FORMER AGRICULTURE MINISTER ATTRIBUTES DELAYED FARMER PAYMENTS TO POOR POLICIES

By Cecilia Zyambo

Former Agriculture Minister Robert Sichinga has alleged that government has failed to pay farmers on time due to poor policies that do not support or prioritize the farming sector.

Mr. Sichinga says it is now too late for government to make payments, explaining that delays have already disrupted farmers’ preparations for the current farming season.

He has noted that many farmers lack the financial capacity to purchase fertilizer and other essential inputs in time, a situation that is expected to significantly reduce overall agricultural output.

Mr. Sichinga has warned that delayed payments to farmers could negatively affect national food security, as many farmers may be forced to sell their produce, including to markets outside the country.

He further stated that, as a former minister, it is too late for him to advise the government, noting that farmers have already lost confidence in its leadership.

Government had promised that farmers who supplied maize to government around June and July 2025 would receive their payments by the stated deadline, but this has not been fulfilled.

PHOENIX NEWS

Starford Chashi in the diaspora defends Harry Kalaba

PAY ATTENTION BA OPPOSITION:

During these sad dark days in Zambia where a president can boast of dribbling citizens to change the constitution, we do not have time to entertain lies and rumors of another opposition leader. This is the time to unite and work together to remove HH who is the greatest enemy to Zambian democracy.

Of recent past, most of you have targeted Harry Kalaba as a selfish individual who is not willing to work with other opposition leaders. I almost believed these allegations until I started talking to him. Me I love the truth. I hate rumors and accusations without evidence.

Kalaba told me the truth which most of you don’t know because other politicians have been feeding you wrong information.

– To start with, Makebi Zulu made a first move and reached out to Kalaba. They had a meeting. The second meeting with Makebi was initiated by Kalaba himself.
– Next… Kalaba reached out to Fred Mmembe and he even went to Mmembe’s house. But nobody has reported this to you all.

– 3rd, Kalaba reached out to Lubinda. He actually went to Lubinda’s house in December because Kalaba really wants the opposition to be united.

– 4th move, Kalaba spoke to Miles Sampa and invited Miles for tea to discuss how they can unite to defeat HH.

As you all know, Sampa is my friend. I called him to verify if Kalaba was telling me the truth. Sampa admitted to me that yes, Kalaba has invited him twice but he hasn’t met him yet.

My Point:
Do not believe everything you read on social media. Take time to find the truth. Our greatest enemy is HH. He feeds on instilling fear and dividing the opposition.

When you start making comments like,
“We don’t want Kalaba because he doesn’t want to work with other opposition leaders”

It’s not only wrong but It’s divisive and it dents his name.
I’m currently communicating with Kalaba on a daily basis. He listens to good advice. He is not Mr Know It All like HH. Kalaba is humble and intelligent.

He is actually the only opposition leader who has reached out to all other leaders and even going as far as entering their homes.

Kalaba is working so hard to save democracy.
We need to give him credit for that and stop spreading false rumors.

Instead, focus on unity of purpose. That’s all we need right now to save Zambia from the hands of evil.

Do not smear Kalaba again. Otherwise, tukapusana.

NAPWISHA.

WHY MUNIR ZULU IS STILL IN PRISON AND DIDN’T GET REMISSION

By Shalala Oliver Sepiso

Munir Zulu is currently serving multiple sentences concurrently or consecutively, including a 12-month term for criminal libel (for which his bail appeal was denied) and an 18-month term for seditious practices (for which he was granted bail, but remained in custody due to the other active sentence).

However, his continued detention without remission, even after serving the potential minimum time, is a point of contention and debate among his lawyers and supporters, who have labeled it unlawful and a matter for judicial review.

But those who support his continued detention say his conduct in prison nullified his eligibility for early release via remission, and his multiple, active sentences legally permit his continued incarceration.

Let’s moved from the above summary and look at details and specifics.

As of January 2026, Munir Zulu remains in prison primarily because he is serving multiple, overlapping sentences and has been denied bail for his most significant term.

While there is public debate regarding his release, his current legal status is as follows:
1. Serving an 18-month Term: In May 2025, Zulu was sentenced to 18 months of imprisonment with hard labour for seditious practices related to claims that the President would dissolve Parliament early. Although he was granted a K35,000 cash bail pending appeal for this specific case in August 2025, he could not be released because he was serving another active sentence.

