GOVERNMENT SUSPENDS DIALOGUE WITH OASIS FORUM

Earlier today, Attorney General Mr. Mulilo Kabesha led a Government delegation in scheduled talks with the Oasis Forum as part of the constitutional reform process.

The meeting was intended to follow up on the Friday 28th of November 2025 engagement at State House chaired by President Hakainde Hichilema. Government has, however, since suspended the dialogue after it became clear that the Oasis Forum was not prepared to engage constructively.

Instead of participating in meaningful discussions, the Forum submitted a letter dated Saturday 29th November 2025 indicating its unwillingness to proceed with genuine dialogue. It was also evident that the Forum came to the meeting with the same fixed position outlined during the Friday meeting rather than taking an open-minded approach, which is necessary to achieving consensus in any meaningful dialogue.

As a result, Government has been left with no option but to discontinue the engagement for now, as effective dialogue requires mutual commitment and acting in good faith.

Government notes that the Oasis Forum’s letter does not identify specific problematic clauses in the proposals and they have not offered any alternative proposals. Meaningful engagement is best achieved where both parties at the table are willing to offer clear alternative solutions to move parties closer to consensus-building rather than generalised objections.

President Hichilema remains committed to inclusive dialogue as a cornerstone for national unity and development. A gesture of goodwill was extended to the Oasis Forum in that spirit, but this was regrettably not reciprocated.

Government will continue to engage other stakeholders and will not allow this development to disrupt the broader national consultation process, including engagement with parties who hold differing views from the Oasis Forum. Government reaffirms that the doors for dialogue remain open to all stakeholders, including those in the Oasis Forum.

The Government wishes to reaffirm that all legal protocols have been strictly adhered to in the formation of the Technical Committee and the solicitation of citizens’ views nationwide. The Technical Committee has since conducted extensive consultations with citizens in all the ten [10] provinces of Zambia.

The Government remains steadfast in its belief that constitutional amendments are critical at this time to enhance equity, broader and inclusive national development and governance.

Issued by:
Cornelius Mweetwa
Chief Government Spokesperson

 FACTS 1ST | Debunking the Delimitation Narrative

Zambia’s constitutional debate has taken a sharper turn following claims by academic Sishuwa Sishuwa, who argues that President Hakainde Hichilema is “desperate” to create new constituencies to manage internal party strife and entrench his political future. His commentary, now widely circulated in PF-aligned spaces, has become a rallying point for opposition sentiment. However, a sober analysis of the record reveals significant gaps, assumptions and rhetorical leaps that demand scrutiny.

First, the factual record.
The delimitation recommendations currently under political discussion were produced by the Electoral Commission of Zambia during the Edgar Lungu administration. This is easily verifiable through ECZ publications, 2020 public hearings and ministerial briefings at the time. The process did not start under President Hichilema, nor is there evidence that he has authored a new list of constituencies awaiting political manipulation. The ECZ’s mandate is constitutional and independent. Any delimitation proposal originates from the Commission, not State House.

Second, the question of access.
Sishuwa claims he has “seen” the latest ECZ report but does not provide the full list of constituencies. His article lists only selective constituencies largely drawn from Southern, Western, Central and Northwestern provinces. If his access was genuine, full disclosure of all recommended splits would be expected. The incomplete list raises methodological concerns and invites questions about the accuracy of the claims. It is unusual for academic commentary to rely on partial reports, especially when the claims have serious national implications.

Third, the logic of political advantage.
Even if constituencies were created in regions favourable to the ruling party, this would not alter the number of registered voters. Delimitation redistributes geography, not votes. It does not produce new voters or inflate a provincial register. Votes remain tied to individuals, not maps. A new constituency only divides an administrative area. It does not create automatic electoral advantage unless one assumes voters lack agency. The assumption that constituency creation guarantees victory ignores historical cases where ruling parties lost newly created seats.

Fourth, the argument on internal UPND conflict.
Sishuwa argues that new constituencies are intended to appease aspirants who may threaten sitting MPs. His evidence consists of assumptions, speculative motives and unsupported claims drawn from unnamed sources. The language used, such as “Hichilema is desperate,” “sleepless nights” and “implosion,” is interpretive rather than evidentiary. It frames internal party competition, which is common in every democracy, as crisis. Without documentary evidence, this reasoning remains conjecture rather than fact.

