FOURTEEN DAYS OF “LONG-RANGE SANCTIONS” — RUSSIA’S FUEL SYSTEM BEGINS TO STRAIN
Between October 27 and November 9, Ukraine launched one of its most concentrated campaigns against Russia’s oil infrastructure since the beginning of the war.
Publicly documented attacks struck or reportedly damaged at least eight major refineries, the Samara oil-distribution hub and a fuel depot supporting Russian forces in occupied Ukraine. Fires were also recorded near the Sheremetyevo aviation-fuel depot, although a direct strike there has not been independently confirmed.
This is not indiscriminate destruction. Ukraine is systematically damaging the infrastructure that processes, stores and transports the fuel sustaining Russia’s military and financing its war.
THE 14-DAY STRIKE LEDGER
October 30 — Novokuibyshevsk refinery, Samara region
Multiple Ukrainian drones reportedly struck the refinery, including its diesel-treatment infrastructure. The facility produces gasoline, diesel, aviation fuel and lubricants.
October 31 — Bashneft-Novoil refinery, Ufa
A fire was reported around the L-35 catalytic-reforming unit, an important part of gasoline production. Ufa lies approximately 1,200 kilometres from Ukraine’s internationally recognized border.
November 1 — NORSI refinery, Kstovo
Fires and damage were reported near the AVT-5 and AVT-6 crude-distillation units. With a processing capacity of roughly 17 million tonnes annually, this is one of Russia’s largest refineries and an important supplier to central Russia.
November 2 — Samara oil-distribution station
Ukraine struck the Samara Linear Production Dispatch Station, a major Transneft facility used to receive, store, blend and pump crude oil. It helps create Russia’s Urals export blend and supplies refineries and export routes.
This was reportedly the fifth attack on the facility within approximately one month. Satellite analysis assessed that dozens of storage tanks were damaged, with several apparently burned out completely. Kazakhstan briefly suspended oil movement through the Atyrau–Samara route while the damage was inspected.
November 3 — Yaroslavl refinery
The YANOS refinery northeast of Moscow was struck, damaging infrastructure and reportedly injuring two workers. The facility processes approximately 15 million tonnes of crude annually and produces gasoline, diesel and fuel oil.
November 5 — Ryazan refinery
Fires were recorded around the industrial area containing the Ryazan refinery, one of Russia’s largest and an important supplier to Moscow. The precise extent of the damage remains unclear.
November 5–6 — Russian fuel depot near occupied Luhanske
Ukraine’s General Staff reported striking a Russian fuel-and-lubricants depot supporting occupation forces in Donetsk region. Unlike attacks on distant refineries, this strike directly targeted fuel intended for the battlefield.
November 6 — Afipsky refinery
A fire broke out in the tank-farm area of the Afipsky refinery in Krasnodar region. Russian officials acknowledged a fire at an industrial facility but attributed it to falling drone debris.
November 7 — Saratov refinery
Geolocated footage showed a fire near the Saratov refinery following a Ukrainian drone attack. The facility processes approximately seven million tonnes annually and has reportedly been targeted repeatedly during 2026.
November 9 — Kirishi refinery
Ukraine struck the Kirishi Oil Refinery in Leningrad region, approximately 800 kilometres from Ukraine. Kirishi is Russia’s second-largest refinery and represents more than six percent of its national refining capacity.
Large explosions and fires were recorded inside the industrial complex. Preliminary analysis indicated possible impacts around three primary processing units: ELOU-AVT-6, ELOU-AT-6 and ELOU-AVT-2. The final extent of the damage remains under assessment.
WHY REPEATED DAMAGE MATTERS
Ukraine does not need to erase an entire refinery from the map to make the attack effective.
A refinery is a connected industrial system. Damage to a crude-distillation, reforming or hydrotreating unit can interrupt an entire production chain. Repairs require specialized equipment, experienced engineers and replacement parts that may be difficult to obtain under sanctions.
Repeated strikes are even more disruptive. Russia can begin repairing a facility only to have it hit again before production fully resumes. Workers must be evacuated, air defences repositioned and resources diverted from other parts of the economy. Storage tanks, pipelines and processing units become increasingly difficult to operate reliably.
The Samara hub demonstrates this strategy clearly. Ukraine has not needed to destroy every tank. Repeated attacks have reduced storage capacity, interrupted pipeline operations and forced Russia to inspect, reroute and protect a facility that once operated safely far beyond the battlefield.
THE PRESSURE IS REACHING RUSSIA’S FUEL PUMPS
Fuel restrictions have now appeared across widely separated parts of Russia, including Karelia, Buryatia, Zabaykalsky Krai, Nizhny Novgorod, Arkhangelsk, Penza and Krasnoyarsk.
At some Rosneft stations, purchases have reportedly been limited to 30 litres of gasoline or 50 litres of diesel, while filling portable canisters has been prohibited. Russian authorities describe the measures as temporary precautions intended to prevent panic buying and distribute supplies evenly.
But purchase limits stretching from northwestern Russia to Siberia are evidence of a system under pressure. Refineries are being interrupted, storage hubs are burning and the distribution network has less spare capacity to absorb the damage.
Russian oil still flows, and these strikes have not caused a nationwide collapse. However, the appearance of geographically dispersed restrictions shows that Ukraine’s campaign is producing consequences far beyond the individual facilities being hit.
UKRAINE WILL NOT ACCEPT ONE-SIDED RESTRAINT
President Donald Trump repeatedly pressed Ukraine to stop attacking Russian refineries, arguing that the strikes were affecting global fuel prices. Ukraine demonstrated that it was prepared to consider mutual restraint—but Russia continued attacking Ukrainian power plants, heating systems and electrical networks.
President Zelenskyy has now made Kyiv’s position clear: attacks on Russia’s refining sector will continue in response to Russia’s campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure.
Ukraine cannot depend on another country to determine what is necessary for its survival. It cannot be expected to leave Russia’s war economy untouched while Russian missiles and drones attempt to freeze Ukrainian cities.
These are Ukraine’s sanctions—delivered by long-range drones against the industry financing and supplying the invasion.
The objective is not necessarily to destroy every refinery in a single night. It is to damage them, force shutdowns, interrupt repairs, reduce storage capacity and make Russia spend more money defending an oil network that was once considered safely beyond Ukraine’s reach.
Fourteen days of strikes have already brought restrictions to Russian fuel stations. If Russia continues attacking Ukraine’s energy system, its own oil infrastructure will continue paying the price.