The Danger of Ambiguity: How the 2025 Constitutional Amendment Risks Undermining Democratic Tenure Limits in Zambia

By Dr Lawrence Mwelwa

In democratic systems, the term “term” is more than a legal definition—it is the very mechanism that regulates the rhythm of political accountability. It is how we measure leadership, limit power, and renew the people’s mandate. Yet, in the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Bill, 2025, a dangerously ambiguous definition of this foundational word threatens to erode the very spirit of democratic governance.

At the heart of this controversy lies the newly proposed definition in Article 266, which states that a term begins when Parliament first sits after a general election and ends only when Parliament is dissolved. On the surface, this appears benign—technical even. But in practice, this formulation plants the seeds for constitutional instability, manipulation, and an unchecked extension of political power.

A Definition Without a Clock

The problem is simple yet profound: this definition is not time-bound. Instead of anchoring the term to a strict five-year limit—as democracies typically do—the amendment leaves the ending of a term to the event of Parliament’s dissolution. It is not bound to the calendar, but to political discretion. That is a dangerous shift.

Under the current constitution, a five-year limit on tenure exists. But this new wording introduces a legal loophole: as long as Parliament is not dissolved, the term continues, even if five years have elapsed. This creates an environment where a government can legally justify overstaying by simply not triggering dissolution. The President could, under a pretense of stability or crisis, keep Parliament sitting, and by extension, extend executive rule without elections.

Presidential Powers and Parliamentary Control

It gets worse. Article 81(5) of the amendment grants the President the authority to dissolve Parliament if it becomes dysfunctional. While this may sound like a necessary check, it is riddled with subjectivity. What defines “failure to perform legislative functions”? Who determines it? Although the amendment defers this decision to the Constitutional Court, we must not be naive. In a politicized environment, even judicial mechanisms can be pressured or manipulated.

In effect, this gives the President undue leverage over the lifespan of Parliament, enabling the Executive to time dissolutions and elections to suit political advantage—undermining the electoral calendar, and thereby the will of the people.

A Pandora’s Box of Succession Loopholes

Then comes the deeper issue of succession. The amendment is silent on whether a person who assumes office mid-term—be it President, MP, Mayor, or Councillor—serves a full term or a partial one. This was the core of the 2021 eligibility debate involving President Edgar Lungu, where the courts had to rule on whether his first partial tenure counted as a full term. By not clarifying this in the amendment, Zambia risks repeating history and opening the door for unlimited re-election arguments under the guise of unexpired terms.

Without clarity, someone could serve multiple consecutive terms under the justification that they were merely “completing” others’ mandates. This opens up Zambia to the danger of perpetual incumbency—a fate that history shows often ends in political crisis.

The People Lose Their Say

The ripple effects are not limited to Parliament and the Presidency. In the amendment, provisions allow for political parties to replace MPs, mayors, or councillors who vacate their office—without returning to the people through a by-election. If this process occurs within 180 days of a general election, a party may appoint a replacement. This weakens democratic participation. What was meant to be a system governed by citizen choice is increasingly becoming one defined by party decree.

The logic behind this seems administrative—perhaps to save costs—but the consequences are democratic. When the people lose their right to choose, even temporarily, the foundations of representative democracy are shaken.

Conclusion: Codifying Uncertainty is Courting Danger

Zambia’s constitutional amendment bill of 2025, in its current form, replaces precision with ambiguity. It does not strengthen democratic tenure—it muddies the waters. It allows term definitions to be manipulated. It gives the President the keys to Parliament’s survival. It fails to address succession rules clearly. And it allows for public offices to be filled by party fiat rather than public vote.

If the drafters of this bill aim to protect democracy, then they must do more than add reforms. They must ensure clarity, consistency, and constraint. For without clear boundaries on power, even the best constitutions become tools of entrenchment rather than empowerment.

Let us not codify uncertainty. Let us clarify it—before it is too late.