Fifth, the rhetorical strategy.
The article’s language is structured to provoke concern. Terms like “dying to create,” “gerrymandering,” and “life presidency” frame a constitutional process as an existential threat. This style mirrors political messaging more than academic analysis. The narrative closely mirrors PF talking points and is now being used by PF supporters as validation. Yet the same PF is telling its supporters, through Brian Mundubile, that they will “defeat Bill 7 on the floor of the House.”

If that is the case, why fear parliamentary process? Bill 10 itself was rejected in Parliament. The Constitution protects legislative autonomy.

Sixth, the issue of transparency.
If the ECZ report is eventually published and differs from Sishuwa’s claims, public trust in academic commentary will suffer. Until then, the foundation of his argument remains unverifiable. Strong claims require strong evidence. Selective disclosure does not meet that standard.

Seventh, the broader political context.
Delimitation has been a long-standing debate across three administrations. The PF attempted it before the 2021 election. The MMD attempted it in the early 2010s. ECZ has repeatedly indicated that Zambia’s population distribution requires adjustments, especially in high-density urban areas like Lusaka.

Provinces like Lusaka and Copperbelt have larger populations but fewer constituencies. If delimitation were based strictly on population, most new seats should emerge in these regions. Sishuwa does not address this contradiction.

Eighth, the civic responsibility.
The Constitution gives Parliament the final authority over boundaries. PF MPs opposition members have already indicated they will vote against the Bill. If they believe the Bill is harmful, parliamentary procedure offers a lawful remedy.

Zambia has precedent. Bill 10 fell in Parliament. The system works when institutions function.

 Editorial Note

This analysis does not defend any political position. It responds to the growing circulation of speculative claims that are now shaping public sentiment through selective evidence and rhetorical framing. Citizens deserve clarity rooted in verifiable facts, not conjecture.

© The People’s Brief | Editors

BISHOP GABRIEL PHIRI PRAISES PRESIDENT HICHILEMA, CALLS FOR UNITY AHEAD OF 2026 ELECTIONS

Chipata Diocese Auxiliary Bishop Gabriel Phiri has praised President Hakainde Hichilema for his continued efforts in promoting peace, unity, and love across the country.

Speaking during the Silver Jubilee celebration in honour of Bishop George Lungu, who has served the Diocese for 40 years, Bishop Phiri emphasized that unity and harmony remain essential as Zambia heads toward the 2026 general election.

He urged political leaders from both the ruling party and the opposition to embrace dialogue and prioritize national cohesion over rivalry.

Bishop Phiri expressed concern over recent incidents of violence in some parts of the country, warning that political conflict threatens national development and social stability.

He encouraged young people to participate positively in governance and reject attempts to use them as tools for political violence.

The Bishop further called for tolerance, mutual respect, and collaboration among all political actors, noting that long-term development can only be achieved in an environment of peace and shared purpose.

Bishop Phiri also thanked Eastern Province Minister Peter Phiri and Agriculture Minister Reuben Mtolo for representing Government at the event, saying their presence reflects the strong partnership between the Church and the State.

ZT

The devil in delimitation: why Hichilema is desperate to create new constituencies

By Sishuwa Sishuwa

Of all the self-serving changes to the Constitution of Zambia that President Hakainde Hichilema is pushing to make before the next general election on 13 August 2026, the creation of new constituencies through delimitation is the most significant to him. Broadly speaking, there are three main reasons why Hichilema is dying to create additional constituencies.

The first is to prevent the adoption-related weakening or even implosion of the ruling United Party for National Development (UPND) ahead of the 2026 general election. Incumbent UPND members of parliament in the party’s traditional strongholds face strong competition for re-adoption. In Sesheke constituency, for instance, Romeo Kang’ombe is up against Fredrick Misebezi, one of Hichilema’s miscellaneous State House aides who is eying the seat. In Keembe constituency, Princess Kasune Zulu, who is also Minister of Justice, faces competition from Chipo Mwanawasa, Hichilema’s policy advisor who has already started campaign outreach programs like sinking boreholes and empowering farmers.

