ANALYSIS | Tonse’s Southern Dilemma
With five days before Zambia votes, an unusual debate has opened inside the Tonse Pamodzi Alliance over whether Brian Mundubile and Makebi Zulu should proceed with their campaign in Southern Province. On Saturday, alliance presidential spokesperson George Chisanga said the leadership was weighing the trip following security concerns and alleged threats of violence. A decision, he said, would follow consultations on how to guarantee the safety of the presidential ticket. The statement came after President Hakainde Hichilema specifically appealed to people in Southern Province to allow the opposition to campaign freely, against the background of violence recorded elsewhere during the closing stages of the campaign.
The contradiction is difficult to miss. Mundubile himself had earlier spoken confidently about going into Southern Province, telling supporters during a Facebook broadcast that the alliance was coming and would meet them there. His campaign then shifted to considering whether the trip should happen at all. Security concerns deserve attention, especially after confrontations involving opposition campaigners elsewhere. But there is an important distinction which political communication should not erase: there is a difference between entering hostile electoral territory and entering a hostile population. Southern is undoubtedly difficult electoral territory for Tonse.
There is little evidence establishing it as a population inherently hostile to opposition candidates.
Zambia’s own political history provides the test. Michael Sata campaigned in Southern Province while leading the PF in opposition. In August 2011, during the campaign which eventually took him to State House, he addressed voters in Choma and continued through the province despite Southern being difficult political ground for his party. Edgar Lungu also campaigned there during his presidency.
More recently, opposition politicians including Harry Kalaba and others have taken their campaigns into Southern communities. Kalaba spent several days campaigning there during this election cycle without the province descending into the kind of violence now being anticipated. This history does not prove an incident cannot happen. It does, however, weaken any attempt to present Southern Province itself as a security problem.
This matters because five days is an eternity in political messaging but an extremely short period in voter mobilisation.
Tonse may believe portraying itself as unwelcome in UPND territory strengthens solidarity elsewhere. But if that messaging develops into a north-versus-south political argument, the immediate mobilisation benefit carries a larger cost. A presidential candidate is asking to inherit one Republic on August 13. He therefore has to speak to Zambia as one electorate. Telling voters in one region, directly or indirectly, that people elsewhere reject “us” because of where “we” come from is not merely divisive communication. It can become poor electoral strategy.
The mathematics explains why. The certified 2026 register contains 8,786,300 voters. Southern, Western and North-Western contain a combined 2,256,822 registered voters. Northern, Luapula and Muchinga contain 1,852,620. The difference is approximately 404,202 voters before Central, Eastern, Lusaka and Copperbelt even enter the calculation. Give Tonse an extraordinary 70 percent across Northern, Luapula and Muchinga and UPND only 25 percent, with five percent elsewhere.
At comparable turnout, Mundubile builds a substantial northern advantage. But allow Hichilema 80 or 85 percent across Southern, Western and North-Western while Tonse falls towards 10 percent, and much of that advantage disappears. This is precisely why serious presidential campaigns do not merely win their strongholds. They manage their losses.
Antonio Mwanza, himself a former senior PF media figure, put the principle neatly last week: “The key is to significantly push the voter turnout and win by large margins in your strongholds and lose with respectable margins in your weakholds.” That is the pathway. If Mundubile can take 70 percent somewhere Hichilema takes 25, he creates a buffer. But where Hichilema takes 85 percent, Mundubile cannot comfortably remain at five or 10 percent. Moving himself from 10 to 25 or 30 percent in hostile electoral territory can be worth hundreds of thousands of votes nationally. Presidential elections reward accumulation. There are no bonus points for winning a province.
This is also why Lusaka and Copperbelt cannot simply be declared Tonse territory and entered into the spreadsheet as compensation. The 2021 result provides a useful reality check. Hichilema won Copperbelt with 420,443 votes, or 56.39 percent, against Lungu’s 300,413, or 40.29 percent. Nationally, Hichilema finished on 2,852,348 against Lungu’s 1,870,780. Lusaka was competitive as well. Even during an election characterised by powerful demand for political change, the major urban provinces did not produce the 70 or 80 percent sweep sometimes casually assumed in current political conversation. Zambia’s metropolitan provinces contain diverse economic interests, rural districts and mixed populations. Winning them is important. Sweeping them is another proposition entirely.
There is another complication for Tonse. Mundubile is fighting his first presidential election. There is therefore no previous presidential result from which anyone can empirically establish his personal electoral strength in Lusaka, Copperbelt, Northern Province or anywhere else. The assumption that he automatically inherits Edgar Lungu’s former coalition remains exactly that: an assumption. Lungu’s 2021 voters are citizens, not transferable party assets. Some may support Mundubile, some Hichilema, some another opposition candidate and some may not vote. By comparison, Hichilema entered 2021 after several presidential contests and an established national voting pattern.
Even with that name recognition and a strong national swing behind him, his victories in Lusaka and Copperbelt remained competitive rather than absolute. Whether Mundubile can reproduce, exceed or fall below the old PF vote is one of the questions Thursday will answer.
Central and Eastern could consequently become decisive. Central has 820,079 registered voters, while Eastern has 1,129,444. Mwanza describes Central as a battleground and Eastern as more of a swing province. Central was already won by UPND in 2021. Eastern went to Lungu, although Hichilema established a significant minority there. The political architecture has since changed considerably, including shifts among former PF politicians and local candidates. If UPND holds Central comfortably and materially improves its Eastern performance while preserving its huge margins in Southern, Western and North-Western, Tonse’s requirement in Lusaka, Copperbelt and the Northern circuit rises sharply.
Conversely, if Mundubile holds the old PF geography, wins Eastern strongly, reverses Lusaka and Copperbelt and reduces Hichilema’s margins elsewhere, the contest becomes much tighter. Those are measurable pathways. Rally declarations are not.
This brings us back to Southern Province. Tonse does not need to go there expecting victory. It needs to go there looking for votes. If 10 people in every hundred are prepared to listen, speak to those 10. If 20 are available, find the 20. Campaigning is precisely the business of persuading people who are not already supporters. Police should provide Mundubile and Zulu with adequate security. UPND supporters should obey Hichilema’s instruction and allow them to campaign without obstruction.
Any credible intelligence about planned violence should be investigated. But absent evidence establishing an exceptional province-wide threat, converting difficult electoral ground into a story about a hostile southern population risks reinforcing the very regional politics a national presidential campaign should be dismantling. Rc
The remaining five days leave little room for strategic theatre. Tonse’s route to State House requires large margins in areas where it believes it has inherited the former PF base, respectable losses in UPND strongholds, competitive performances in Central and Eastern, and victories in Lusaka and Copperbelt large enough to alter the national balance. Hichilema’s equation runs in reverse: protect Southern, Western and North-Western, hold Central, improve in Eastern and the Northern circuit, and remain sufficiently competitive in Lusaka and Copperbelt.
This is why abandoning Southern Province would not be a demonstration of electoral strength. It would surrender opportunities in a province where Tonse already begins from behind. Win heavily where you are strong. Lose intelligently where you are weak. Then count everything. That is how Thursday’s election will be decided.
At The People’s Brief, our election analysis is built around ECZ data, historical results, constituency patterns, campaign organisation and Zambia’s own political history. We review the numbers because elections generate confidence long before they generate results. Our purpose is not to manufacture certainty for either camp. It is to test political narratives against what can actually be measured and help readers manage expectations before the ballots provide the final answer.
© The People’s Brief | Ollus R. Ndomu