2. The 12-month Libel Sentence: He was sentenced in April 2025 to 12 months for criminal libel against two cabinet ministers. His application for bail pending appeal for this term was specifically denied by the court because the court felt that he failed to show “exceptional circumstances” and displayed a lack of remorse.

3. Additional Suspended Sentence: In May 2025, he received a further nine-month sentence for another sedition charge. This term was suspended for 12 months, meaning he does not have to serve it behind bars unless he commits a similar offense within that period.

Issues with Remission: Although some reports suggest he should have been released by now through standard “remission” (which typically allows for release after serving two-thirds of a sentence), prison authorities have reportedly cancelled or not granted his remission due to administrative action or alleged ‘no good behaviour’.

Summary of his “Mail” (Bail) Status: You may have heard he was given bail, which is partially true; he was granted bail for the 18-month sedition case. However, because he was simultaneously serving the 12-month libel sentence—for which bail was refused—he remained in custody. His supporters claim he has now served his full time, but legal experts note that without remission, he must serve the terms in full, potentially keeping him jailed until October 2026 if the terms are served concurrently or even May or June 2027 if the terms are served consecutively and without any granted appeals.

In conclusion, in Zambia, remission is not a mandatory right for all convicts; it is an earning scheme based on industry and good conduct within the correctional facility. The Zambia Correctional Service (ZCS) has the discretion to grant or cancel remission. The Nature of Remission as as follows:

1. Discretionary, not Mandatory: While the law provides that a prisoner can earn a remission of one-third of their sentence for good behavior, this is a privilege, not an automatic right. The decision rests with the officer in charge of the correctional facility to motivate inmates to behave well.
2. Based on Conduct: Remission can be lost, in whole or in part, if an inmate commits a prison offense or is found guilty of misconduct.

3. Munir Zulu’s Situation: It is confirmed from Prison sources that Munir Zulu’s remission was administratively cancelled or not granted, which is a primary reason he remains in prison despite having served the notional “two-thirds” of a sentence. Prison authorities or the officer in charge reportedly cancelled or refused to grant his remission due to alleged “not good behaviour” or “administrative action”.

Specific alleged offenses included being “problematic” in prison and accusing authorities of theft. It is also confirmed that he was charged twice for illegally being found in position of communication gadgets (phones). And generally, in the prison authorities’ assessment, his discipline was not good.

Saboi Imboela Torches Faction PF — And Dumps More Fuel on an Already Raging Ichipani Fire

Saboi Imboela has taken a verbal blowtorch to the Faction Patriotic Front (PF), gleefully pouring gasoline on an Ichipani that was already burning out of control.

Recalling her time in the United Kwacha Alliance (UKA), Saboi revealed that she once made what many then considered a “radical” proposal. In a UKA meeting, she suggested that the only way to save the alliance was to expel PF altogether. The idea was dismissed. The result, she says, is now history: UKA collapsed under the very weight she warned about.

With unmistakable satisfaction, Saboi drew a direct parallel to current events in Tonse Alliance.

“Let me explain my post a little further,” she said, making it clear that her earlier warning was neither emotional nor accidental. When UKA refused to act, it sealed its own fate. Tonse, however, has now made the hard but necessary decision that UKA lacked the courage to make.

According to Saboi, Tonse may emerge leaner, with fewer numbers, but it will survive—and survival, she argues, is far better than being strangled by internal chaos. The alliance, she insists, has chosen long-term stability over short-term illusions.

And then came the real jab.

PF, Saboi said, is simply “too big” to be in any alliance. Not big in influence or electoral discipline—but big in behavior and attitude. Too loud, too entitled, too unruly to function alongside others. In short, a political giant that knocks over the furniture wherever it goes.

Her verdict was blunt and unapologetic: PF should seriously consider standing on its own. Alliances, she implied, are for partners—not for political bullies who believe every room belongs to them.

In one sweeping statement, Saboi managed to mock, warn, and vindicate herself all at once—leaving Faction PF singed, exposed, and once again at the center of a fire they insist they are not responsible for, even as the smoke tells a very different story.

