INSIGHT | Is the presidency becoming a two-bloc contest?
Zambia still has a multiparty system on paper. The ballot can carry more than a dozen presidential candidates. Parliament can contain several political parties and independents. But the presidential numbers since the 2016 constitutional reforms are beginning to tell a different story. The requirement for a candidate to secure more than 50% of valid votes has not abolished smaller parties. It has, however, made it increasingly difficult for them to matter in the final contest for State House.
The pattern is now visible across three elections. In 2016, Edgar Lungu won with 50.35% against Hakainde Hichilema’s 47.63%. Together, the two leading candidates captured almost 98% of valid presidential votes. In 2021, Hichilema and Lungu again dominated the field, taking roughly 97.7% between them. In 2026, the concentration became even sharper: Hichilema received 60.49% and Brian Mundubile 37.87%. The remaining presidential candidates, taken together, shared only about 1.6% of the valid vote. Zambia may still have many parties, but its presidency is being decided overwhelmingly between two electoral blocs.
This is why Mundubile’s performance needs to be read carefully. His 1,856,217 votes are strikingly close to Edgar Lungu’s 1,870,780 in 2021. The similarity does not mean candidate quality is irrelevant. Mundubile campaigned, organised and became the face of the Tonse challenge. But the numbers strongly suggest he also inherited something much larger than himself: the old PF electoral geography. The vehicle changed from green to blue. Much of the electorate did not. The PF may have lost its former position as the principal opposition vehicle, but its voting bloc largely survived and migrated.
Parliament reinforces the point. Of the 224 constituency seats so far decided, UPND holds 137 and NRPUP 59. Citizens First has two, Zambia Must Prosper one and the Socialist Party none, while the Resolute Party and independents account for the remainder. For Harry Kalaba, Kelvin Bwalya and Fred M’membe, this is not merely a disappointing election result. It is a structural warning. Their parties are competing for political space inside a system where two large blocs already command most presidential voters and most organised parliamentary territory.
The question for smaller parties is therefore becoming brutal but necessary: where exactly will their 50%+1 come from? Kalaba finished third in the presidential race with about 0.39%. Kelvin Bwalya followed with roughly 0.35%, while M’membe received about 0.25%. Even if the three had combined their presidential votes, they would still have remained far below 2% nationally. Ideology, speeches and social-media visibility can build recognition. They do not automatically create a presidential pathway.
Under the current constitutional architecture, a smaller party must either build a genuinely new national coalition or penetrate one of the two established blocs at scale.
Geography makes the problem even harder. Southern, Western and North-Western have become extraordinarily reliable UPND vote banks. In 2026, Hichilema took about 96% in Southern, 96.4% in Western and 95.8% in North-Western. Mundubile, meanwhile, dominated Eastern, Luapula, Muchinga and Northern, broadly reproducing the geography associated with the former PF vote. Lusaka and Copperbelt remained competitive, with Mundubile narrowly taking Lusaka and Hichilema narrowly taking Copperbelt.
This is why the old slogan that whoever wins Lusaka and Copperbelt wins Zambia is no longer sufficient.
The emerging formula is different. Bank enormous margins in your strongholds. Prevent your opponent from doing the same in theirs. Remain competitive in Lusaka and Copperbelt. Then win the turnout battle. Hichilema’s 2026 numbers demonstrate the power of this approach. Southern recorded turnout of about 69%, Western 73.4% and North-Western 78.4%. By comparison, turnout in several Mundubile-leaning provinces hovered around the low 50s. A stronghold with weak turnout is an unused asset. A stronghold voting above 70% becomes a national weapon.
Central Province deserves special attention because it may be changing the balance further. Hichilema was already competitive there before becoming President. In 2021 he secured 276,674 votes against Lungu’s 158,598, about 60.6% against 34.7%. In 2026 he won Central with 259,432 votes, roughly 64.1%, and carried the province by almost 120,000 votes. Central is increasingly behaving less like a neutral swing province and more like an extension of the UPND’s broader red corridor. If this becomes durable, the opposition’s route to 50%+1 becomes narrower still.
This is where politicians such as Kalaba and M’membe must think beyond simply “growing the party”. A candidate can become nationally known, articulate and respected without becoming mathematically competitive for the presidency. The presidency now requires millions of votes concentrated efficiently across regions. A smaller party can win a constituency. It can elect councillors. It can influence debate. But unless it can either break one of the two dominant blocs or inherit one when political realignment occurs, State House remains distant.
Zambia has therefore not become a two-party state in the legal sense. It is becoming something more interesting: a two-bloc presidential democracy operating inside a multiparty system. Parties may change names. Alliances may collapse. Colours may shift from green to blue. Leaders may come and go. But electoral identities, regional loyalties, organisational networks and inherited voter bases can survive those changes.
For any politician planning for 2031, this is the lesson hiding inside the 2026 numbers: the battle is no longer simply about becoming popular. It is about building, inheriting or breaking an electoral bloc large enough to cross 50%+1.
– The People’s Brief | Ollus R. Ndomu