Unspoken Constitutional Fact: Bill No. 7 of 2025 Has No Legal Existence- John Sangwa

Unspoken Constitutional Fact: Bill No. 7 of 2025 Has No Legal Existence

By John Sangwa, SC

Introduction

On 28 November 2025, the Oasis Forum met with the President to urge him to abandon his
plans to amend the Constitution before the next general election.

The purpose of the engagement was to emphasise the importance of constitutional stability, meaningful public participation, and adherence to the rule of law during an electoral period.

Unfortunately, the outcome was not satisfactory. It became clear that the President remains determined to proceed
with constitutional amendments despite the Constitutional Court’s judgment and the
representations made to him.

This determination to alter the Constitution in such circumstances has created widespread
confusion and concern. Many citizens are unsure about what the law requires, the stage of the constitutional process, whether any Bill legally exists, and the implications for Zambia’s democracy.

It has therefore become necessary to provide a clear explanation of the constitutional position.

The public deserves to understand:
(a) (b) why Bill No. 7 of 2025 does not exist in law, why the Constitution as amended in 2016 must not be amended for partisan convenience, and
(c) why amending the Constitution months before an election is dangerous and
democratically improper.
This explanation is essential, not only to dispel misinformation, but also to safeguard
constitutional order and ensure that citizens are fully informed about the consequences of
proceeding outside the legal framework established by the Constitution and affirmed by the Constitutional Court.

What follows is a three-part analysis:

(a) (b) (c) Part I explains why Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Bill No. 7 of 2025 legally does not exist, why no debate on the said Bill is currently lawful, and why the Technical Committee and its work should be the subject of discussion.

Part II demonstrates that the Constitution as amended in 2016 was a bipartisan national
settlement that should not be reopened for partisan or electoral advantage.

Part III shows why amending the Constitution months before an election is dangerous,
destabilising, and a profound threat to democratic governance.

Taken together, these Parts explain why Zambians must resist any attempt to amend the Constitution at this moment, and why the only responsible national debate should centre on why the Constitution must not be amended at all, especially so close to an election.

PART I: The Constitutional Amendment Bill No. 7 of 2025 Does Not Exist

In early 2025, Zambia entered a period of significant constitutional uncertainty. The events began on 8 March 2025, during International Women’s Day celebrations, when the President unexpectedly announced that the Government intended to amend the Constitution.

This announcement came without prior notice and without any form of public consultation.
Amending the Constitution is a momentous act in any democracy, and in Zambia it has
historically involved broad national engagement. Yet this time, no national discussion had taken place at all.

A few days later, the Minister of Justice, Hon. Princess Kasune, reinforced the President’s
announcement and went further. She disclosed that a draft Constitutional Amendment Bill had already been prepared and would soon be introduced in Parliament. On 26 March 2025, she confirmed this position before the National Assembly. Many Zambians rightly felt excluded from a process that should have been participatory and transparent.

Citizens Go to Court

Because Government had neither consulted the public nor established any official
constitutional review mechanism, a group of citizens filed Constitutional Petition No.
2025/CCZ/009 on 1 April 2025. They argued that: the Constitution belongs to the people of
Zambia; the people must be consulted before any amendments are initiated; no proper
procedure or consultation had taken place; and Government had therefore acted outside the law.

They noted that previous constitutional reform efforts, such as the Mwanakatwe Commission
and the 2011 – 2012 Technical Committee, were grounded in extensive public participation,expert review, and broad national consensus. None of these safeguards were followed in 2025.

Government Moves Ahead Anyway

Despite the petition being before the Court, Government continued with its plan. On 23 May 2025, it published the Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Bill No. 7 of 2025 in the
Government Gazette. On 25 June 2025, the Bill received its first reading in Parliament.

This increased national concern, given that the legality of the process had not yet been determined by the Constitutional Court.

The President’s Deferment of the Bill

On 26 June 2025, as criticism mounted and the Court had not yet ruled, the President
announced that Bill No. 7 would be deferred to allow for more consultation. At that stage, the
deferment appeared to be a temporary political move. It did not withdraw the Bill, cure its constitutional defects, or address the concerns raised in the petition.

