 December 2011.

Mr. Mung’omba who is not new to the affairs of the company, has in the past served as Group A Director of ZCCM Limited in 1996–98. Between 1995–1998, Mr. Mung’omba was World Bank’s appointed Team Leader in the initial preparation of the ZCCM Limited privatization Report and Plan by the UK based Investment Bank NM, Rothschild & Sons and international law firm Clifford Chance. Later Mr. Mung’omba was involved in the creation of the present ZCCM-IH.

July 21, 2015 Daily Nation Reporter

FDD president Edith Nawakwi has been challenged to explain her involvement with the Canadian businessman Ari Ben-Menashe who swindled Zambia in a bogus maize deal and was also involved in the failed privatization of some mining assets.

PF deputy secretary general Mumbi Phiri has also challenged FDD spokesman Antonio Mwanza to explain if he had asked Ms Nawakwi about Ben-Menashe’s involvement in the botched mines privatization deals, “he should not just talk about things without investigating”.

Ms. Phiri revealed that Carrington Sales owned by an Israeli Ben-Menashe was ordered by a London court to refund Zambia US$10 million from the botched maize deal but that Ms. Nawakwi introduced the same man to the privatization team led by chairman Francis Kaunda.

Mrs. Phiri said Ms Nawakwi, who presents herself as an incorruptible and virtuous person, must explain what role Ari Ben-Menashe played in the failed delivery of maize to Zambia and also his involvement in the failed purchase of mining assets which had to be stopped by President Frederick Chiluba.

Ms. Phiri said the role of Ms Nawakwi in the botched sales of the mines were very well documented in a book published in 2002 by former privatization negotiation chairman, Francis Kaunda, which book has never been challenged.

“That book gives details of the role Ms Nawakwi played and it cannot be said that she is blameless,” she said.

“In all fairness I would like her to explain to the Zambian people what role Ari Ben-Menashe played in the maize deal and in the sale of the mines, both of which were found to be irregular,” Ms Phiri said.

“I would also like Ms Nawakwi to tell the country why she was dismissed as Minister of Finance so that the people of Zambia have an idea of the person who has now come out to criticize and cast aspersions on Edgar Lungu and other people in leadership.

“She must explain if, as the book says, it was not her who brought Carrington Sales Company of Canada with their key man Ari Ben-Menashe to negotiate the sale of the mines which Mr. Francis Kaunda later discovered to have been totally contrived, involving people of dubious character.

According to the book, Ms. Phiri said, Mr. Kaunda and his negotiating team travelled to Canada for a meeting with alleged mining houses organized by Carlington Sales but that when the Zambians investigated the people they were meeting they discoverd that they were not mining houses, but actors who had been paid to do so.

“This book was published in 2002 and Ms Nawakwi has never challenged the facts presented by Mr. Francis Kaunda. Can she explain this to the people of Zambia. Can she explain why Mr. Kaunda refused to sign the mining deals in Canada?

After that can she also explain how Zambia lost millions of dollars paid for maize which was never delivered in a deal brokered by Ben-Manashe of Carrington Sales,” Ms Phiri said.

We know who is who…. Don’t think you are smart will go deeper.

HAKAINDE HICHILEMA IS RUTHLESS, VIOLENT AND HIS GREED CAN DESTROY THE COUNTRY- EDITH NAWAKWI

Opposition UPND leader is a ruthless, violent and greedy man determined to obtain wealth at all cost.

Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD) leader Edith Nawakwi has charged that her experience with Hichilema depicted a man who was violent, brutal, tribal and lacked respect for his colleagues in the Opposition.

She said Hichilema was unfit to be leader of the country.

She said Hichilema lacked humility and regarded everybody else with contempt.

She reminded the country that Hichilema unleashed violence on her, over a political differences they had when 3 political parties, UNIP, FDD and UPND came together in 2006 to form an an alliance called United Democratic Alliance (UDA).

She said previous presidents from Levy Mwanawasa, Rupiah Banda and Michael Sata tried to court him but Hichioema lacked humility and was full himself.

Nawakwi was speaking on Hot FM and said Hichilema has been attacking her using his online newspapers like Koswe.