By Elly Katu

GUEST ARTICLE: A MISSED MOMENT – HOW ZAMBIA’S OPPOSITION SQUANDERED THE POST-LUNGU TRANSITION

By Masheke Akashambatwa

When Edgar Chagwa Lungu lost the 2021 presidential election, Zambia’s opposition—particularly the Patriotic Front (PF)—was presented with a rare and decisive opportunity: to use the former head of state’s stature, experience, and residual influence to manage an orderly succession and rebuild itself as a credible alternative government. Instead, internal indecision, misplaced loyalty, and persistent denial combined to derail that moment, leaving the opposition fractured and politically diminished.

A former president who exits office after defeat occupies a unique position in democratic politics. Such a leader can serve as a unifying figure—above factionalism—capable of guiding renewal without insisting on personal political resurrection. Edgar Lungu had the platform, the visibility, and the legitimacy to play precisely this role. He could have convened the party, encouraged generational transition, and overseen the emergence of a single, broadly accepted successor around whom the opposition could amalgamate.

That opportunity was missed.

Rather than treating Lungu as an elder statesman in transition, some quarters within the PF insisted on keeping him at the center of active politics. Calls for his “comeback” dominated the party’s post-election narrative. This insistence did more than merely delay succession; it actively undermined it. Potential successors were unable to fully emerge, factions entrenched themselves, and the party remained suspended between past leadership and future necessity. In effect, the PF attempted to relive yesterday’s politics in a context that demanded renewal.

This reluctance to let go also sent a damaging signal to the broader electorate. Voters who had decisively opted for change were offered little evidence that the opposition had listened, reflected, or adapted. Instead of presenting new ideas, new leadership, and a reformed internal culture, the PF appeared locked in nostalgia, defending its previous tenure rather than reimagining its future role.

Compounding this failure was the party’s persistent refusal to accept responsibility for its internal collapse. Rather than acknowledging that the disarray and confusion were largely self-inflicted, PF leaders repeatedly blamed the United Party for National Development (UPND) and the state for circumstances they themselves had created. While governments must always be scrutinized for fairness and adherence to the rule of law, blaming external forces for every internal shortcoming only deepened the opposition’s credibility crisis.

This narrative of victimhood became a substitute for introspection. Internal disputes, leadership wrangles, incoherent messaging, and organizational paralysis were framed as the result of persecution rather than poor strategic choices. In doing so, the PF not only failed to correct its course but also alienated supporters who expected accountability and honesty from their leaders.

The irony is that a managed transition anchored by Edgar Lungu’s endorsement of a successor could have strengthened the opposition significantly. Unity around one leader would have reduced infighting, clarified strategy, and allowed the party to focus on policy critique and alternative governance. Instead, by clinging to the past and denying responsibility for its own missteps, the PF finds itself in a weakened and miserable political position.

Zambia’s democracy benefits from a strong, organized, and credible opposition. The lesson from this episode is clear: leadership is not only about winning power, but also about knowing when—and how—to pass it on. By failing to use Edgar Lungu’s post-presidency wisely, the opposition missed a defining moment to renew itself and reassert its relevance on the national stage.

Masheke Akashambatwa
Data and political Analyst

 ECZ, Voter Figures & a Growing Trust Deficit

The Electoral Commission of Zambia has moved to clarify what it calls a misunderstanding over voter registration figures, after opposition voices raised alarms about an alleged discrepancy of 1,788,405 voters ahead of the 2026 general election.

The controversy was triggered by a statement from Chishala Kateka, who questioned why a total of 8,861,918 registered voters announced during the 2025 Mass Registration exercise did not match a 7,073,513 figure appearing in a detailed polling-station register hosted on the ECZ website. Kateka described the variance as “a significant and whopping 25.28% differential” and warned that it undermined confidence in the electoral process.

In a press statement dated 11 January 2026, ECZ rejected any suggestion of hidden or excess voters. The Commission said the 7,073,513 figure represents the current certified register, consisting of voters registered before the 2021 election and those added through continuous registration up to February 2024.

The additional 1,788,405 voters, ECZ explained, were registered during the Mass Registration of Voters exercise conducted between October and November 2025 and remain provisional.

“The figure is provisional and represents raw registration data, which is currently being cleaned and validated,” ECZ said. It stressed that combining a certified register with a provisional one and labelling the difference as fraudulent is “misleading and inaccurate.”.

The Commission outlined mandatory post-registration processes still underway. These include removal of duplicate registrations, deletion of deceased voters, consideration of claims and objections, and public inspection. Only after these steps, ECZ said, will the final register be certified and announced for use in the 2026 election.

