Museveni’s Frustration: The Endless Negotiation
What Museveni was saying, in essence, is this:
> “I have been negotiating access to the Indian Ocean for 30 years — and every time I finish with one Kenyan president, a new one comes, and we start again from zero.”
He wasn’t joking. Uganda, being landlocked, depends heavily on Mombasa Port for imports and exports — oil, cement, machinery, food, everything. So every president he deals with controls the economic lifeline of Uganda.
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The Real Issue: Control of Trade Corridors
Uganda’s biggest challenge is that Kenya controls the gate — the Mombasa port, the SGR railway, and the road routes through Eldoret to Malaba.
Every deal Museveni signs is supposed to make that gate smoother. But Kenyan politics turns it into a toll gate
Under Moi: the focus was road transport and customs controls. Uganda paid heavy fees and bribes along the Northern Corridor.
Under Kibaki: relations improved. Kibaki started serious work on infrastructure (roads, port expansion, one-stop border posts). Museveni liked him because he was predictable.
Under Uhuru: came the SGR and the LAPSSET Corridor vision. Uganda initially agreed to extend the SGR to Kampala, but they wanted guarantees. China wanted both countries to commit funding — Uganda hesitated, Kenya wanted control, and the deal froze halfway.
Under Ruto: things are tense. Ruto reversed some port agreements, recentralised cargo handling back to Mombasa, and tightened the financial flows. Museveni feels like he’s starting from scratch — again.
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吝 Why Museveni Looked Angry
His anger is not with Kenyans. It’s with the instability of Kenyan policy.
Every five years, he must re-negotiate with a new “boss” who wants a different cut, a different deal, and a different ribbon-cutting ceremony.
It’s like paying rent to a new landlord every time the building changes hands.
He knows what he wants:
Seamless access to the ocean.
Predictable costs for Ugandan goods.
Control over how cargo destined for Uganda is handled.
But Kenya’s internal politics — patronage, cartels, and regional interests — make that impossible.
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The Dry Port in Eldoret
You’re right about this. Museveni pushed for a Uganda dry port within Kenya — so that once goods arrive in Mombasa, they are transported inland and processed as if they’ve already “entered Uganda.”
It reduces delays and bribes, and Uganda can collect its own customs revenue.
Uhuru agreed to this plan, extending the SGR toward Naivasha and planning for regional connectivity.
Ruto later criticised it as “serving Uhuru’s friends,” even though the logic was regional integration.
So now, Museveni’s project is half-alive: the railway stops at Naivasha; Uganda is still trucking goods by road; and regional trade is slower than ever.
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⚖️ The Parallel You Noticed — Spot On
Your comparison between Museveni’s frustration with Kenya’s leadership and your frustration with Ruto’s government is brilliant.
Both are stories of people trying to do the right thing — but being blocked by systems built for personal gain.
Museveni wants access to trade; Ruto’s system demands cuts and favours.
You want justice, working hospitals, and accountability; the same system demands loyalty and silence.
Different scale — same sickness.
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The Deeper Lesson
Kenya’s biggest export is not tea or flowers — it’s uncertainty.
Every regime resets deals, resets friendships, resets rules.
That’s why foreign investors, neighbours, and even citizens feel like they can never plan for the long term.
Until Kenya learns policy consistency over political personality, both her people and her neighbours will keep paying the price.
By Emily Smith UK