She said Hichilema benefited from the privatization assets as a consultant and ended up owning many assets he was entrusted to sale such as those belonging to Lima Bank.

She said he obtained the house belonging to Lima Bank situtaed on Serval Road, Kabulonga, from an entity, Lima Bank, that he was privatizing.

He also obtained state ranches that he was tasked to sale.

She also said the sale of Musio-O-Tunya Intercontinental Hotel was sold at $6million, a Hotel valued at more than $26million at the time.

She said Hichilema became a Board member and part owner Sun International.

She also said as Receiver Manager of RAMCOZ, Hichilema needed to explain what they did with the $35million for the sale.

She said if Hichilema was entrusted with state power, he will be like King Ahab who killed a peasant,Naboth, over his own piece of land.

She said it was on record that Hichilema has been getting land, grabbing land from ordinary people including one who has suffered a stroke.

She also likened Hichilema to Nabal described in 1 Samuel 25:1-42, a wealthy but foolish man who disregarded authority and other people, but was served by his wife Abigail from the wrath of King David.

But God struck down Nabal ten days later for disregarding the authority of King David.

Nawakwi said as former Finance Minister, she knows that Hichilema has a duty to explain to Zambians, his corrupt role in the privatization process that earned him illicit wealth.

HH THINKS ZAMBIA IS NOTHING WITHOUT HIM – NAWAKWI

… Says he should not get angry when Zambians ask him how he amassed his wealth

Lusaka … 27th August 2020 (Smart Eagles)

Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD) president Edith Nawakwi says UPND leader Hakainde Hichilema should not get angry when Zambians ask him how he amassed his wealth.

Speaking when she featured on Hot FM’s ‘Hot seat programme’ Hon. Nawakwi who served as minister of finance in the MMD government, said Mr.Hichilema is lucky if he has not been probed by law enforcement agencies and therefore, should not start to vilify her and say she was sleeping when the privatisation of public asserts was going on.

She said Hichilema should have declared interest in some of the asserts he privatized on behalf of government.

“He said I was sleeping, thieves come when you are sleeping, that’s why they break in and come with guns. However,the very next day we had finished the transactions on Intercontinental hotel and it had moved to be Southern Sun Hotel, Mr.Hichilema became the chairperson of the new owners isn’t that conflict of interest,what is wrong is that the very next day he became part and parcel of the people who had bought the asserts and he didn’t declare that he would have an interest in the Hotel “Hon Nawakwi said.

“There are further stories,you talk of RAMCOZ on the Copperbelt, these are issues people want HH to clarify.”

And Hon. Nawakwi says the UPND leader should explain at what point he became a millionaire and started to have money in foreign accounts.

“They were the receivers, they should explain to say this is what we did,this is how we got our money and this is were we got the millions from. Prior to privatisation how much money did HH have he should say that, prior to him moving to sable road where was he living,what was the value of the house he got from Lima bank,how much did he pay,was the bid advertised, was it solicited bid within their firm,all those issues need answers.

Meanwhile, Hon. Nawakwi said Mr. Hichilema should not think Zambia is nothing without him.

“There are people even in the Bible who think when they have money no one else matter – they are useless and this ideal of thinking that you are the most intelligent and no one else has brains, I think that is self defeating. HH must learn that building bridges and making relationships is important in politics. Each time UPND makes statements to talk about me it’s either, No Nawakwi is going to be minister of finance for Lungu No Nawakwi has now defected I have even been appointed by websites such as Koswe but this is in their attempt to bring others down, this should STOP,” says Hon. Nawakwi.

LUSAMBO’S HOPES TO BECOME PRESIDENT OF ZAMBIA IN 2026.

By stembridge
Has this once great country become a “SALAULA” state for midiocrity to prevail as an advantage for people to express foolish desires. The naming of children after the first family can not be anointment to begin to think of being president of this country, it is not as easy as the way president Lungu found himself at the summit of power, it has become common knowledge that there is no leadership in president Lungu, Zambians sympathised and they did not take time to assess any leadership abilities, Zambians must now elect a leader, apperently HH is unmatched by all causes to become the next republican president in 2021, this may sound offensive to the PF adminstration, but in reality he is the credible person to break the continued ravaging of state resources, HH is hoped to restoring our democratic rights and freedoms, control and restoring of our judicial system, reopening of private media houses, restructuring of the civil service, rebranding the cheracter of govt and build nvestor confidence, doing away with the business crooks, reducing on borrowing and building investment capacities that will create employment and generate wealth for the country, these hopes can not come from PF under president Lungu or Lusambo after 2021and beyond, well meaning citizens can not be decieved with development using unmanageable debt.