ECZ Chief Electoral Officer Brown Kasaro added that “at no point does the Commission hide figures or intend to manipulate voter data,” reaffirming that all procedures are conducted in line with the Constitution and electoral laws, with the participation of political parties and stakeholders.

Despite the clarification, opposition suspicion remains high. Kateka argued that ECZ should have proactively explained the distinction earlier, noting that analysts and opposition parties had already been using the provisional figure in public commentary.

“If opposition did not become aware of this differential, what did ECZ intend to do with it?” he asked, warning that elections can be “lost before even the first ballot is cast.”

The episode is unfolding against a tense political backdrop. Several opposition figures, including from the Patriotic Front and the Socialist Party, have increasingly accused the Commission of bias in favour of the ruling United Party for National Development.

These claims have not been substantiated by evidence but are gaining traction on social media and within opposition ranks.

Adding to the intrigue are unconfirmed reports that PF officials, including Makebi Zulu, have been engaging former ECZ officials in private consultations. Those named in rumours include Patrick Nshindano and Esau Chulu. The meetings are said to focus on “vote protection” strategies, though no formal statements have been issued by the individuals involved.

For ECZ, the challenge now goes beyond arithmetic. While the Commission’s explanation aligns with standard electoral practice, the timing and political climate mean that technical clarity alone may not restore trust. With opposition unity fragile and fears of manipulation already entrenched, voter figures have become a proxy battlefield for a deeper contest over credibility.

As the Commission completes data cleaning and moves toward certifying the final register, the coming weeks will test whether transparency and engagement can steady public confidence, or whether suspicion will continue to shape the narrative long before polling day.

© The People’s Brief | Ollus R. Ndomu.

RESPONSE TO ECZ CLARIFICATION ON DISCREPANCIES IN THE VOTER REGISTRATION FIGURES

Chishala Kateka, President New Heritage Party
11 January 2026

I wish to thank Mr Kasaro, ECZ CEO, for the prompt clarification regarding the observed differences in the reported figures between his speech and that contained on the ECZ website.  More so as today is a Sunday. 

The point of having a website for any institution, is for the provision of information in order for the public to access the same, without the need to revert to the personnel in that institution.

Any information that is availed to the public, must of necessity be, clear, unambiguous and be able to standalone in being able to communicate that information.  Failure to doing that, a footnote or some other explanatory note, should be availed to the public so that they have an understanding of what that table is trying to communicate.

Would it not have been more reasonable for ECZ to explain the difference between Mr Kasaro’s speech figures which related to 2025 and the table on the website, which too clearly stated that these are 2025 figures, to avoid confusing less knowledgeable persons such as I myself? 

ECZ is a critical institution in this country, more so this year, as we head towards elections. 

Mr Kasaro was present at the meeting that was held between ECZ and Opposition Political Parties, at which we informed ECZ that we had received a lot of complaints from angry members of the public regarding the manner that the Mass Voter Registration was being conducted. 

Mr Kasaro should therefore be very alive to the fact that there is a lot of mistrust between the public and this government and that therefore, paying attention to detail regarding the information being shared, is of paramount importance.

⛔ VIEWPOINT: Why Kalimanshi’s Defection Matters for UPND

The defection of Innocent Kalimanshi to the ruling United Party for National Development (UPND) is not an ordinary crossover. It is politically symbolic, strategically calculated, and deeply rooted in the lived realities of Lusaka’s urban politics.

Kalimanshi is not a soft-spoken cadre with a clean technocratic résumé. He rose to prominence during the Patriotic Front (PF) era as a feared and influential market enforcer, particularly around Intercity Bus Terminus and surrounding trading hubs. For years, his name was associated with political intimidation, street disruption, and the rough enforcement culture that defined PF’s relationship with informal traders and youth groups in Lusaka.

This background is precisely what makes his move politically significant.

By defecting to UPND and publicly apologising to youths “for any wrongdoing,” Kalimanshi is attempting a moral reset. But beyond personal reconciliation, his defection signals a reorientation of street power. He understands the language of markets, bus stations, and informal economies. He speaks to young men who do not attend policy forums but decide elections through presence, mobilisation, and mood.

For UPND, this is less about forgiveness and more about electoral pragmatism.

