CAUGHT IN ITS OWN WEB: HOW BILL 7 HAS PLUNGED THE GOVERNMENT INTO A CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS OF ITS OWN MAKING- Prof. Cephas Lumina

CAUGHT IN ITS OWN WEB: HOW BILL 7 HAS PLUNGED THE GOVERNMENT INTO A CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS OF ITS OWN MAKING

By Prof. Cephas Lumina

Governments often stumble into crises; fewer manage to manufacture them with the determination and spectacle ours has displayed in recent months. The unfolding constitutional crisis, driven by the Executive’s insistence on resuscitating the already-dead Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Bill No. 7 of 2025 (“Bill 7”), is not only ill-advised but legally indefensible, politically reckless, and institutionally corrosive.

The nation is witnessing the extraordinary spectacle of an administration simultaneously undermining the Constitution, contradicting its own public justifications, and ensnaring itself in a web of its own misrepresentations. What began as a rushed and self-serving amendment process has developed into a crisis of legality, credibility, and governance—one entirely of the government’s own making

At the heart of the controversy lies a simple fact that the Executive (and the Speaker of the National Assembly) refuse to confront: Bill 7 is a nullity. It was nullified not by opinion or political pressure, but by the Constitutional Court in Munir Zulu and Another v Attorney-General. This is the unavoidable starting point for any honest assessment of the current impasse.

The legal effect of the Munir Zulu judgment: Bill 7 died on arrival

In my earlier commentary in this paper (“‘Tainted at Birth’: Why Bill No. 7 must be withdrawn or considered a nullity, not merely deferred,” 10 July 2025), I argued that Bill 7 did not survive the Constitutional Court’s ruling in Munir Zulu – a view shared by most legal experts.

The Attorney-General publicly asserted that the judgment merely required consultations. But that interpretation ignored the Court’s reasoning. The Court held that the process leading to Bill 7 was unconstitutional. A Bill founded upon an unconstitutional process cannot stand. The Court does not need to utter the words “null and void” for the legal effect to be plain.

Bill 7 was therefore not merely paused—it was fatally tainted. The hurried—and I dare add, rather suspicious—“deferral” announced by State House a day before the Court’s decision did not rescue it; deferral cannot revive a Bill whose foundation has been invalidated.
Despite persistent calls from legal experts, church bodies, civil society organisations, and citizens to withdraw the Bill considering the judgment, the government pressed ahead and, in doing so, deepened the constitutional quagmire.

A Technical Committee built on a legal fiction

Rather than acknowledge that Bill 7 was a nullity, the Executive created a procedural detour: the appointment of the Technical Committee on Amendments to the Constitution. The Committee’s terms of reference were revealing. They mirrored the content of Bill 7 and required the Committee to draft constitutional amendments and provide justifications, as well as produce a comprehensive evaluative report. This was not an invitation to assess whether amendments were needed; it was an instruction to produce them.

The compressed timeframe—purported “nationwide consultations” across all provinces and districts between 27 October and 13 November 2025—made genuine public participation impossible. The process appeared designed not to hear the nation’s views, but to stage compliance with Munir Zulu.

Yet even this flawed exercise has ultimately been undermined by the government itself. Under established practice, the Technical Committee’s report and draft Bill should have been taken to Cabinet and, if approved, published in the Government Gazette thirty days before introduction in Parliament.

Instead, the government has chosen to sidestep the Committee’s work entirely, ignoring the very deliverables it demanded and funded. The question is obvious: Why appoint a committee, instruct it to draft amendments, rush consultations, and then bury its output the moment it is completed?

The answer is obvious: the Committee was never intended to produce a new Bill, or at least one that did not fit the Executive’s agenda. It was meant to create the illusion of compliance while preserving a path back to the already-tainted Bill 7. More plausibly, the Committee’s draft did not align with the Executive’s objectives.

A resurrection attempt that violates the Constitution

On 2 December 2025—just a day after the Technical Committee submitted its report and draft Bill to the President—First Deputy Speaker, Attractor Chisangano, announced that she had received a communication from the Minister of Justice requesting resumption of consideration of Bill 7. She added that the select committee on the Bill would “commence its meetings immediately.”

