BRIAN MUNDUBILE’S 2026 BID: CAN THE CHALLENGER TURN ECONOMIC DISCONTENT INTO ELECTORAL VICTORY?
By Dr Brian Malama
LUSAKA — With Zambia’s general election only days away, the presidential contest has increasingly narrowed around incumbent President Hakainde Hichilema and Tonse-Pamodzi Alliance/NRPUP candidate Brian Mundubile.
Some recent reporting describes the election effectively as a two-horse race, although 14 presidential candidates are contesting.
Mundubile enters the final stretch with a credible path to an upset, his victory as certain. Pollsters assessment last month regarded Mundubile as the favourite.
The decisive question is whether dissatisfaction over the cost of living and the government’s economic record can be converted into sufficient turnout for the opposition—and whether Mundubile can penetrate areas where the UPND remains electorally strong.
From opposition uncertainty to principal challenger
Mundubile’s emergence is itself politically significant. Following the death of former president Edgar Lungu in 2025 and subsequent turmoil within the opposition, Mundubile eventually emerged at the head of the Tonse formation.
He has since had to build a presidential campaign around the relatively new National Reconciliation Party for Unity and Prosperity rather than rely upon an established nationwide party machine comparable to the UPND.
The Electoral Commission of Zambia formally cleared Mundubile and running mate Makebi Zulu to contest the presidential election in May. His candidature therefore survived the political and legal uncertainties surrounding opposition realignment and his movement between political formations.
That experience provides Mundubile with a potentially powerful campaign narrative: survival against the odds. Instead of beginning the race with the institutional advantages of incumbency, his campaign has had to establish a new political vehicle, consolidate alliances, resolve questions surrounding his candidature and build national recognition within months.
The unequal-playing-field argument
There are also legitimate concerns about Zambia’s wider democratic environment, the government has specifically manipulated the election against Mundubile.
Recent analysis has raised questions about institutional independence and the implications of the ruling party’s parliamentary dominance. Afripoli, for example, identifies electoral-system integrity as one of the central issues surrounding Thursday’s election.
Mundubile’s campaign has itself alleged irregularities and raised concerns about matters including remarked; ballot transportation and accreditation of party agents.
Hichilema is determined to rig this election following several layers of the so called, ‘MINGALATO ‘ loosely translated as electoral malpractice through manipulation that could lead to plausible rigging of the election results.
More seriously, reports of political violence and extra judicial killings have emerged during the campaigns. One recent account alleges that Mundubile’s campaign convoy was stoned, vehicles smashed and blockaded.
Such incidents, wherever responsibility ultimately lies, damage the principle of a level playing field because candidates cannot campaign freely when supporters or candidates fear violent attacks and later on death.
The crucial test will therefore come at polling stations: access for party agents, security of ballot papers, transparent counting, transmission of results and the ability of observers and competing parties to verify the process.
Mundubile’s strongest weapon: the economy
Mundubile’s greatest electoral opportunity may nevertheless have less to do with electoral administration than with the kitchen-table economy.
The elections are ultimately influenced by what households experience—not simply what national economic indicators show.
That is precisely where Mundubile has positioned his campaign.
His manifesto emphasises jobs, lowering the cost of living, economic transformation and ethical leadership
At its launch, Mundubile argued that Zambia needs an economy that creates tangible employment rather than merely producing impressive statistics, while promising to place young people and women at the centre of economic development.
There is an important analytical distinction here: Hichilema must defend a record; Mundubile must defend the credibility of a promise.
That asymmetry can favour a challenger during difficult economic circumstances
But Mundubile has vulnerabilities of his own
Mundubile cannot simply campaign against Hichilema. He must convince undecided voters that he represents a credible government-in-waiting.
His opponents have attempted to portray Tonse Pamodzi alliance as a repackaging of the former PF political establishment rather than genuine political renewal. That argument could resonate with voters who remember why they removed the PF from government in 2021.
His comparatively new political vehicle also faces an enormous organisational challenge. Elections are won constituency by constituency and polling station by polling station.
UPND possesses the advantages of an established national organisation and incumbency; Mundubile therefore needs not merely popular enthusiasm but trained agents, nationwide mobilisation, voter turnout and effective protection of his vote during counting.
Why Mundubile nevertheless has a path to State House; Three conditions could produce a Mundubile victory.
First, economic dissatisfaction must be sufficiently widespread to overcome traditional party loyalties.
Secondly, he needs very strong turnout in areas receptive to his candidacy while making meaningful gains in UPND strongholds. Thirdly, opposition-minded voters must consolidate around him rather than fragment their votes among the remaining presidential candidates.
The emerging perception of a Hichilema–Mundubile contest helps him on that third point.
The Tonse Pamozi Alliance project Mundubile’s poll at 68–72 across the country; Mundubile currently commands such a large majority in this highly charged election.
Hichilema’s greatest disadvantage may be his own 2021 promises
There is another political difficulty for the incumbent. Hichilema cannot campaign in 2026 as the outsider he was in 2021.
Every major promise can now be measured against five years of government.
Mundubile can consequently ask a politically potent question: Are ordinary Zambians materially better off than they were five years ago?
Hichilema’s answer may not suffice because his incompetence and absence of development agenda has costed the country an opportunity to better the lives of majority Zambians.
Mundubile’s answer is different: if those achievements have not translated into sufficient jobs, affordable food, household income and economic security, then macroeconomic success has not yet become prosperity for ordinary families.
That is probably the strongest ground on which Mundubile can fight this election.
The verdict
I would therefore describe Mundubile as a serious challenger with a plausible route to victorious election result on Thursday.
His strongest political story is powerful precisely because it combines three themes: economic dissatisfaction, demand for political change and his own difficult journey to the ballot paper.
His most effective contrast with Hichilema is consequently not to claim as fact that the election has already been stolen or that every government action constitutes persecution.
It is stronger to argue that Mundubile has fought his way onto the ballot despite political and institutional obstacles and must now be allowed to confront Hichilema on an unquestionably level electoral field.
Thursday will settle the argument that opinion polls, rallies and campaign rhetoric cannot.
Hichilema is asking Zambia to judge what he has done with five years in power. Mundubile is asking Zambia to entrust him with the next five. That is the real choice at the centre of Zambia’s 2026 election.