PRESIDENTIAL TERM LIMITS, THEIR INCENTIVES AND WHAT THEY MEAN FOR ACCOUNTABILITY.
Presidential term limits do more than just determine how long an individual may remain in office. They can also change the incentives facing a president, the governing party and the wider public administration.
During a president’s first term, the possibility of re-election creates strong electoral incentives in the sense that the president and governing party may devote considerable attention to strengthening party structures, maintaining political support and demonstrating achievements that can help secure a second mandate. This can encourage performance because the government knows that it must return to the electorate. However, it can also create incentives for short-term or highly popular policies that produce immediate political benefits even where longer-term, less popular reforms might better serve national development.
The second and final term creates a different set of incentives. Because the president cannot constitutionally seek another term, the pressure of personal re-election is removed. This can give the president greater political space to pursue difficult reforms whose benefits may only become apparent after he or she has left office. Attention may also shift towards legacy: What will this administration be remembered for? What institutions, infrastructure or reforms will remain after the president has gone?
But, this does not mean that every final-term president automatically becomes more development-oriented. A president may instead become a “lame duck”, lose influence within the governing party, or concentrate on determining who succeeds him or her. Nevertheless, the certainty that the presidency must eventually be handed over changes the political calculation.
Where there is no presidential term limit, that certainty disappears. Every term can potentially become another re-election term with the same president-elect. An incumbent who wishes to remain in office may therefore continue facing incentives to maintain electoral coalitions, strengthen personal control of the governing party and protect the political structures necessary for continued rule. Over a sufficiently long period, there is also a risk that the distinction between the state, the governing party and the incumbent becomes increasingly blurred.
The effects can extend beyond the president to the civil service, security institutions, state-owned enterprises, local government and other public institutions. Where political turnover is a realistic possibility, officials know that today’s governing party may become tomorrow’s opposition. That possibility can provide an additional incentive for institutions to operate according to law and established procedures rather than depending exclusively upon loyalty to particular political leaders.
However, where the same president remains in power for a very long period, networks of political and administrative dependency can become deeply entrenched. Some officials may come to believe that their careers, appointments or protection depend upon the continued survival of the incumbent administration. Officials implicated in wrongdoing may have particularly strong incentives to resist political change if they fear investigation or prosecution under a successor government.
This helps explain one important democratic function of presidential term limits: they make succession predictable and unavoidable. The constitutional system effectively says that regardless of a president’s popularity, achievements or political strength, at a predetermined point another person must have the opportunity to occupy the office.
Term limits, just as dictatorships or systems without term limits, do not guarantee good government, eliminate corruption or ensure that a successor will govern better. Strong courts, an independent electoral system, professional public institutions, effective parliamentary oversight, free media and active citizens remain essential to good governance.
But this does not discount the fact that term limits can provide an additional institutional safeguard by preventing political competition from becoming indefinitely centred on one individual and by periodically removing the considerable advantages enjoyed by a sitting president.
With regards to whether or not we must maintain the presidential term limit, Zambia’s constitutional review process of 2025 is an important point of reference. During the nationwide consultations, the Technical Committee recorded that most submissions favoured maintaining limits on elected tenure, while only a minority favoured abolishing term limits, including the presidential term limit. The Committee ultimately recommended:
“Maintaining the constitutional limit of two five-year terms for the President.”
This is useful in the broader term-limit discussion because it provides documented evidence of views submitted during an official national consultation, rather than relying on claims about what “Zambians want.”
There is another interesting distinction in the report: although many submitters apparently supported imposing two-term limits on MPs as well, the Committee recommended retaining no term limit for MPs, while specifically recommending retention of the two five-year presidential limit.
And that is why I maintain that Zambia must uphold the presidential term limit. We can not discard the technical committees submission about this matter just 10 months after submission. Lest we begin to question every other submission that led us to the Bill number 7 amendment.
Xhuzwayo Phiri
26/09/2026