In Kafue, Mirriam Chonya is up against Buumba Malambo, the area council’s chairperson and one of Hichilema’s vociferous defenders. In Choma Central, long-serving MP Cornelius Mweetwa, who is also Minister of Information, faces competition from Vitaris Masopo, a local rancher, and Trevor Mwiinde, the UPND deputy national youth chairperson. Jack Mwiimbu, the Minister of Home Affairs and Internal Security who has held the Monze parliamentary seat since 2001, is having sleepless nights because of a looming challenge from Victor Cheelo, a businessman and loyalist of Hichilema. In Chikankata and Magoye constituencies, incumbent MPs face competition from relatively established challengers in Harriet Matongo and Nachoombe Kabunda, respectively.

This illustrative picture of constituencies where sitting UPND MPs face known serious competitors provides the wider context within which Hichilema’s desperation to create new constituencies through delimitation should be understood. To avert the risk of having current MPs running as independent candidates if they are not adopted, or of joining or forming a rival party to challenge the UPND in next year’s election, Hichilema has devised a solution that he hopes would pacify the warring factions in the ruling party: divide all the above constituencies and others where there is greater internal party competition for adoption so that the interests of both the current and aspiring MPs can be accommodated. In effect, the president is seeking to change Zambia’s constitution to resolve differences in his party.

The second reason behind Hichilema’s desperation to create new constituencies is to give his party a clear majority in parliament after the 2026 election. Hichilema appears greatly concerned that he could ‘win’ the presidential election but lose control of the National Assembly, where rigging is harder, even with his supporters in charge of the country’s electoral management body. To avoid this prospect, the president proposed to alter the size of the National Assembly by creating new constituencies on the pretext that some of the existing ones are too big to be efficiently administered by a single MP. This was not long before the Electoral Commission of Zambia delivered to him a delimitation report that recommended that certain constituencies be split into two or three.

The report is yet to be made public, but I have had sight of it. Most of the constituencies that are earmarked for division based on their size are in areas that have historically voted for the UPND:Southern, Northwestern, Central and Western provinces. In densely populated provinces like Lusaka and Copperbelt, where the ruling party’s support has declined considerably since the last general election, very few constituencies will be split – unless they have an established record of voting for Hichilema – because of the fear that the opposition would win the newly created seats.

Other provinces like Luapula, Muchinga, Northern and Eastern will only receive tokenist attention, as the primary focus is on creating new constituencies in safer zones – constituencies where the UPND is guaranteed of winning if they can avoid the splits discussed above. The constituenciesvto be divided include Monze, Choma Central, Magoye, Mapatizya, Kazungula, and Namwala in Southern Province; Itezhi-tezhi, Keembe, and Nangoma in Central Province; Kafue, Kanyama, Chilanga, and Chongwe in Lusaka Province; Mufumbwe, Mwinilunga, Zambezi East, and Kasempa in Northwestern Province, and Senanga and Mulobezi in Western Province, among several others. Through gerrymandering, the president is hoping that his party will win most of these new seats, facilitating an even greater majority for the UPND and making it easier for it to make further changes to the Constitution in the future.

The underlying political motivation behind the planned delimitation was accidentally revealed by Hichilema at a recent press conference where he justified the need for new constituencies on the ground that the geographical spread of the existing one is skewed in favour of regions that have historically voted against him and the UPND. “Over the years, there was discrimination in the delimitation of constituencies”, he complained on 25 November. However, according to Article 59 of the Constitution, size and geographical spread of constituencies are unimportant factors to consider when delimitating the boundaries constituencies.

What must be taken into account are the following considerations: the history, diversity and cohesiveness of the constituency; population density, trends and projections; ensuring that the number of inhabitants in each constituency is reasonable, taking into account the means of communication and geographical features; ensuring that constituencies are wholly within districts; and seeking to achieve an approximate equality of constituency population, subject to the need to ensure adequate representation for urban and sparsely populated areas.