Urban Lusaka, especially areas like Chawama, Kanyama, Garden, and major markets, has historically been volatile political terrain. These spaces are shaped by personality, and proximity rather than ideology. Kalimanshi brings with him credibility in those circles, not because he is loved in a traditional sense, but because he is known and understood.

His statement praising President Hakainde Hichilema for curbing political violence and redirecting youths toward productive livelihoods aligns neatly with UPND’s broader narrative of restoring order without repression.

It also allows the ruling party to reframe former PF street figures not as enemies, but as “reformed actors” within a new political culture.

UPND Secretary General Batuke Imenda’s decision to openly welcome Kalimanshi, alongside more than 3,000 defectors, underscores this strategy. The message is clear: the ruling party is not only consolidating elite support but also absorbing grassroots power brokers, especially those who once destabilised urban spaces.

This defection also lands at a critical political moment. Lusaka remains central to national perception, media narratives, and opposition momentum. Even beyond the immediate Chawama parliamentary by-election, the capital is a testing ground for August 2026.

Neutralising or co-opting former PF mobilisers reduces the risk of street-level disruption while expanding UPND’s reach among politically restless youth.

Still, the move is not without risk. Kalimanshi’s past will follow him, and critics will question whether UPND is rehabilitating political violence or merely repackaging it. How the ruling party deploys him whether as a disciplined organiser or an unchecked mobiliser, will determine whether this defection strengthens governance or merely shifts old habits under a new banner.

For now, the political logic is unmistakable.

UPND is not just campaigning in conference halls and rallies. It is reengineering the street, one defection at a time.

© The People’s Brief | All Rights Reserved

KALIMANSHI APOLIGISES TO YOUTHS, DEFECTS TO UPND

Innocent Kalimashi has apologised to youths across the country for any wrongdoing, calling for unity and national development.

Speaking during his defection to the ruling United Party for National Development (UPND) in Ward 2 of Chawama Constituency, Kalimashi said it was important to reconcile with those he may have wronged in the past.

He urged Zambians, particularly the youth, to rally behind President Hakainde Hichilema, whom he praised for demonstrating strong leadership by curbing political violence and redirecting young people towards productive livelihoods.

Kalimashi told youth leaders that joining the UPND signifies readiness to work with party leadership and commitment to discipline and adherence to the party’s vision.

Meanwhile, UPND Secretary General Batuke Imenda welcomed over 3,000 defectors into the party and encouraged members to keep their doors open to individuals from other political parties who wish to join.

G. Liswaniso

A ZAMBIAN SOLDIER DIES IN THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC – RETHINKING THE COUNTRY’S ROLE IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

By Kellys Kaunda

When Staff Sergeant Alick Banda of the Zambia Army died recently in the Central African Republic where our men and women are part of a UN mission, I began to think about our role in the search for peace in the Great Lakes Region.

The core members of this region include Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda, DRC, Kenya and Tanzania.

A wider definition includes Ethiopia, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia.

In 2004, the Heads of State and government of these countries met in Dar es Salaam to agree on how they could work together to find lasting peace in the region.

On its part, the UN has been involved in peacekeeping and stabilization missions in the region – the Central African Republic and the DRC – since the 1990s.

In fact, for the DRC, the first UN mission was in 1960 when chaos erupted after the Belgium government granted the country independence.

Zambia has been involved in UN missions in both the Central African Republic and the DRC for many years now.

In the case of the DRC, Zambia has also been involved in mediations among warring parties.

The questions we must seek to answer are: why does the region – the Central African Republic and the DRC – continue to be volatile despite all the international effort? And, what else can Zambia do either differently or enhance current efforts aimed at the search for peace in the region?

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation has six departments, among them, the department of Great Lakes.

As the name suggests, this is where the technical team is believed to reside whose work must inform the role of the country’s political leadership.

If this department is to be really effective in its work, it must be staffed by officers with experience in the region such as former diplomats, former army officers who served in UN missions there and academics with relevant high qualifications specializing in the region.

Preferably, these should be at PhD level where their analytical skills would be necessary in teasing out the complex political, cultural, economic and security challenges of the region.

From my knowledge when I served in foreign service, I wasn’t sure if this department was appropriately staffed to make meaningful contributions.

Of course, am not suggesting this is the magic formula needed to resolve the conflicts in the CAR and the DRC.

There are gigantic problems that include geopolitical conflicts, appropriate levels of funding to the UN, AU and SADC missions and appropriate military gear for the soldiers of contributing nations.

