The Curious Case of the Guinea-Bissau coup or not
…Goodluck Mr Jonathan
Amb. Anthony Mukwita reflects on Saturday
29 Nov. 25
I have scoured news sources, continentally and beyond starting from Lagos all the way to Doha and back, to try and get to the bottom of the Guinea-Bissau sad coup story.
Verifiable reports indicate soldiers toppled President Umaro Sissoco Embaló, suspended institutions, and installed General Horta Nta Na Man as interim leader for one year; Embaló then left for Senegal after being detained.
Former Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan publicly argued it was not a “real” coup, calling it closer to a “ceremonial coup,” noting the unusual sequence in which Embaló announced a coup before the military spoke—an account that risks trivializing a forceful seizure of power.
Guinea-Bissau has long been described as a cocaine gateway from Latin America to Europe, with narco-traffickers exploiting corruption and instability; the military even framed its actions as a response to “drug barons.”
While the country’s drug problem is serious, open-source reporting focuses on routes and influence rather than concrete, verifiable quantities; the principal drug is cocaine transiting to European markets.
Analysts have characterized the state as a “narco-state in flux,” with overlapping fault lines in politics and security.
Leaders, resources, and context
The ousted president is Umaro Sissoco Embaló; the interim leader is General Horta Nta Na Man (also referred to as Horta N’Tam/Horta Inta-A in some reports in image).
Guinea-Bissau’s economy relies on cashew exports, but it also has bauxite, phosphates, gold, diamonds, fisheries, and potential offshore oil—largely underdeveloped due to instability.
Credible scholarship and analyses consistently argue that coups—by any name—undermine democracy and should be condemned, documenting their negative impacts and regional democratic relapse.
Debunking the “fake coup” narrative, with a caution
When a president is arrested, institutions are suspended, and an army chief is sworn in as interim head of state, the event meets the core characteristics of a coup.
Calling it “ceremonial” risks normalizing extra constitutional power grabs and eroding deterrence. Madagascar’s Andry Rajoelina fled and was ousted amid a military-led takeover—his own statements confirmed flight under threat—showing how denial does not change the reality of a coup situation.
Goodluck Jonathan’s framing invites a “boy who cried wolf” problem: repeated minimization may diminish Africa’s credibility in condemning and deterring coups.
Pros, cons, and lessons for Africa
• Pros (limited and contested):
o Checks on constitutional abuse: Coups sometimes halt leaders governing in legal grey zones, as alleged in Guinea-Bissau’s contested political trajectory.
o Security reset claims: Juntas often justify action as combating criminal capture (e.g., narco networks), though outcomes rarely match rhetoric.
• Cons (overwhelming and evidence-based):
o Democratic backsliding: Coups derail elections, suspend institutions, and deepen mistrust in governance.
o Instability and economic harm: They scare investment, freeze reforms, and prolong poverty—especially in fragile, resource-rich states like Guinea-Bissau.
o Regional contagion: Scholarship shows coups feed cycles of relapse and weaken continental norms against military rule.
• Lessons for Africa:
• Clean elections matter: Transparent, well-administered polls reduce grievance and legitimacy crises that trigger interventions.
• Rule-of-law and inclusion: Broad consultation, independent courts, and legislative oversight prevent “grey zones” where elites normalize extra constitutional manoeuvres.
• Unambiguous condemnation: Coups must be called what they are—military seizures of power—and unequivocally condemned to preserve deterrence and democratic norms.
• Tackle illicit economies: Robust anti corruption and transnational crime cooperation are essential so security pretexts don’t become coup cover.
In sum, Guinea-Bissau’s takeover was real: the president was detained and left the country; a General was installed; institutions were suspended.
The drug factor must not be dismissed while former President Goodluck’s rhetoric must be taken with a pinch of salt because if it walks like a duck, clucks like a duck, it’s probably a duck.
One wonders what his motivation for the statement is but then Mr Goodluck is a big man and former President, not like simple diplomats and analysts like myself.
Africa’s credibility depends on rejecting euphemisms and insisting on clean elections, inclusive governance, and firm norms against unconstitutional power.
Ambassador Anthony Mukwita is a published Author & International Relations Analyst.