At present, Zambia has ten provinces and 156 constituencies. The distribution of the constituencies and population per province, based on the 2022 census data, is as shown below:

1. Copperbelt – 22 constituencies (2.7m people)
2. Western – 19 (1.3m)
3. Eastern – 18 (2.4)
4. Southern – 18 (2.3m)
5. Central – 16 (2.2m)
6. Luapula – 15 (1.5m)
7. Lusaka – 13 (3m)
8. Northern – 13 (1.6)
9. Northwestern – 12 (1.2m)
10. Muchinga – 10 (922,213)

The implication of this data is twofold.

The first is that the geographical distribution or spread of constituencies numerically favours provinces that have generally voted for the UPND. For instance, Southern, Western, Northwestern, and Central provinces share a total of 65 parliamentary constituencies between them. Northern, Eastern, Muchinga and Luapula provinces share a total of 56 constituencies, with the two urban provinces, Lusaka and Copperbelt, sharing the remaining 35. By claiming that previous delimitation exercises were discriminatory and therefore presenting the latest effort as aimed at curing that discrimination by allocating more constituencies to the historically disadvantaged provinces, Hichilema either genuinely misread the facts, was unforgivably ignorant, or was lying (again!) on a fundamental issue – and whichever it is, none is acceptable, especially when coming from a president.

The second implication is that if delimitation was done transparently and impartially, most of the new constituencies should go to Lusaka, Copperbelt, and Eastern provinces. This is because they each have more people than the remaining seven provinces. For instance, Southern Province, with 2.3 million people, has 18 constituencies whereas Lusaka, with 3 million, only has 13. Some individual constituencies in Lusaka such as Mandevu have more people than entire districts elsewhere. Western and Northwestern provinces, each with only a third of Lusaka’s population, have 19 and 12 seats, respectively.

As it therefore stands, the situation – i.e. the distribution of constituencies vis-à-vis population density – currently favours Hichilema. What the president is now trying to do is to use the argument of constituency size and geographical distribution to allocate even more seats to Southern, Western, and Northwestern provinces. In making the false claim that these three provinces have suffered discrimination in previous delimitation exercises, he is attempting to conceal the real motivation behind the latest exercise: partisan political considerations. If the president must publicly pronounce himself on previous efforts, particularly those that resulted in the creation of new constituencies, it should be to thank his predecessors for showing consistent favouritism towards the same provinces, though largely sparsely populated, that he incorrectly claims have been historically disadvantaged.

The third and final reason behind Hichilema’s desperation to create new constituencies is to pave the way for the next constitutional changes that will follow the 2026 election aimed at perpetuating himself in power. If the progressively unpopular Hichilema, who was recently pelted with stones by disappointed voters on the Copperbelt, manages to rig next year’s poll and secure a second five-year term, he would be constitutionally barred from standing for another term as the Constitution contains a clear two-term limit for the presidency.

Several presidential hopefuls in the UPND are working on the reasonable assumption that the president would step down at the conclusion of his two terms after which they would openly compete for the right to succeed him. They are wrong. The 63-year-old Hichilema is going nowhere any time soon. His plan is to use the impending constitutional changes to avert intra-party divisions, secure a two-thirds majority in parliament in next year’s general election, and, in the aftermath, move to make further changes to the Constitution of Zambia’, among which is to remove presidential term limits.

If there is anything that Hichilema learnt from his predecessors’ failure to pass election-linked constitutional amendment bills, it is that no matter what the public or civil society says in opposition to an incumbent president’s plans on the subject, constitutional amendment bills are won or lost in parliament. This explains why he is doing everything possible to raise the two-thirds majority that he needs in parliament to make changes to the Constitution.

The president knows that if MPs knew his actual intentions, they may vote against the coming bill, thereby dealing a decisive blow to his post 2026 bid for absolute power. To hoodwink them, he has dangled several carrots, whose appeal cut across party lines, to increase their chances of supporting the bill. These include financial inducements, a proposal to delay the dissolution of parliament to 24 hours before the general election, which would allow MPs to retain their existing lucrative remuneration, and a related proposal that MPs, though paid, should do no work in the final three months that precedes the next general election.

The president has further sought to specifically placate UPND MPs into supporting the constitutional amendment bill, which, if passed, would give him greater control over parliament. This explains why he is avoiding antagonising the MPs, especially those with established power bases in the party, by creating additional constituencies where they or their challengers can stand. Once he has used them to achieve his initial objective, he can then easily dispense with them after the election.