However, while these are daunting challenges, Zambia must do her part by addressing those issues that are within her capacity to address – one day at a time.

PF CHARGES MUNDUBILE FOR CREATING PARALLEL STRUCTURES

PF faction Acting Deputy Secretary General for Administration Celestine Mukandila has directed PF presidential aspirant Brian Mundubile to submit an exculpatory letter to the disciplinary committee within seven days, explaining his gross indiscipline.

Mukandila has also charged PF Member of the Central Committee Japhen Mwakalombe with gross indiscipline, further directing him to exculpate himself before the disciplinary committee within seven days.

In a letter dated January 10, 2026, and addressed to Mundubile, Mukandila said Mundubile was establishing parallel structures.

“Dear Honourable Mundubile, RE: Exculpatory Letter, Gross Indiscipline, Yourself. Refer to the above caption. This letter formally charges you, as a Patriotic Front Central Committee Member (MCC/Member of Parliament), with violating the 2007 constitution. As an MCC/MP, you owe the highest fiduciary duty to the party, yet your actions constitute a gross breach of constitutional authority and trust. You are hereby charged with serious breaches of the Patriotic Front (PF) constitution and regulations, as follows: 1. Unsubstantiated Accusations Against Party Leadership: You made false claims via a Facebook statement in that the party leadership is scheming to expel you and your campaign team to bar your intra-party election candidacy -claims with no factual basis. This violates Regulation 29(h) (spreading false information injuring the party’s or its officials’ reputation) and Article 15(g) (obligation to fight against conduct harming the party),” he stated.

“Establishing Parallel Structures: Under your watch, your campaign team is purposefully promoting division by creating parallel party structures contrary to party regulations, violating Article 20 (party structure based on democratic principles of unified, elective organs) and Regulation 43 (requirement for all party organs to be registered with the Secretary-General). 3. Breach of Public Event Protocols: Likewise, you deliberately violated established protocols by attending an illegal Tonse Alliance meeting without the authority of the party president and acting Deputy Secretary Generals, contravening Regulation 29(d) (disobeying party organ directives)”.

Mukandila further said Mundubile recognised individuals who had been dismissed from party positions by the party president.

“Unauthorised Recognition of Dismissed Members: You have continued to recognise individuals dismissed from party positions by the president, violating Article 13 (prohibiting leaders from acting contrary to party authority) and Article 58(c) (Central Committee’s mandate to enforce discipline and regulate party organ activities). These actions undermine party unity, disregard hierarchical authority, harm the PF’s integrity, and disrupt organisational order. You are required to submit a written exculpatory statement within seven days to the Disciplinary Committee, per Regulation 100(1). Failure to respond constitutes acceptance. Post-response, a decision will be rendered promptly, with appeal rights to the Central Committee, National Council, or General Conference (Regulation 99). As an MCC, you are entrusted to uphold the constitution. This charge enforces accountability to protect the party’s unity and mission,” he said.

Meanwhile, Mukandila also directed Mwakalombe to present an exculpatory letter to the disciplinary committee, explaining his gross misconduct.

“Dear Honourable Mwakalombe, RE: exculpatory letter – gross indiscipline – YOURSELF. Refer to the above caption. I wish to inform you that your actions and activities between the 6th to 8th January, 2026 are inimical to the interests of the Party, its unity and the organisational order. Particulars of the alleged offence are that, you have violated the party constitution by holding or being part of divisive parallel meetings and unauthorised press conferences without any authority and mandate from the Central Committee, the Secretariat and the party president by purposefully promoting division and creating parallel party structures contrary to party regulations. (Article 20: party structure based on democratic principles of unified, elective organs) and Regulation 43 (requirement for all party organs to be registered with the Secretary-General),” stated Mukandila.

“As a member of the Central Committee, you owe the highest obligation and duty to the party, yet your actions constitute a gross breach of constitutional authority and trust. Specifically, your actions are in violation of: Article 58: Purporting to exercise Central Committee-exclusive powers (e.g. policy-making, official appointments) outside the statutory membership. Article 15(a)/(g) and Regulation 29(): Betraying membership obligations to uphold party leadership and unity, fostering factionalism. In view of the above, you have been given seven days in which to exculpate yourself in writing to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against you”.