Legally, nothing had changed, the Bill remained on the Order Paper, and the core constitutional issues remained before the Court.

Everything changed the following day. On 27 June 2025, the Constitutional Court delivered its final judgment. The Court held that: the entire process leading to Bill No. 7 was
unconstitutional; Government must conduct meaningful public consultation before drafting or introducing a Constitutional Amendment Bill; all actions taken in relation to Bill No. 7 were invalid and void.

The Court did not merely pause the process, it extinguished it. From that moment, Bill No. 7
no longer existed in law. The President’s deferment became irrelevant once the Court declared the entire process a nullity.

A New Committee Is Formed

Following the Court’s ruling, the President was obligated to restart the process properly. On
20 October 2025, he issued the Terms of Reference for a Technical Committee, an expert body mandated to guide a new, lawful, and inclusive constitutional review process.

The Committee was tasked with:
(a) studying the Constitutional Court’s judgment;
(b) examining the issues Government wished to amend;
(c) conducting nationwide public consultations;
(d) reviewing past constitutional reform processes;
(e) preparing a detailed report;
(f) and drafting a new Constitutional

Amendment Bill only if the public’s views justified doing so.

The establishment of the Committee marked the beginning of an entirely new process and
confirmed that Bill No. 7 could not be revived.
Note on the Legal Status of the Technical Committee.

It is important to note that the legality of the Technical Committee’s appointment and the
validity of its Terms of Reference are not addressed in this article. Those questions are currently the subject of active litigation before the Constitutional Court in Cause No. 2025/CCZ/0029.

For that reason, this analysis proceeds on the basis of the Committee’s existence as a matter of fact, without expressing any view on whether its establishment complies with the Constitution or the law. The focus of this article remains limited to the constitutional implications of the Court’s judgment of 27 June 2025 and the legal position regarding the non-existence of Bill No. 7.

What the Appointment of the Technical Committee Means

The creation of the Technical Committee and the issuance of the terms of reference on 20
October 2025 fundamentally reshaped the constitutional landscape. Its implications can only be understood in relation to two earlier events: the deferment of Bill No. 7 on 26 June 2025, and the Speaker’s ruling of 9 July 2025 claiming that Parliament could still proceed with the.Bill.

1. Implications for the Deferment

The deferment had been only a pause, not a solution. But the appointment of the Committee after the Court’s judgment had deeper meaning. It signalled acceptance that the original process was unconstitutional. It effectively abandoned Bill No. 7 in both law and practice. It established the Committee as the only path forward.

2. Implications for the Speaker’s Ruling

The Speaker had insisted Parliament could continue with Bill No. 7. But the President’s actions.contradicted this: The President followed the Court, not the Speaker. Parliament cannot meaningfully debate an invalid Bill while a new one is being prepared.

The Speaker’s ruling therefore lost practical relevance.

Why Debate Must Wait Until the New Bill Is Published

When Government first attempted to amend the Constitution, it did so without consulting the people. The Constitutional Court found that: there was no meaningful public consultation, and the procedure used was fundamentally defective. Because of these defects, Bill No. 7 does not exist in law.

The Technical Committee is now the only mechanism for restarting the process. It is tasked with gathering public views and possibly drafting a new Bill. Until it completes its work: no valid Bill exists, and there is nothing to debate.

Even once a new Bill is drafted, Article 79 requires it to be gazetted for 30 days before debate.

During that period, the public may scrutinise it, and any citizen may challenge unconstitutional content or procedure in the Constitutional Court. Until such a Bill is lawfully produced and gazetted, all debate is speculative.

If There Must Be Any Debate, It Should Be About Why the Constitution Must Not Be
Amended at This Time

Close to an election, with no crisis, no public demand, and no valid Bill, the only meaningful
national discussion is: Why should the President not amend the Constitution at all, especially months before an election? This is the debate Zambia must have, and the only one that respects the rule of law and constitutionalism.

PART II: The Constitution of 2016 Was a Bipartisan Settlement and Must Not Be
Reopened for Partisan Convenience
The second and most fundamental reason to oppose attempts to revive or reintroduce
amendments akin to Bill No. 7 is that the Constitution as amended in 2016 is not an ordinary statute.