Part of the other constitutional changes that Hichilema is pushing through before the 2026 poll include abolishing parliamentary by-elections and allowing the party where the affected MP came from to pick a replacement. If the coming bill passes, this proposal will greatly consolidate his power over MPs, enable him to purge those perceived as potential challengers from the UPND, and put him in a stronger position to have the decisive say on succession.

With a clear majority in parliament, he can then change the Constitution and decide to remain in power for as long as age and health would permit him – effectively becoming a wamuyaya (life) president. Alternatively, the president could, when he finally gets tired, anoint a pliant successor who will protect him from possible prosecution for corruption and criminal misuse of state power. Already, there are credible rumours within UPND circles that Hichilema is grooming two of his presidential aides to succeed him much, much later.  A senior UPND leader told me in September that the president’s plan is to get one or two of his aides into parliament next year and then appoint them to ministerial roles in the hope that this would secure them advantage in the succession race:

“Our deputy SG [i.e. UPND deputy Secretary General Getrude Imenda] recently came out to say that long-serving UPND MPs should consider leaving the stage while still appreciated by stepping down to pave the way for fresh faces ahead of the 2026 general elections. She claimed that a dignified exit by veteran MPs would provide an opportunity for party renewal.  But we know that she was sent by HH to test the waters by saying what she said. She was just his mouthpiece. Upon realising that he will need us to support Bill 7 in parliament, he used the SG [Secretary General Batuke Imenda] to do some damage control by claiming that the statement attributed to Ms. Imenda does not reflect the UPND’s official stance”, the official said before touching on the succession dynamics.

“Both the SG and the deputy SG work at the secretariat. When they issue public statements, why should we believe one and not the other? We are not kids. We know that the targeted MPs are Hon. Gary Nkombo, Hon. Mweetwa, Hon. Mwiimbu, and others from Northwestern. HH is uncomfortable with these MPs because they have rooted themselves in the party. He also seems to think that they have the capacity to undermine his rumoured intention to impose one of his lackeys at State House as successor.  We have worked hard for this party and will not allow him  to do as he pleases. When the time is right, you will see what will happen in the UPND”, they said.

If everything I have said so far paints a grim picture, it is only because the situation is grave, very grave. I do remain hopeful, however, that the people will defeat Hichilema and reclaim their democracy. Zambians hate violence. This explains why they are most comfortable with changing governments or removing unpopular leaders through the ballot, a mechanism that Hichilema is seriously eroding. They learnt it the hard way in 1972 with then President Kenneth Kaunda and in 1996 with Frederick Chiluba when both leaders manipulated the Constitution to advance their personal political interests. Since then and at critical moments in history, they have broken ranks and come together to defend democracy and the constitution from manipulation. We saw this togetherness in 2001 when the people rose against President Frederick Chiluba’s attempt to change the Constitution to seek a third term in office.

We, again, saw this togetherness in 2019 and 2020 when the people rose against President Edgar Lungu’s attempt to rewrite constitutional rules for self-preservation. We are now seeing the togetherness against Hichilema’s own attempt to rewrite constitutional rules for self-preservation. Much credit must go to the Oasis Forum who have been at the forefront of this principled defence of the Constitution and our democracy from executive-driven murderous attacks. In opposition, Hichilema praised the Oasis Forum as a consistent defender of public interest whenever they questioned the excesses of his predecessors. Today, the same person finds no shame in denouncing the Oasis Forum as people who just “hate” him and are seeking “regime change” when they question his leadership actions or hold him to account.

It is hard to understand and almost impossible to explain what has happened to the more sane Hichilema we had in opposition. The current one, who openly takes pride in blocking the Oasis Forum from exercising their constitutional right to peaceful assembly by demonstrating against his proposed changes to Zambia’s Constitution, looks like a cloned version of the one we had before the last general election. I must commend the Oasis Forum for calling his bluff on dialogue by agreeing to meet Hichilema at State House where they asked him in person to abandon the divisive changes he is trying to make to the Constitution. I know that Hichilema, ever intransigent, will proceed with his plans. He has repeatedly shown that he is not one to back down from his position even when he is clearly in the wrong.