On Tuesday, Mundubile officially launched his Copperbelt and Central Province campaign team ahead of the PF presidential race. The team is headed by Mkushi South PF MP Davison Chisopa as Campaign Manager. The launch was attended by prominent PF members such as Davies Mwila, Mufulira PF MP Golden Mwila, among others.

Efforts to get a comment from the duo proved futile by press time.

News Diggers

MUNDUBILE TO RUN FOR TONSE ALLIANCE PRESIDENT
…Forms a movement names it “Brian Mundubile.”

Yesterday the Given Lubinda led Patriotic Front faction slapped charges against Mundubile and suspended him from the party..

Among other charges slapped against him is attending an illegal meeting of Dan Pule Tonse Alliance that expelled PF from the Alliance, his continously to work with PF members who have been expelled from the party and forming parallel structures within PF.

They gave him seven days in which to exculpate himself or be expelled.

But Mundubile seems set at nothing but aspiring for the presidency. He has now called on his Supporters to join his movement.

Mundubile on Friday walked away from the Presidential candidates and PF Elders meeting which has been working on reducing the number of aspiring candidates from 10 to 2 citing intimidation and scheme to expelled him by the Lubinda Faction. This is one of the charges he has been slapped with which the party says is false and brings the party in disrepute.

Sources close to Mundubile have told Zambian Eye that he will remain in Tonse Alliance and contest the presidency as a movement.

Tonse Alliance has opened nominations for the Chairman who will also be the presidential candidate for the elective congress to be held at the end of this month.

PF SUCCESSION WRANGLES: WHEN JEALOUSY AND HATE THREATEN PARTY UNITY

Yes, succession wrangles are normal in every political party. They are expected in any democratic process. However, what is happening in the Patriotic Front (PF) today goes beyond normal competition it is a clear display of jealousy, hatred, and deliberate schemes aimed at one man: Hon. Brian Mundubile (BMM8).

The actions and conduct of ba Lubinda, Chishimba Kambwili, Miles Sampa, Celestine Mukandila, and some members of the MCC are not meant to strengthen the party but to completely destroy its unity. Instead of building PF, they are busy tearing it apart from within.

When Miles Sampa announced on his page that the leadership had agreed to reduce the number of presidential candidates to two, many of us genuinely thought this was progress. We believed, at last, reason had prevailed. But sadly kanshi zero. It later became clear that this was nothing but a scheme to defranchise Brian Mundubile and silence the voice of the people.

But let it be known today: we have a word for them.

We are resolved.
We are ready.
And we are united.

Where Brian Mundubile goes, we go.

The people are tired of manipulation. They are tired of confusion. They are tired of recycled names and endless power games. The people have already made their decision. The message from the grassroots is loud and clear.

The BMM8 bus is already on the move.
There is no stopping it.
There is no turning back.

Those who think they can block the will of the people will soon learn that leadership is not chosen in backrooms it is chosen by the masses. History has shown this before, and it will show it again.

Join the BMM8 movement now

MARTIN SIMWABA
BRIAN MUNDUBILE CAMPAIGN TEAM –  COPPERBELT PROVINCIAL YOUTH CHAIRMAN POLITICAL

Lunte Member of Parliament Hon. Mutotwe Kafwaya writes::::

I DRIBBLED THEM – HH SAID OF HIS BILL 7.

—————————-

HH observed those like myself, who were making noise against the enactment of Bill 7 and said to himself mwachepa sana.

And then he deployed his trademark mingalato. And dribbled his way to Bill 7 success. That illegal bill which became law.

Not sure whether we could regard it as an illegal law. Makebi Zulu will guide on this.

I took time to think and consider who true victims of that mingalato really are.

(1) The judiciary

The judiciary declared Bill 7 unconstitutional by so declaring the process which culminated into its drafting.

HH’s minister refused to withdraw it from the enactment process. After a while, like they did the cyber bills, Bill 7 was back on the floor and proceeded with speed of ordinary business.

A Constitutional ammendment for which more than two stages were considered in one meeting. Second Reading, Committee Stage, Report Stage and Third Reading all done in one day. This was umungalato for real.

(2) Patriotic Zambians & organisations which opposed the bill.

OASIS Forum, LAZ, NGOCC, ZCCB, Evangelical Fellowship, CCZ, Opposition Members of Parliament, chiefs, eminent citizens etc.