It is the product of a long, difficult, and ultimately bipartisan national compact, not a
political instrument to be adjusted whenever a ruling party sees an opportunity.

The Constitution as amended in 2016 was the culmination of a reform process that began in
1991 and involved successive governments, opposition parties, civil society, and diverse
sectors of society. Both the Patriotic Front (PF) and the United Party for National Development (UPND) participated fully, debated intensely, and jointly endorsed its final form.

The UPND had every opportunity to raise any concerns or propose further refinements at the time.

If the changes the UPND now seeks were genuinely necessary, urgent, or foundational, they could and should have been proposed during the 2016 constitutional negotiations, when the party fully participated, or at the very least in 2019 when the PF introduced the Constitutional (Amendment) Bill No. 10 of 2019.

Introducing them hurriedly, unilaterally, and without consensus in 2025 is therefore neither justified nor credible.

Reopening the Constitution now undermines the deliberate and inclusive settlement that both major political parties agreed to less than a decade ago.

Constitutional Stability Requires Broad National Consensus

A Constitution is not meant to change with every election cycle. It is the foundational
framework that ensures stability, continuity, predictability, and national unity.
The Constitution is intended to reflect a broad-based national consensus, not the shifting preferences of whichever political party happens to form government. Allowing a ruling party to reopen the Constitution simply because the political moment appears favourable is profoundly dangerous.

When constitutional amendments become tied to partisan timing: legitimacy is weakened, institutions become unstable, the rule of law is eroded, and public confidence declines.

This is not how a constitutional democracy protects itself.

The PF Was Wrong Before 2021, and the UPND Is Wrong Now

This principle is not new, and it is certainly not selectively applied. The PF’s attempt to amend the Constitution through Bill No. 10 before the 2021 general election was wrong in law and principle, and many Zambians including the UPND rightly rejected it.

At that time, the critique was simple: No ruling party should unilaterally reopen the
Constitution for partisan advantage.
That critique applies equally today. The UPND’s attempt to reopen the Constitution through Bill No. 7, especially months before an election, is just as improper as the PF’s attempt was.

The supreme law must not be rewritten to suit the political preferences of whichever party
temporarily holds power. The Constitution must be respected across administrations, not
manipulated by them.

A Constitution Must Stand Above Party Politics

Once constitutional amendment becomes a tool of political convenience, the Constitution loses its authority and becomes indistinguishable from ordinary legislation. This is dangerous.

A Constitution that changes whenever a ruling party wishes to change it: weakens public faith in institutions, politicises the rule of law, destabilises governance, and transforms the
Constitution into a partisan battleground. The result is predictable: instability, division, and the gradual corrosion of constitutionalism.

A stable constitutional order, accepted by all political actors, is essential for national unity,

peaceful transitions of power, and the preservation of democratic norms.

PART III: Why the Constitution Must Not Be Amended Before an Election

Even if a valid Bill existed today, which it does not, and even if the Technical Committee had
completed its work, which it has not, amending the Constitution months before a general election would still be an extraordinarily dangerous and democratically improper act.

Constitutional amendments made on the eve of an election threaten the stability, fairness, and legitimacy of the electoral process. They risk undermining public trust at the precise moment when the country needs unity and predictability.

This Part explains why any attempt to amend the Constitution before the next election must
be firmly rejected.

1. Constitutional Amendments Before Elections Undermine Fairness and Neutrality
The Constitution sets the rules for: how elections are conducted, how public power is exercised, how disputes are resolved, and how institutions function.

Changing these rules shortly before an election destabilises the political environment. It creates uncertainty about: the rights of voters and candidates, the powers of key institutions, the rules governing electoral disputes, and the structure of the political playing field.

No democracy should alter its constitutional framework at the very moment that framework is about to be tested. Doing so undermines institutional neutrality and public confidence in the electoral process.

2. Constitutional Amendments Near an Election Create Suspicion and Distrust
Regardless of the stated intentions, constitutional amendments close to an election inevitably raise suspicion. Citizens and political actors will reasonably wonder: Why now? Why not after the election? Is the ruling party attempting to tilt the political playing field? Are these changes designed to secure electoral advantage?

