EDITORIAL | The “One-Party State” Narrative Falls Apart Under Scrutiny

🇿🇲 EDITORIAL | The “One-Party State” Narrative Falls Apart Under Scrutiny

For months now, a familiar line has been repeated across opposition platforms, civil society spaces, and sections of international commentary. Zambia, we are told, is “sliding back” into a one-party state. The language is dramatic. It evokes the memory of a past many Zambians deliberately moved away from in 1991. It is designed to alarm.

But when placed against current political realities, the claim begins to collapse.

The narrative gained traction in the face of internal conflicts within opposition parties, delays in party registrations, court battles over leadership, and heightened tensions around police permissions for political activities. Each of these developments, taken in isolation, raised legitimate questions. Combined and amplifed together, they are presented as evidence of a coordinated state project to eliminate opposition and consolidate power indefinitely under President Hakainde Hichilema.

This framing is compelling. It is also misleading.

A one-party state is defined by the absence of competition. Zambia today presents the opposite. Over 50 presidential aspirants have openly engaged with the Electoral Commission of Zambia ahead of the 2026 elections. Opposition leaders continue to speak, organise, and challenge government positions. Political alliances are being formed. Campaign narratives are already shaping public debate.

This is not silence. It is a crowded political field. The real story lies within the opposition itself.

The Patriotic Front, once the country’s dominant force, is now entangled in leadership disputes so deep that multiple individuals claim the presidency at the same time. These conflicts have spilled into courts, not because the state imposed them, but because party members themselves sought legal resolution. When institutions are asked to interpret party constitutions, delays and rulings become inevitable.

This is not suppression. It is the consequence of unresolved internal governance.

The same applies to the case of John Sangwa and the Movement for National Renewal. His withdrawal from the presidential race has been framed as evidence of state obstruction. His own explanation points to structural limitations. Late entry into politics. Lack of funding networks. Restricted mobilisation capacity. These are political challenges faced by many new entrants.

They do not, on their own, prove systemic exclusion.

The argument around police restrictions deserves careful attention. There have been instances where opposition activities were limited or denied. That should be scrutinised. But to extend these instances into a blanket conclusion that no opposition mobilisation has been allowed since 2021 stretches the facts beyond recognition. Political activity continues across the country, even if unevenly.

Selective examples cannot define the entire system. They must be weighed against what is visibly happening.

Then comes the most persistent claim. That constitutional changes and constituency delimitation are part of a long-term strategy to entrench power and eventually remove presidential term limits.

Again, the facts resist the narrative.

The recent delimitation exercise conducted by the Electoral Commission of Zambia has produced a distribution of constituencies that does not overwhelmingly favour any single region. Earlier claims that specific provinces would dominate the allocation have now been disproven by actual figures.

Reality has corrected speculation.

The suggestion that term limits are under immediate threat remains hypothetical. No formal legislative process is currently advancing such a change. No constitutional amendment proposal has been tabled to that effect. Raising the possibility is legitimate. Presenting it as an active plan is not.

Zambia’s political moment is better understood differently.

What is emerging is a dominant-party phase, not a one-party state. The United Party for National Development has consolidated its internal structures and is projecting coherence ahead of elections. The opposition, by contrast, is fragmented, legally contested, and struggling to present a unified alternative.

Dominance creates imbalance. But it does not eliminate competition. The distinction matters.

Zambia’s institutions remain active. Courts are hearing cases. Parliament continues its work. Media platforms host critical voices daily. Civil society organisations continue to operate. Elections are scheduled and preparations are ongoing.

These are not the features of a closed system. They are the features of a democracy under pressure, but still functioning.

The danger of the “one-party state” narrative is not just that it is inaccurate. It is that it distracts from the real work that needs to be done. Opposition parties must rebuild structures, resolve internal conflicts, and develop credible policy alternatives. Civil society must ground its critique in verifiable evidence. Public discourse must rise above alarmism.

Democracy is not protected by exaggeration. It is protected by credibility. Zambia is not returning to a one-party state.

It is confronting the consequences of uneven political organisation.

And until this imbalance is corrected, the perception of dominance will persist, not because competition has been eliminated, but because it has not yet been effectively organised.

© The People’s Brief | Editor-in-Chief