Any wild vicious thing that leaves its jungle to terrorise innocent beings must be returned to its territory or killed and burried completely, this is what Zambians must do to PF to save this once better country for all.

This country is now a loughing stock, if Zambians will always think leaders come from God ,we are all mistaken ,president Lungu did not, we have a constitution which is the supreme law of the land, it is not part of the bible, these are earthly regulations which guide what is right to do from not , president Lungu is ineligible to contest the 2021 general election bcause he has ‘HELD ‘office twice and sworn in twice, there is no Compromise to this fact, we have heard ministers threatening citizens with the new security equipment which have been procured by the PF govt, there are two possibility intentions to use them against the people, if they choose to demonstrate against the bid for the third term.

The other side of view is the dispute, if the coming Election is going to be fraudulent as the previous one where judge ESAU CHULU was seen mentioning wrong figures ad none existing constituency like CHITULIKA, the hiring of a foreign national in the name of CHAVULA .

The Zambian delegation which went to observe elections in Malawi were pelted and percieved to be riggers, the security wings and indeed the police have a constitutional obligation to defend the ligitimate powers people have to elect their own desirable leader to govern this country, any intentions to use this force aggression against the people is dictatorship, these instituitions are meant to serve the nation and not to defend the ineligibility of president Lungu and indeed any hopes to impose himself on this country, time has manifested that he is not the right person to have governed this country, and the consiquencies are reavealed under the pathetic circumstances he has brought affecting the majority of our good meaning citizens, children, the old the young and many familis of today in zambia.

Being president of this country should not be eased like taking a cup of Ordnary water because of people positioned to impose leaders on this country, this is the justice we must fight for and that is why weapons have been bought for, we are being threatened but we shall not fear to break this empire. God hear us

I CRY ZAMBIA MY BELOVED COUNTRY

PF THUGS ATTACK, ASSAULT UPND MEMBERS IN MUNALI, KALIKILIKI

…barely a day after Lungu warns to rain tonnes of bricks on perpetrators of violence

RULING Patriotic Front-PF-cadres armed with short battons, tesser guns, fan belts and machetes this morning led by notorious gang leader only identified as “Bosile” attacked United Party for National Development-UPND-members in Lusaka’s Mtendere Township causing bodily harm and injuries to a number of UPND sympathizers in the process.

The attack comes barely a day after President Edgar Lungu issued a strong worded statement warning of stern action against those who will be found perpetuating violence ahead of the 2021 tripartite elections. Mr Lungu instructed the Zambia Police to act, and we shall see how serious he was to stop political violence.

According to Mr Sinonge’s daughter, Faustina, who witnessed the ordeal, the PF thugs got incensed when word went round that UPND 2021 Munali aspiring candidate, Lillian Mutambo was scheduled to have a meeting at Sinonge Private School. The PF cadres who were armed to their teeth decended upon the UPND members inflicting injuries on Mr Lufunda Ndumba and Namushi Sinonge.

Mr Ndumba sustained a fractured arm, swollen fingers and a deep cut in the forehead while Mr Sinonge sustained a bleeding nose and a fractured hand for merely holding a different political view.

The notorious cadres also walked away two Airtel cell phones both valued at K1, 000 and an undisclosed amount of cash robbed in broad day light.

And Ms Mutambo says she and other senior party officials yesterday escaped lynching when a horde of PF thugs armed with various offensive weapons trailed them in Toyota Hiace in Rabecca area of Mutendere.

She has vowed that the UPND would soon start effecting citizens arrests on the known PF cadres, adding that the party would also defend itself when attacked by PF thugs who seem to have ‘immunity’ under Mr Lungu’s watch.

A docket has since been oponned while investigations are still continuing. The world awaits to see how serious Police shall take Mr Lungu’s call to arrest people involved in political violence.

© UPND MEDIA TEAM