Your counsel the UPND is meaningless. It doesn’t matter. This might imply that a court declared illegal transaction like Bill 7 can go as long as HH and or his UPND government want it.

(3) Parliament

Parliament transacted business which was declared illegal by court. This may attract severe consequences in the very near future. The enactment also cast a reputational risk on the assembly.

The dance didnt help matters –

(4) Tax payers

By far the most dribbled is the Zambian tax payer.

HH said he was showing love to the women, youths and differently abled people.

What HH didnt say that his love for those groups and seventy more constituency based MPs including three additional nominations will be funded by you; the tax payers.

Tax payers will have to pay them for their salaries and allowances.

Tax payers will have to pay for their accommodation in Lusaka. Their transport to and  fro their respective constituencies each time Parliament goes on recess and reopens.

Now that MPs are back in the council, tax payers will pay for MPs travel to and fro their districts each time there is a council meeting.

Tax payers will pay for new constituency offices and additional support staff who will be deployed in the 70 new constituencies.

Remember that this incremental cost has not been budgeted for in the 2026 national budget.

The Zambian tax payer has truly been dribbled on this one. One could imagine such an incremental cost based on a law which shouldn’t have been but supported by imingalato.

Time will tell – ndemwebakofye ine.

Restoring EVERTHING PATRIOTIC.
MK10.01.2026

RED FLAG: ECZ NUMBERS DO NOT TALLY

By Brian Matambo | Lusaka, Zambia

As we approach the 2026 general elections here in Zambia, I would like to urge opposition political parties to not only run emotionally driven campaigns with nice slogans and danceable music. They must invest heavily in data and systems if they are to avoid being shocked on 13 August. On election day, it is not slogans that decide outcomes. It is numbers.

And speaking of numbers, the nation, and particularly opposition politicians, may wish to know that the Electoral Commission of Zambia has been releasing figures that do not align with its own official records.

The most striking example emerges from Southern Province. ECZ publicly announced that the province had 1,119,174 registered voters in 2025. The figure travelled widely, shaping political calculations and public perception. Yet ECZ’s own official final register for Southern Province records only 858,103 registered voters. The difference, 261,071 voters, is not a technical inconvenience. It is a contradiction large enough to alter turnout analysis, provincial weight, and confidence in the entire electoral process.

In elections, numbers are not commentary. They are the legal architecture of legitimacy.

Demographic context sharpens the concern even further. Southern Province’s voting-age population in 2022 stood at approximately 1,135,121. Applying Zambia’s average annual population growth rate of 4%, the projected voting-age population for 2025 rises to roughly 1.27 million. Against this reality, a register of 858,103 represents a plausible and historically consistent registration rate in a largely rural province. A register of 1,119,174, on the other hand, implies a registration coverage approaching total saturation of eligible adults, a statistical outcome rarely achieved even in highly urbanised societies.

What unsettles the situation is not merely that two numbers exist, but that the public has not been taken through the journey from provisional to final with clarity. One number was announced. Another now governs the official register. Between the two, no reconciliation has been offered.

This pattern is not new. New Heritage Party President Chishala Kateka has raised similar concerns at the national level. In her article dated 10 January 2026, she noted that ECZ Chief Executive Officer Brown Kasaro reported 8,861,918 total registered voters in his mass registration statistics speech, yet ECZ’s own “Registered Voters Per Polling Station” document reflected only 7,073,513 voters. The difference was 1,788,405 voters, representing a variance of 25.28 percent.

“Granted, the figure in the speech by the CEO was provisional,” Kateka wrote, “however a differential of 1,788,405 in the number of registered voters, a significant and whopping 25.28 percent variance from the actual, surely should be a cause of concern to any perceptive person even if not savvy with statistics.”

Her words echo directly into the Southern Province case. Different scale. Same pattern.

In both the national and provincial cases, the issue is not that provisional figures differ from final ones. That is expected. The issue is that the difference is vast and the explanation absent. Numbers change, but the public is not told why. And in elections, unexplained change does not remain neutral. It invites doubt.

The Southern Province discrepancy fits neatly into this wider pattern. No electoral commission is protected by silence. It is protected by transparency. Clear reconciliation reports, open explanations, and disciplined public communication are not favours to the nation. They are obligations to it.

When numbers refuse to agree, citizens do not become cynical by choice. They become cautious by necessity. And when numbers begin to argue, democracy has every right to worry.