MNANGAGWA’S HIGH-STAKES GAMBLE: CAN HE MAKE AMERICA AND CHINA COMPETE FOR ZIMBABWE?
By Gabriel Manyati
America spent years looking at Zimbabwe through the lens of sanctions, elections, human rights and governance. Now Washington is looking increasingly at what Zimbabwe has to sell. That is a striking development.
After years of estrangement, Zimbabwe has begun attracting renewed attention from American political and business circles, particularly around critical minerals, trade, investment and the possibility of improving bilateral relations. The reported interest from the Trump administration and American officials comes at a time when Washington is aggressively seeking alternative sources of minerals considered important to its industrial and strategic supply chains.
This is not evidence that Washington has suddenly fallen in love with Zimbabwe. It is evidence that Zimbabwe has become more commercially interesting. And that distinction matters.
The Minerals Are The Leverage
Zimbabwe possesses lithium, platinum-group metals, nickel, chrome and gold, among other commercially important minerals. The United States has been trying to reduce vulnerabilities in critical-mineral supply chains, particularly where China has established dominant positions. Zimbabwe consequently fits into a much larger American search for alternative sources.
But Beijing got there first.
China has spent billions establishing positions across Zimbabwe’s lithium industry. Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt acquired Arcadia Lithium Mine for US$422 million. Sinomine invested in Bikita Minerals. Chengxin Lithium became involved in Sabi Star. Yahua Group entered the Kamativi project. These are not speculative diplomatic gestures. They are mines, processing plants and supply relationships.
Huayou’s Arcadia operation demonstrates the scale of the Chinese presence. Its investment has included a major processing facility, while Bikita has also moved towards downstream processing. Zimbabwe has simultaneously tightened restrictions on exports of unprocessed lithium in an effort to force more value addition inside the country. China’s footprint goes beyond lithium.
Tsingshan’s Dinson Iron and Steel Company has established the Manhize steel project. Chinese companies are deeply involved in Zimbabwe’s ferrochrome industry. Chinese capital has also become important to infrastructure, mining equipment and the movement of minerals. That matters because China is not merely buying Zimbabwean minerals. It is becoming embedded in the industrial infrastructure through which those minerals are extracted, processed and transported.
Washington is therefore entering a field in which Beijing already has a substantial commercial footprint.
What Can America Offer?
This is where Mnangagwa’s opportunity begins. America cannot realistically out-China China in Zimbabwe simply by promising another mining investment. It would have to offer something different.
American capital could help finance projects. Western financial institutions could provide access to funding that Zimbabwe has struggled to obtain. American mining technology and engineering expertise could help develop deeper value chains. American companies could provide an alternative market for minerals currently flowing overwhelmingly towards Asian buyers. Most importantly, improved relations with Washington could help reduce some of the political and financing risks attached to Zimbabwe.
The US sanctions architecture has already changed significantly. In March 2024, Washington terminated its Zimbabwe-specific sanctions programme, while simultaneously imposing Global Magnitsky sanctions on Mnangagwa and others. ZDERA remains a separate issue. Proposals to repeal or modify the legislation have periodically surfaced in Washington, but proposals are not the same thing as a completed policy change.
For Zimbabwe, meaningful American engagement would therefore not simply mean an American delegation visiting Harare. It would mean cheaper and more accessible capital, credible investment, technology partnerships, market access and potentially a broader pathway back into international financial markets.
There is already a small illustration of what greater commercial engagement could look like. Washington has allocated Zimbabwe a tariff-rate quota for sugar exports, giving qualifying Zimbabwean sugar duty-free access within that quota. The scale is modest. The symbolism is not.
Can Mnangagwa Play Both Sides?
This is the heart of the matter. The most interesting strategy is not for Mnangagwa to choose America over China. It is to make China worry about losing ground to America, while making America realise that China already has a substantial ground position. That creates a negotiating conversation.