This was politically explosive and legally indefensible. What happened to the draft amendment Bill produced by the Technical Committee only one day before? Why pretend to comply with Munir Zulu, then abandon the one action that could have restored some semblance of constitutional legitimacy to the process?

More fundamentally, how can Parliament “resume consideration” of a Bill that no longer exists in law?

Bill 7 was not simply tainted; it was effectively extinguished by the Constitutional Court in Munir Zulu. The government is, therefore, attempting to do the legally impossible.

The Standing Orders leave the government no escape route

The Standing Orders that govern parliamentary procedure were designed to ensure predictability, legality, and order in the legislative process. Yet it is precisely these rules that now trap the government. Far from providing a pathway through the crisis, they close every conceivable door to the revival of Bill 7.

For one, the Standing Orders demand that any constitutional amendment Bill must be published in the Gazette at least thirty days before it is introduced for First Reading. This requirement is meant to guarantee transparency and allow the public to scrutinise proposed constitutional changes before Parliament is invited to debate them. If the government were acting lawfully, it would be preparing to publish the draft Bill produced by the Technical Committee. But doing so would amount to admitting that Bill 7 is defunct. Publication of a new Bill would automatically invalidate the pretence that Bill 7 is still alive, and it would compel a restart of the entire legislative process—precisely what the Executive is determined to avoid.

Then there is the rule prohibiting the introduction of two Bills on the same subject within a single parliamentary session. This provision alone makes the government’s strategy impossible. If Bill 7 is acknowledged as withdrawn or lapsed, no new constitutional amendment Bill can be introduced until the next parliamentary session (after August 2026). Yet the Executive knows that waiting would derail its political timelines, so it has opted instead to bulldoze forward in defiance of the text and spirit of the Standing Orders and the Constitution.

The government’s difficulties do not end there. Even if it sought to amend Bill 7 through the select committee process, the Standing Orders only allow amendments that fall within the scope of the original Bill’s objectives. They do not permit a parliamentary committee to transform an invalid Bill into a substantively new one. Doing so would violate parliamentary practice, which demands that a Bill so fundamentally altered must be discarded and replaced—again triggering the Gazette requirement and again making it impossible to proceed within the current session.

Finally, the most decisive rule is Standing Order 122. It provides that any Bill deferred for more than six months is considered withdrawn. Bill 7 was “deferred” on 26 June 2025, meaning it lapses automatically on 25 December. A lapsed Bill is finished; it cannot be revived or reconsidered in the same session under any circumstances.

Taken together, these provisions form an unbreakable chain. Every legal and procedural path the government might attempt is blocked by rules designed to safeguard constitutional amendment from exactly this kind of manipulation. Instead of accepting this reality, the Executive has chosen to push forward along a route that violates the Standing Orders at every turn and invites a deeper constitutional crisis with every step.

Digging the hole deeper: A crisis of legitimacy

What we are witnessing is not simply procedural mishandling; it is an Executive scrambling to preserve a political agenda that has lost its legal foundation and public legitimacy.

The sense of desperation is palpable. Even those close to the process admit as much. One individual who has publicly defended the Technical Committee privately remarked to me about a senior government official involved in driving the amendment:

“He’s mad. He’s fighting for survival. He’s been involved in too many deals and knows if he loses office he would be in trouble.”

This is an extraordinary admission. It strips away the veneer of patriotic rhetoric and exposes the real motivations behind the amendment. For some, this constitutional amendment is not about strengthening democracy, improving representation, or enhancing governance. It is about self-preservation.

When constitutional reform becomes a tool for political survival, the integrity of the entire process collapses.

Reconsideration by the Select Committee: A constitutional absurdity

That the select committee is receiving submissions on a legally dead bill is itself an embarrassment to constitutionalism. The committee is operating on the fiction that Bill 7 still exists. But a nullity cannot be revived by parliamentary enthusiasm.