In fact, the real reason why Hichilema met the Oasis Forum was not to listen to what they had to say with a view to changing his mind; it was to try and see if he could persuade the civic body into buying his position on constitutional reform. After all, the Forum represents the most organised and serious opposition to Hichilema’s plans to rewrite constitutional rules for his benefit. If he could compromise it, then he would have succeeded in creating legitimacy around his self-serving constitutional changes. Fortunately for Zambia, the men and women in the Oasis Forum are not for hire. They are forthright and upstanding Zambians who will never betray public interest.

The self-interested changes that Hichilema is desperate to make to the Constitution constitute the first step to establishing a de facto one-party state. The next step would involve making further changes to the national law after the 2026 election. If Hichilema succeeds with the first step, we would have allowed him to dig our collective grave and bury all of us alive. If he is not stopped in his tracks, I can predict that there will come a time in future when, following the country’s epic collapse including the total destruction of its democratic institutions, we will look back with regret at key moments where we could have halted his march to a constitutional dictatorship.

Now is the time to stop Hichilema before it is too late and in a manner that is less painful to everyone involved. The judiciary, though seemingly compromised, has one final opportunity to stop him. The National Assembly, though seemingly compromised, has one final opportunity to stop him. It is no exaggeration to say that the future of Zambia lies in the hands of these two sites of power or institutions. Should the judges and the MPs abdicate their responsibility to protect the constitutional order, they would have succeeded in laying the foundation for what, I fear, might come next.

Source: https://x.com/ssishuwa/status/1995058453920821453?s=20

WHAT THE S&P UPGRADE MEANS FOR “ORDINARY” ZAMBIANS

By Mark Simuuwe, UPND Media Director

When global ratings agency S&P Global announced an upgrade of Zambia’s credit rating from Selective Default (SD) to CCC+, the news made headlines across financial circles. But for many citizens, one question remained:

UNDERSTANDING THE RATING: FROM SELECTIVE DEFAULT (SD) TO CCC+

What is Selective Default (SD)?

Selective Default means a country failed to pay some of its debts, even if it continued paying others. For Zambia, this happened in 2020, when the government missed the US$42.5 million Eurobond interest payment.

Being in SD means:

• The country is considered unreliable in honouring its obligations.
• It loses access to affordable borrowing.
• Investors and lenders avoid the country.
• It signals a severe financial crisis.

In simple terms: SD means “Your finances collapsed, and you failed to pay your debts.”

What does a CCC+ rating mean?

CCC+ is still a low rating, but a major improvement from default.

It means:

• The country is no longer in default.
• Debt payments are being made or restructured.
• Investors view the economy as fragile but improving.
• There is a real possibility of recovery if reforms continue.

In simple terms: CCC+ means “You were in deep trouble, but now you’re stabilising and slowly rebuilding credibility.”

Why is the move from SD to CCC+ important?

This upgrade shows the world that:

✔ Zambia is no longer in debt crisis mode
The country is honouring its obligations or has reached agreements with creditors.
✔ Confidence is being restored
Investors, banks, and development partners see Zambia as more trustworthy.
✔ Borrowing costs can start to fall
A better rating means cheaper financing for government and businesses.
✔ It unlocks economic activity
More investment → more jobs → better stability → gradual relief for cost of living.
✔ It reflects successful reforms

Transparency, fiscal discipline, and debt restructuring are working.
In everyday language

SD → CCC+ means: “You were written off as financially collapsed. Now the world recognises that you’ve stood back up, stabilised your books, and are moving in the right direction, but you still need discipline to stay on track.”

“HOW DOES THIS AFFECT ME, MY FAMILY, MY BUSINESS, OR MY COST OF LIVING?”

To answer this, we turn to the reflections of a man who has witnessed Zambia’s economic journey across multiple eras, Dr Situmbeko Musokotwane, Minister of Finance and National Planning, whose decades in public service stretch from the hopeful years of the 2000s, through the turbulence of the past decade, to today’s gradual recovery.

FROM STABILITY TO CRISIS: HOW ZAMBIA WAS KNOCKED OFF COURSE

Between 2015 and 2021, Zambia’s debt trajectory shifted dangerously.

