HICHILEMA WILL GET HIS WAY ON THE CONSTITUTION, BUT THERE ARE VERY SERIOUS CONSEQUENCES
Excessive reliance on Parliament to amend a constitution can significantly alter the balance of power in a democracy. It can undermine the very foundations of constitutionalism.
It’s very clear that Mr Hakainde Hichilema will rely heavily, almost solely, on Parliament to amend the Constitution. His party does not, on its own, hold the two-thirds majority the Constitution requires. But with nominated members of Parliament and the independents who habitually vote with government, he will find the numbers without much difficulty. He will get through every amendment he wants.
But, there are very serious consequences in allowing a Hichilema-controlled legislature to dominate the process of amending our Constitution.
First, it will seriously erode the separation of powers. When a parliament holds unchecked power to alter the supreme law, the line between ordinary legislation and constitutional law blurs. An executive backed by a large parliamentary majority can use the legislature to systematically weaken the judiciary and the independent oversight bodies, and to centralise power in the ruling party.
Second, there is the risk of constitutional hyper-amendment. Frequent alterations lead to constitutional instability. Instead of serving as a lasting, foundational framework, the Constitution becomes a highly politicised document that changes with every shift in the political winds. This creates legal uncertainty for citizens, for businesses and for government institutions themselves.
Third, what we are likely to witness is the tyranny of the majority. A dominant political faction with a supermajority can rewrite the Constitution to suit its immediate political goals. Protections for political and other minorities can be easily diluted or removed. And the same power can be used to entrench the incumbent. Parliament can alter electoral laws, term limits and voting requirements to make it harder for opposition parties to compete fairly.
This will certainly lead to a loss of public legitimacy and ownership. A constitution derives its authority from the sovereignty of the people. When amendments are pushed through by parliamentary manoeuvre, without direct public participation through referendums or broad civic consultation, the people come to see the Constitution as a tool of the political elite rather than the will of the nation. That disconnect breeds cynicism and destroys civic trust.
And we are likely to witness constitutional decay and democratic backsliding. Historically, excessive reliance on parliamentary amendment has been a primary vehicle for legalistic autocratisation. Aspiring authoritarians rarely overthrow the constitution. They use compliant parliamentary majorities to legally dismantle democratic checks and balances from within. Democracy breaks down under the guise of the rule of law.
None of this is theory for us in Zambia. We have already seen it. Excessive reliance on Parliament to amend our Constitution has undermined the separation of powers, compromised democratic legitimacy, and put political expediency above enduring constitutional stability. The clearest example is the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Act No. 13 of 2025, which began life as Bill No. 7. It reshaped our legislative and electoral framework just months before a general election.
When the ruling party holds a dominant majority in the National Assembly, the line between the executive and the legislature disappears. Civil society, the Law Association of Zambia and the church bodies all raised the alarm over Bill 7. It changed the composition of councils to bring constituency MPs into them, and it removed the two-term limit on mayors and council chairpersons. MPs became both the makers of the rules and their principal beneficiaries.
Amending the Constitution strictly through Parliament also shuts citizens out. In June 2025, the Constitutional Court declared Bill 7 unconstitutional because it had been initiated without the wide public consultation that Article 79 of the Constitution demands. The government’s answer was to appoint a Technical Committee on Constitutional Amendments to satisfy the legal requirement. But the process that followed was rushed. Meaningful debate was limited, and deep public dissent was sidelined.
A constitution is meant to endure. Relying on Parliament subjects it instead to the tides of the political calendar. Zambian governments have altered the Constitution in election windows before: in 1991, in 1996, in 2016, and again in 2025. Passing Bill 7 so late in the life of Parliament meant changing electoral rules, by-election provisions and constituency boundaries right before an election. Altering the supreme law for immediate convenience leaves us with a fragmented legal framework, full of gaps that the courts are constantly forced to fill.
Parliamentary amendments can also impose massive structural expansions, with heavy financial burdens, without the voters ever approving them. Act No. 13 moved Zambia to a mixed-member proportional representation system and enlarged the National Assembly from 156 constituencies to 226, with a further 40 seats filled by proportional representation. Observers such as Democracy in Africa have pointed out that the salaries, allowances and benefits of these new seats fall on the taxpayer, at a time when Zambia is under strict budgetary restraint and struggling to manage its public debt.
Its defenders say parliamentary amendment allows swift institutional fixes, such as guaranteeing seats for women and young people. But, the Zambian experience shows that excessive reliance on this path turns the Constitution into a political instrument rather than a sacred pact with the people.
Fred M’membe
SP President