The Copperbelt Was Not Lost Overnight: We Refused to Listen.
It was easier to win the Copperbelt than to explain the scale of the loss we have suffered.
This result did not simply happen to the UPND. In many respects, UPND leaders worked hard to produce it. We must therefore resist the temptation to blame everyone except ourselves. The difficult truth is that the Copperbelt has been sending warnings for some time, and we refused to listen.
Unfortunately, the damage has not been confined to parliamentary contests. It has affected the Presidential vote as well.
There were several strategic mistakes.
1. We fielded weak candidates.
In some constituencies and wards, we put forward candidates who simply did not command sufficient local confidence, influence or political reach. A political party cannot expect a national message to compensate for a candidate who is disconnected from the electorate.
2. We allowed greed around mining activities to damage our standing.
The Copperbelt is a mining province. Mining is not merely an economic activity there; it is part of the social and political identity of the people. Where communities perceived that political interests were benefiting themselves rather than the wider population, resentment was inevitable.
3. We kept the Mine Workers’ Union at arm’s length.
That was a serious strategic error. The mining workforce remains one of the most organised constituencies on the Copperbelt. You cannot afford to alienate organised labour and still expect to command the confidence of mining communities.
4. We could not win the confidence of people we referred to as “illegal miners”.
Whatever one’s position on illegal mining, dismissing a large network of people whose livelihoods are connected to mining was never going to produce votes. Politics requires engagement, regulation, persuasion and inclusion. You cannot simply write off an entire constituency and expect it to support you.
5. We over-engaged students while under-engaging the wider population.
Our engagement with students at CBU was visible, but it was not enough. The political reality of the Copperbelt extends far beyond university campuses. The less educated, informal workers, marketeers, mine communities, compounds and ordinary working families constitute a substantial part of the electorate. They needed to be heard, not merely spoken to.
6. We underestimated the influence of the “Jerabos”.
Whether one agrees with their methods or not, their networks possess considerable influence within mining communities. Politics is not about choosing the people whose influence we like. It is about understanding where influence exists, engaging responsibly with communities and ensuring that legitimate political concerns are addressed.
7. We disengaged our grassroots structures.
This may be one of the biggest failures. Once a political party stops listening to its grassroots, a vacuum is created. And political vacuums do not remain empty for long. Somebody else fills them.
8. Chingola and parts of Chililabombwe require a particularly honest examination.
The OB 19 issue must be investigated properly and without defensiveness. Whatever the political interpretation, it became a significant source of dissatisfaction and should not have been allowed to grow into a wider political liability.
The common thread running through all these failures is simple:
We refused to listen.
We listened to people who agreed with us and dismissed those who challenged us. We relied too heavily on structures, personalities and assumptions, while failing to appreciate the changing political mood on the ground.
The lesson from the Copperbelt is therefore not simply that we lost votes.
The lesson is that we lost contact with the people who give a political party its votes.
If the UPND wants to recover the Copperbelt, the answer cannot be another public relations campaign. It must begin with humility, accountability and a return to grassroots politics.
We must sit with miners. We must sit with mine workers. We must sit with informal miners. We must sit with marketeers, students, church communities, traditional leaders, ordinary residents and the people in the compounds. We must listen before we speak.
And most importantly, we must be prepared to hear things we do not want to hear.
The Copperbelt has given us a political lesson that cannot be ignored.
We refused to listen. Now we must learn to listen again.
By Robbinson Jr Mazyombwe