Key governance and fiscal warning signs included:

• Loans contracted without full Ministry of Finance assessments
• Limited parliamentary oversight on major borrowings
• Poor tracking of state-owned enterprise (SOE) debt
• Expensive commercial loans replacing concessional financing
• Growing fiscal deficits without a stabilising IMF framework

The crisis peaked in 2020, when Zambia failed to honour a US$42.5 million Eurobond interest payment, plunging the nation into official default for the first time in its history.

The consequences were severe: rising prices, investor flight, collapsing confidence, and a shrinking economic space for ordinary people and businesses.

THE TURNING POINT: REFORMS AFTER 2021

The post-2021 period marked a deliberate shift toward restoration and rebuilding.

Reforms included:

1. Transparency in debt reporting
2. Fiscal discipline across ministries
3. Cleanup of incorrect and hidden debt figures
4. Adoption of an IMF-supported economic programme
5. Comprehensive debt restructuring negotiations
6. Passage of the Public Debt Management Act (2022) ensuring all loans require justification and parliamentary approval

These steps, though technical and sometimes painful, rebuilt Zambia’s financial credibility inch by inch.

The result is what the world is now acknowledging: Zambia is no longer in default territory, and its credit rating has been upgraded.

WHAT THE S&P UPGRADE MEANS FOR ORDINARY CITIZENS

Many citizens ask: “How does this rating change help me when the cost of living is still high?”

The answer lies in how ratings affect national borrowing and economic conditions.

1. CHEAPER FINANCING FOR PUBLIC SERVICES

A better rating reduces the cost of borrowing for government, freeing up resources for:

• roads and bridges
• clinics and hospitals
• schools
• energy expansion
• water and sanitation infrastructure

2. INVESTOR CONFIDENCE RETURNS

A country perceived as stable attracts more investments, which means:

• more mines expanding operations
• more tourism investments
• more agricultural and agro-processing opportunities
• new factories and service industries

3. A MORE PREDICTABLE COST OF LIVING

Economic predictability helps stabilise the Kwacha, inflation, and commodity prices, making life less volatile for households.

4. JOB CREATION ACROSS SECTORS

As investments rise, employment opportunities grow, especially in:

• manufacturing
• construction
• transport and logistics
• hospitality
• small and medium enterprises (SMEs)

In short, the upgrade doesn’t solve everything overnight, but it moves Zambia onto the path where solutions become possible.

WHY THIS MOMENT INSPIRES HOPE

Having served during both strong and turbulent economic periods, Dr Musokotwane emphasises that Zambia today is not relying on luck but on intentional, disciplined policy choices supported by:

• Rigorous debt management
• Parliamentary oversight
• Disciplined state-owned enterprises
• Transparent quarterly debt disclosures
• Predictable economic policies
• A national resolve to avoid repeating past fiscal mistakes

These are the building blocks underpinning S&P’s renewed confidence in Zambia.

BUT PROGRESS IS FRAGILE — DISCIPLINE MUST CONTINUE

Economic recovery is delicate. Only sustained discipline can protect Zambia from falling back into past pitfalls.

The country must continue avoiding:

• Unauthorized borrowing
• Opaque contracts
• Excessive government spending
• Undisclosed guarantees
• Poorly managed SOEs
• Weak procurement practices

The guardrails put in place since 2022 must be safeguarded to maintain stability and progress.

WHAT COMES NEXT FOR ZAMBIA

If Zambia maintains its current trajectory, the benefits will continue to extend to ordinary people. Expected outcomes include:

• Stabilising cost of living
• Productivity gains in energy and agriculture
• Expansion of private-sector investment
• Growth in SMEs and job-creating industries
• Better prospects for millions of young Zambians

Zambia has travelled through one of the most challenging valleys in its economic history. The S&P upgrade is a signal that the climb back toward stability and opportunity is not only underway, it is gaining recognition from the world.

A CALL TO PROTECT THE PROGRESS

As Dr Musokotwane reminds the nation, this is a moment for cautious optimism. Zambia is rising again, not by accident, but through discipline, transparency, and responsible governance.

Better days are possible. But they require every stakeholder, citizens, institutions, government, and the private sector, to guard the progress made and ensure the nation never returns to the mistakes of the past.

(C) UPND Media Team
For National Information and Public Engagement.

UPND Zambia