The Executive’s conduct has now placed Parliament in an impossible position. If the committee proceeds, it risks dignifying an unconstitutional act. If it declines, it exposes the Executive’s impropriety.

Thus, the government has not only trapped itself—it has trapped Parliament and the broader constitutional order as well.

PULL-QUOTE

“A nullity cannot be revived — yet government insists on dragging Bill 7’s corpse through Parliament, even as its own mandated draft amendments and report of 1 December 2025 lie discarded.”

The unfolding crisis: A government at war with the Constitution

All these developments have combined to create a constitutional crisis that is no longer abstract or speculative; it is unfolding in real time. The government’s refusal to accept the implications of the Munir Zulu judgment has set off a chain reaction of legal, procedural, and political ruptures. The crisis is not a single event but a series of accumulating breaches that together threaten the integrity of the constitutional order.

At the legal level, the Executive is attempting to advance a Bill that has been effectively extinguished by the Constitutional Court and by the Standing Orders. By insisting on treating Bill 7 as if it were still valid, the government is placing itself in direct conflict with the very Constitution it claims to be amending. This defiance of judicial authority erodes the principle of constitutional supremacy and signals to all institutions that legality is optional when political stakes are high.

There is also a procedural crisis. Parliament, which is supposed to operate according to established rules, is being pulled into a process that violates those rules at every stage. The select committee’s ongoing engagement with Bill 7, despite its legal nonexistence, creates confusion about the status of Bills, the meaning of deferral, and the force of Standing Orders. The procedural framework that ensures order in legislative processes is buckling under political pressure.

Then there is the political dimension—a profound crisis of legitimacy. Public confidence in the government’s intentions has deteriorated sharply, especially given the widespread perception that the amendment is self-serving and rushed. The speed at which the Technical Committee was forced to work, the absence of genuine consultation, and the government’s failure to publish the Committee’s report all feed a growing belief that the process is neither transparent nor principled. Add to this the unresolved allegations of bribery of Members of Parliament, and the shadow over the amendment becomes darker still.

Finally, the crisis is one of governance. The Executive is not merely failing to uphold the Constitution—it is actively undermining it. By pursuing an impossible legislative path rather than accepting lawful limits, the government is damaging the same institutions that uphold its own legitimacy. This sets a dangerous precedent for future administrations and threatens the stability of the constitutional order itself.

What emerges from this picture is a government in open conflict with the guardrails of constitutionalism, unwilling to retreat even as its actions deepen the crisis on every front.

Conclusion: A crisis deepened by the government’s own design

The country now stands at the edge of a constitutional rupture engineered entirely by those entrusted to safeguard the constitutional order. This crisis arises not from legal ambiguity, but from the Executive’s refusal to accept the consequences of its own unlawful actions. Bill 7, nullified by the Munir Zulu judgment, cannot be revived through insistence or political will.

What makes this moment especially troubling is the government’s decision to discard the very mechanism it created to repair the process. After directing the Technical Committee to produce draft amendments and a comprehensive evaluative report the Executive has ignored these deliverables, treating them not as tools of constitutional repair but as obstacles to be circumvented, simply because their content does not further its narrow partisan interests.

Meanwhile, the Standing Orders leave no lawful path forward. A lapsed Bill cannot be revived. A Bill on the same subject cannot be reintroduced in the same session. A fundamentally altered Bill must be gazetted anew. By refusing to accept these constraints, the Executive risks drawing Parliament into illegality.

Layered atop these violations are credible allegations of bribery, casting a corrosive shadow over the entire endeavour. A constitutional amendment pursued under such suspicion cannot command public confidence.

Even if forced through, Bill 7 will retain the incurable taint of an unconstitutional constitutional amendment—born of an unlawful process, pursued in defiance of judicial authority, and advanced in contempt of procedural safeguards.

In the end, the government has woven and fallen into a constitutional trap entirely of its own making. The country deserves a constitutional process anchored in legality, transparency, and national interest—not one propelled by political desperation. Until the Executive acknowledges that Bill 7 is beyond resurrection, the country will remain suspended in an avoidable and increasingly dangerous constitutional crisis.

CREDIT: THE MAST