_Transparency and Accountability at the Ballot_
_By Professor Namukolo Miyanda, Pan-Africanist and Governance Expert_
_11th July, 2026_
Zambia’s 13 August 2026 general election will be decided by ballots lawfully cast and transparently counted, not by rally size or speculation. Credibility depends on procedural safeguards, credible observation, and evidence-based dispute resolution. Public confidence in the process is strengthened when all stakeholders demonstrate transparency and accountability at every stage of the electoral cycle.
The NRPUP/Tonse-Pamodzi Alliance, led by presidential candidate Brian Mundubile and his running mate Makebi Zulu, has mounted a determined and people-driven campaign that has resonated widely across the country. Despite significant logistical challenges, including being denied access to air transport, Mundubile has prioritised direct engagement with communities, meeting citizens in markets, villages, and townships to listen to their concerns and present practical solutions. His hands-on approach and commitment to reaching voters without relying on costly infrastructure have earned him strong grassroots support.
All players must uphold high levels of integrity and professionalism to ensure that the electoral process remains credible and convincing. Ballots should be counted at each polling station immediately after polls close, with party agents and accredited observers present. Results must be posted publicly and agents must receive signed GEN-12 forms. Ghana’s 2016 and 2020 elections employed this method, and civil society Parallel Vote Tabulation verified official tallies. The Electoral Commission of Zambia already requires counting at polling stations and mandates that agents receive GEN-12 copies. Every accredited agent must be trained to remain until counting ends and the GEN-12 is issued. Political parties should audit agent deployment to ensure coverage of all 13,500 plus polling stations.
Domestic observation provides scale and local knowledge that international missions alone cannot match. Kenya’s 2022 election saw the Elections Observation Group deploy over 130,000 observers; their parallel tally confirmed that paper forms matched the IEBC results portal. In Zambia, Church Mother Bodies, the Law Association of Zambia, Foundation for Democratic Process, and Transparency International Zambia have historically undertaken this role. ECZ should publish the 2026 accreditation framework early and simplify requirements for citizen observers. Coordinated deployment by civil society will ensure statistically significant coverage and reduce blind spots
Judiciaries across the continent have consistently held that rally attendance is not evidence; polling-station forms are. Malawi’s Constitutional Court annulled the 2019 presidential election after scrutinising results sheets and finding widespread use of correction fluid. Zimbabwe’s courts in 2018 and 2023 based rulings on Form V11s, not crowd size. Article 101 of the Zambian Constitution provides 14 days for a presidential petition, but the burden rests on petitioners to submit polling-station evidence. Parties must therefore prioritise securing GEN-12 copies and maintaining clear chain-of-custody records.
Technology should augment, not replace, manual processes. Nigeria’s 2023 election used BVAS for biometric accreditation and IReV to upload results sheets. Where uploads failed, the Independent National Electoral Commission reverted to signed physical forms. ECZ uses biometrics for voter registration, not voting, and has clarified that the system is limited to preventing duplicate registration. The legal result remains the GEN-12 signed by agents at the station.
Three immediate measures can reduce post-election tension and reinforce accountability. First, ECZ should publish detailed totalling procedures that show how GEN-12s move from polling stations to the national centre, including the officials required to sign at each stage. Second, ECZ, Zambia Police Service, political party liaison committees, and accredited observers should operate joint situation rooms to verify incidents in real time. Third, ECZ, ZICTA, and other relevant agencies should provide proactive, timely communication from 13 to 15 August to counter misinformation. Safeguarding electoral integrity ahead of Zambia’s August elections would help reduce discrepancies and limit the grounds for petitions.
Electoral integrity ultimately rests on ordinary citizens serving as agents and observers, on paper forms signed in public, and on courts that demand evidence. The experiences of Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, and Nigeria demonstrate that transparency at the polling station, credible domestic observation, and strict adherence to paper results constitute the most reliable safeguards. For Zambia, the path to a credible election lies in training agents, accrediting observers, collecting every GEN-12, and using the lawful petition window if discrepancies arise.