Even if these suspicions are false, the perception alone damages national cohesion. It polarises the political landscape, heightens mistrust, and undermines the legitimacy of the election outcome. A credible election requires a credible constitutional environment.

3. Stability Is Essential During Electoral Transitions
Election periods are delicate moments that require: certainty, predictability, legality, and
institutional stability. Constitutional change at this time introduces confusion at precisely the
wrong moment. Institutions such as: the Electoral Commission of Zambia, the Judiciary, political parties, the police and security services, and public administration need a stable constitutional framework to ensure a peaceful, credible, and well-managed election. When that framework changes suddenly, institutional confusion follows.

4. There Is No National Crisis Justifying Urgent Constitutional Change

Some countries amend their constitutions urgently when facing: constitutional breakdown, national emergencies, civil conflict, or institutional paralysis. Zambia faces none of these situations.

The Constitution as amended in 2016 is functioning. There is no breakdown, no dysfunction of state institutions, and no urgent crisis requiring immediate amendment. Without a crisis, urgency becomes a political invention, and invented urgency is a hallmark of constitutional manipulation. If the Constitution is not broken, it does not need to be fixed.

5. Amending the Constitution Before an Election Sets a Dangerous Precedent

If the ruling party amends the Constitution shortly before an election, it sets a precedent that future governments may follow. The result is a cycle in which: every party amends the Constitution before elections, each alters the rules for partisan gain, constitutional stability collapses, and the supreme law loses its authority.

This is how democracies decay. This is how constitutionalism dies not suddenly, but
incrementally, one self-serving amendment at a time.

6. The Constitution Must Stand Above the Electoral Calendar

A Constitution is meant to stabilise the political system, not respond to electoral timing. Serious constitutional reform must take place: outside election periods, through broad national consensus, with full public participation, and after careful, national reflection.

Amending the Constitution on the eve of an election reverses these principles. It politicises the supreme law, undermines its legitimacy, and invites future manipulation. A Constitution must never become a tool of political strategy.

PART 4: The Constitution Must Stand Above Politics, Power, and Election Timetables

Zambia is at a defining constitutional moment. The Constitutional Court has already held that the so-called Constitution of Zambia (Amendment) Bill No. 7 of 2025 does not exist in law.

The President’s deferment of the Bill cannot revive it. The Speaker’s ruling cannot validate it.
The only process is now vested in the Technical Committee appointed in October 2025, which is still carrying out its mandate. Until that Committee completes its work and until a fresh Bill is published in the Gazette in compliance with Article 79, there is nothing before the nation to debate.

The insistence on proceeding with constitutional amendments before a general election therefore raises deeper questions, questions about leadership, legitimacy, and the future of constitutional democracy in Zambia.

The Constitution as amended in 2016, is not a partisan creation. It was a bipartisan national
settlement, reflecting long years of public participation and political compromise. If the
Constitution can be reopened merely because a ruling party finds it politically convenient to
do so, then it stops being a national compact and becomes a political weapon. That is not
constitutionalism. It is constitutional manipulation.

And even if a valid Bill existed, which it does not, it would still be democratically unacceptable to amend the Constitution months before an election. Election periods require stability, neutrality, and predictability. Altering the supreme law on the eve of an election threatens the fairness of the electoral environment, invites suspicion, destabilises institutions, and sets a dangerous precedent that future governments may exploit.

The Constitution must not be rewritten to suit political convenience. It must not be reshaped
according to electoral calculations. It must not be adjusted to secure partisan advantage.
A Constitution must stand above politics, above momentary power, and above the shifting fortunes of political parties.

It is the anchor of the Republic. If that anchor is loosened, the entire system is set adrift.

At this moment, Zambia does not need constitutional amendments. It needs constitutional stability. It needs respect for the rule of law. It needs leadership that places the nation above partisan interest.

If there must be any national debate now, it should be about this central question: Why should the President not amend the Constitution at all, and especially not on the eve of a national election? The answer is simple: Because Zambia’s democracy, stability, and constitutional order depend on restraint, not on reckless alteration of the supreme law.

The Constitution belongs to the people.
It must be protected by the people.

And it must never be amended for partisan gain.