Harare should be able to tell Washington: if you want Zimbabwean lithium, platinum, nickel or chrome, bring capital, processing technology, infrastructure finance and market access. And it should simultaneously be able to tell Beijing: if American companies are now prepared to invest, Chinese companies must offer better terms. But “better terms” must mean something concrete.
More local beneficiation. More jobs. More Zimbabwean suppliers. More technology transfer. Better infrastructure. Higher tax and royalty returns. More transparent mining agreements. Domestic processing rather than the export of raw or minimally processed minerals. Railways capable of moving greater volumes. Electricity infrastructure capable of supporting mines and factories. The value of competition lies precisely there.
If America and China compete merely to secure access to Zimbabwean ore, Zimbabwe can lose while both foreign powers win. If they compete to build processing capacity, finance infrastructure, transfer technology and secure long-term industrial partnerships, Zimbabwe has a chance of winning.
But Leverage Is Not Bargaining Power
This is where Mnangagwa’s gamble becomes dangerous. Zimbabwe has repeatedly announced large investments without always producing equivalent levels of industrial transformation. Infrastructure constraints remain severe. Electricity shortages, railway limitations and expensive capital all make it harder to turn mineral deposits into broad-based industrial capacity.
Zimbabwe’s dependence on Chinese financing also demonstrates the difficulty of suddenly shifting towards Washington. China has money already committed. Chinese companies already have personnel on the ground. Chinese investors already understand the regulatory environment. Chinese firms have established relationships with Zimbabwean state institutions and private businesses.
An American company considering a major Zimbabwean mining investment has to decide whether it wants to enter a market where Chinese companies already possess significant advantages. That means Washington will not automatically offer better terms. Nor will Beijing automatically surrender its position.
China could respond to increased American interest by improving its offers, accelerating projects or strengthening its infrastructure commitments. That would be good for Zimbabwe only if Harare is prepared to use the competition intelligently.
There is also a domestic political problem. A government cannot extract better terms from multinational corporations if contracts are opaque, enforcement is weak and politically connected intermediaries capture too much of the value. That is why the quality of Zimbabwe’s institutions matters more than the number of foreign investors.
The Trump Factor
Trump makes the opportunity more transactional. His administration has placed considerable emphasis on critical minerals, American supply chains and reducing dependence on strategic competitors. That makes Zimbabwe’s mineral resources commercially and strategically interesting. But Washington’s interest should not be mistaken for charity.
America will want something in return. Perhaps access to lithium. Perhaps platinum-group metals. Perhaps preferential commercial relationships. Perhaps influence over supply chains in which China currently has an advantage.
Mnangagwa therefore has to understand the nature of the bargain. If Washington wants Zimbabwean minerals because they matter to American industry, Zimbabwe should ask what America is prepared to put on the table. That could include investment capital, technology, market access, infrastructure partnerships, financing and diplomatic normalisation.
The same principle applies to China. If Beijing wants to preserve its dominant commercial position, Harare should ask what additional value China is prepared to create inside Zimbabwe.
The Real Test
Mnangagwa’s opportunity is real. Zimbabwe possesses minerals that Washington increasingly values, while Beijing already has substantial investments in mining, processing, steel and infrastructure. America now appears interested in expanding its own commercial presence. That creates competition.
But leverage is not the same as bargaining power. The president’s real test is whether he can turn American interest into better Chinese offers, Chinese investment into better American offers, and both into measurable gains for Zimbabweans.
That means demanding processing rather than simply extraction. Jobs rather than promises. Railways rather than memoranda. Technology rather than trucks of ore. Taxes and royalties rather than politically convenient concessions.
Zimbabwe does not necessarily need to choose between China and America. It needs to make both work harder for access to Zimbabwe.
The question is no longer whether Zimbabwe can attract America or keep China. The question is whether Mnangagwa can make both want Zimbabwe badly enough to pay a better price for it. That is the difference between possessing mineral wealth and possessing bargaining power.
Zimbabwe may finally have the first. The great test is whether Mnangagwa’s government can build the second before somebody else captures the value.
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